

1 Q. **Reference: 2025 Capital Budget Application, Project 6, Replace Interconnect Microwave**  
2 **Radios (2025), page 2, lines 2 to 5.**

3 a) Please confirm whether system communications between Muskrat Falls, Soldier’s Pond  
4 and the Newfoundland and Labrador System Operator’s Energy Control Centre (“ECC”)  
5 will be interrupted in the event of an Optical Ground Wire (“OPGW”) failure on the  
6 Labrador-Island Link (“LIL”).

7 b) Please provide details of the communications system redundancy and/or backup.

8 c) Will ECC monitoring and control of devices at the Muskrat Falls facility be impacted by  
9 an OPGW failure and reliance on the backup system?

10 d) Will protection schemes, including but not limited to automated roll back of exports  
11 over the Maritime Link, be affected by an OPGW failure and reliance on the backup  
12 system?

13 e) Are there any operating limits, constraints or special operating procedures for the LIL in  
14 the event of an OPGW failure?

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17 A. a) The section of the Labrador-Island Link (“LIL”) optical ground wire (“OPGW”) fibre being  
18 utilized for this project is between Sunnyside Terminal Station (“SSD TS”) and Stony Brook  
19 Terminal Station (“STB TS”) on the Island. For this project, a new optical transport system  
20 will be installed to connect the east and west coast microwave systems, and will not share  
21 any optical transport equipment with the LIL. While fibres within the same LIL OPGW cable  
22 will be used, in the event of an OPGW cable failure in the SSD TS to STB TS section of the LIL  
23 OPGW, the microwave interconnect circuits will have redundancy through the TL267 OPGW  
24 into Bay d’Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Station. In the case of a failure on one of the  
25 redundant communications paths, traffic will be routed over the alternate path. For  
26 additional details on the risk of use of the LIL OPGW to provide connectivity, please refer to  
27 Newfoundland and Labrador’s response to PUB-NLH-059 of this proceeding.

- 1           **b)** For security reasons, details on redundancy and/or backup systems cannot be provided.
- 2           **c)** SCADA<sup>1</sup> monitoring and controls for Muskrat Falls will revert to the redundant path in the  
3           event of an OPGW failure.
- 4           **d)** In the case of a failure on one of the redundant communications paths, traffic will be routed  
5           over the alternate path.
- 6           **e)** Operating instructions were created and will be followed by the Independent System  
7           Operator depending on system conditions at that time.

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<sup>1</sup> Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”).