

NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

120 Torbay Road, PO Box 21040, St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, A1A 5B2

Transcript of the Phase One Hearing

The Board's investigation and hearing into supply issues and power outages on the Island
Interconnected system

March 30, 2015

Present for the Board:

Andy Wells, Chair and Chief Executive Officer Darlene Whalen, P. Eng. Vice Chair Dwanda Newman, LLB, Commissioner James Oxford, Commissioner

Present on behalf of the Board:

Maureen Greene, Q.C., Hearing Counsel Jacqueline Glynn, Board Counsel Cheryl Blundon, Board Secretary

Present for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro:

Geoff Young, Counsel for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro David MacDougall, Counsel for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Rob Henderson, Vice-President, Hydro Dawn Dalley, Vice-President, Corporation Relations and Customer Service Paul Humphries, Vice-President, System Operations and Planning

Present for Newfoundland Power:

Ian Kelly, Counsel for Newfoundland Power Gerard Hayes, Counsel for Newfoundland Power Gary Smith, President and CEO Gary Murray, Vice President, Engineering and Operations

Present for the Intervenors:

Thomas Johnson, Consumer Advocate Paul L. Coxworthy on behalf of the Island Industrial Customers Danny Dumaresque and Mr. William Kennedy Roberta Benefiel, on behalf of Grand Riverkeeper Labrador, Inc.

Persons/Parties making Public Presentations:

Dwight Ball, Liberal party, Leader of the Official Opposition Keith Morgan, Browne Fitzgerald Morgan & Avis, on behalf of Nu-Quest Distribution Inc.

March 30, 2015	Mulu-Page	verbaum Court Reporters
1	Page 1	Page 3
1 CHAIR:	1	representing Grand Riverkeeper Labrador.
2 Q. Good morning, everyone. For the record, I'm	2 CHA	
3 Andy Wells, Chairman of these proceedings, and	1 3 C	Okay, thank you. Board staff present are
4 on my left is Vice-Chairman Darlene Whalen, or	1 4	Cheryl Blundon, our Board Secretary; Jacqui
5 my right are Commissioners Jim Oxford and	5	Glynn, legal counsel; Maureen Greene, Board
6 Commissioner Dwanda Newman. In January of	of 6	Hearing Counsel, and Sam Banfield, our
7 2014, the Board commenced an investigation and	d 7	Engineering Consultant. The Board's
8 a hearing into the supply issues and power	8	investigation is being undertaken in two
9 outages that were experienced on the Island	9	phases. Phase One concerns the adequacy and
Interconnected System in late December, 2013,	10	reliability of supply on the Island
and going into early January, 2014. The	11	Interconnected System up to the
parties to the investigation are, of course,	12	interconnection with Muskrat Falls, and Phase
13 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and	13	Two relates to the same issues, adequacy and
14 Newfoundland Power. The Intervenors are the	14	reliability of supply after the Muskrat Falls
15 Consumer Advocate, the Island Industrial	15	interconnection. The Board is continuing its
16 Customers consisting of Corner Brook Pulp and	16	work on Phase Two, which includes ongoing
Paper, and North Atlantic Refining, and Teck	17	investigation by the Board's consultant,
18 Resources. We have two further Intervenors,	18	Liberty Consulting Group, as well as the
19 Mr. Danny Dumaresque and the Grand River	19	intervenors and their consultants. It's
20 Labrador Incorporated, and I don't have the	20	expected that reports on Phase Two, including
21 name of the individual from the Grand River	21	a report from Liberty, will be filed later on
here. Anyway, we'll ask the parties to	22	this year. Today's hearing is part of the
23 identify themselves. I guess, we'll do it	23	Board's process for Phase One. As I said, to
24 right now. So first, Newfoundland Hydro, I	24	assist with your investigation, we engaged the
25 guess.	25	services of Liberty. Their initial work
1	Page 2	Page 4
1 MR. MACDOUGALL:	1	focused on the outage causes and actions that
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Chair and Commissioners,	2	should be taken by Hydro and Newfoundland
3 David MacDougall, external counsel for	3	Power to reduce the risk of further outages
4 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro. I'm joined	4	for the winter. Liberty's interim report was
5 today with my colleague, Jennifer Grey, and	5	released on April 24th, 2014, providing
6 with Geoff Young, in-house counsel at Hydro,	6	preliminary conclusions and recommendations
7 and we will have a witness panel and I will	7	relating to adequacy and reliability of supply
8 introduce them when they're put forward.	8	on the Island Interconnected System. The
9 KELLY, Q.C.:	9	Board's interim report was issued on May 15th,
10 Q. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Commissione	rs, 10	2014. It set out the Board's initial findings
11 Ian Kelly, and with me Gerard Hayes for	11	about the causes of the January, 2014 outages
12 Newfoundland Power.	12	and identified the key priority items that
13 CHAIR:	13	should be undertaken to address winter
14 Q. And our intervenors, Industrial Customers?	14	readiness in advance of the interconnection
15 MR. COXWORTHY:	15	with Muskrat Falls. This investigation
16 Q. Paul Coxworthy for the Island Industrial	16	continued throughout 2014 as the Board with
17 Customers, Mr. Chair.	17	the assistance of its consultants, monitored
18 MR. JOHNSON:	18	utilities progress in relation to the required
19 Q. Chairman and Commissioners, Tom Johnson,	. 19	key actions. In December, 2014, the Board
20 Consumer Advocate in these proceedings.	20	received the Phase One final report of the
21 MR. DUMARESQUE:	21	Liberty Consulting Group relating to
22 Q. Mr. Chairman, Danny Dumaresque, along with M		Newfoundland and Labrador Power - Newfoundland
23 Bill Kennedy, my legal advisor.	23	and Labrador Hydro and Newfoundland Power.
24 MS. FRAMPTON:	24	Both utilities filed reports, responses to
25 Q. And Roberta Frampton Benefiel. I'm	25	Liberty's reports, in January, 2015. The

March	30, 2015 Mul	ti-Page	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 5	5	Page 7
1	intervenors advised that they did not wish to	1	examination, the intervenors will be given an
2	file additional expert evidence, but were	2	opportunity to pose questions to the utility
3	provided the opportunity to ask questions in	3	representatives. We'll hear from Newfoundland
4	relation to the reports, and, of course, all	4	Hydro first, followed by questions, if any,
5	reports and documentations are available on	5	from Newfoundland Power, Mr. Dumaresque, the
6	the Board's web page. The Board published	6	Consumer Advocate, the Industrial Customers,
7	notices of today's hearing inviting	7	Grand Riverkeeper, and then that will be
8	participation and received two requests to	8	followed by Newfoundland Power, with the same
9	make presentations setting out the specific	9	lineup with respect to questioning. At the
10	areas to be addressed. I believe that these	10	conclusions of the presentations and
11	presenters are here today. I see Mr. Ball,	11	questioning a date for written submissions
12	and I understand Keith Morgan of Nu-Quest	12	from the parties and the intervenors will be
13	Distribution is also here as well. Before I	13	set. If there are any other persons present
14	ask the intervenors to proceed, I think I	14	who have questions or comments following
15	should just clarify for the assembly here	15	today's presentation, they may be put to the
16	today that our electrical system consists of	16	Board in writing immediately following. The
17	generation assets, transmission assets, and	17	Board's Secretary can assist you with this,
18	distribution assets. Generation and	18	and as I say, please see her before you leave.
19	transmission are primarily, but not solely,	19	I note that April 7th, 2015, has been set as
20	the responsibility of Newfoundland Hydro.	20	the last date for the filing of written
21	Distribution is primarily, but not solely, the	21	submissions from the public. The Board will
22	responsibility of Newfoundland Power, and, in	22	consider all the information and issue its
23	fact, one can say for the sake of simplicity,	23	final report on Phase One. The Board has
24	and not being inaccurate, that Newfoundland	24	determined that certain costs related to the
25	Power is the primary customer of Newfoundland	25	outage will be subject to a separate
	Page (5	Page 8
1	Hydro, and the records of our proceedings to	1	proceeding in the fall. I also would like to
2	date shows that the Board has found no	2	emphasize for the sake of the record that the
3	significant issues with respect to	3	events which occurred on March 4th, 2015, will
4	distribution, the distribution system,	4	not be addressed in this hearing or the
5	Newfoundland Power. The issues we are	5	Board's Phase One Report. We are in the
6	addressing arise primarily almost completely	6	process of gathering information from both
7	from generation issues and transmissions	7	utilities on the system events of that day,
8	issues which are solely the responsibility of	8	and the Board has not yet received a report
9	Newfoundland Hydro. So, we're going to have	9	from Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in
10	the two intervenors first, and if there are	10	relation to these events. Unless the Board's
11	other members of the public who wish to speak,	11	investigation is complete, it would be
12	by all means please make yourself known to our	12	premature to address the March 4th, 2015
13	Board Secretary. Following the two	13	events. In terms of timing for today's
14	presentations by Mr. Ball and Mr. Morgan,	14	proceedings, we're scheduled to set if it
15	Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and	15	necessary until 2 o'clock. We'll take a short
16	Newfoundland Power will make a presentation,	16	break at the appropriate time, which I guess
17	and we've asked both parties to address the	17	I'll decide. So let us move to the agenda.
18	specific issues raised by the presenters. In	18	Where is my agenda? Here we go. Papers
19	addition, Mr. Dumaresque has indicated he'd	19	everywhere. I would ask for public
20	like to question Newfoundland and Labrador	20	presentations, and Mr. Ball, if you would come
21	Hydro with respect to three areas of interest,	21	forward. Mr. Ball, of course, is leader of
22	and the Board has advised Hydro to address	22	the Official Opposition and he's indicated he
23	these issues in its presentation. Other	23	wishes to speak for ten minutes.
24	intervenors have indicated that based on the	24 MR.	-
25	record they did not wish to conduct a cross-		. Good morning, and first of all, thank you for
L		1 2	6,, j 0 0 1 0 1

Page 11

Page 12

Page 9 the opportunity to present to the Public Utilities Board this morning. Mr. Chair and Commissioners, what brings me here today is to elaborate on the complaint that the Official Opposition filed with the PUB in January, 2014, following what became widely known as DarkNL. Of course, this was a series of widespread controlled and uncontrolled power outages that left many people in the province without power.

Our complaint at the time centred around Newfoundland and Labrador's Hydro failure to provide adequate, reliable, and reasonable service as envisioned in Section 37 of the Public Utilities Act. Given the series of failures in equipment, operations, and communications at Hydro, we believe that this hearing is crucial particularly given the public's exclusion in the lead up to the outages. The public ought to have an official forum to voice their concerns.

We also believe the PUB is the proper forum for this investigation, given the Board's mandate includes the regulation of electricity utilities in the province to failing to practice open communication.

With multiple generation units out of service and a cold snap and winter storm on the way, Hydro was particularly vulnerable to any equipment or operations issues that could and, in fact, did arise, and Liberty, of course, pointed this out. The number, nature, and short timeframe of these failures brought into question Hydro's practices for equipment, operation, and maintenance. It is our belief that failures extended beyond equipment and operations to communications. Hydro should have engaged the public much earlier with concrete ways to conserve energy in an effort to prevent or at least mitigate power outages. Hydro should have simultaneously communicated the need to prepare for the possibility of extended power outages. Instead what we had were residents just getting two hours to prepare to gather supplies for coming outages, such as food, water, generations, gasoline to even power them, flashlights, batteries and the like; basic needs.

In a province where hundreds of communities live with boil orders, where many

Page 10

ensure safe and reliable service. The powers of the Public Utilities Board are enshrined in the Public Utilities Act and its accompanying regulations. The PUB is an esteemed administrative tribunal that has served this province well at least since 1949.

So I can clearly say the Official Opposition has every confidence in the PUB and we commend the PUB for the work it has done and continues to do on behalf of the rate payers in the province. Further, we commend the PUB on commissioning Liberty Consulting Group to provide an objective analysis of the January, 2014, outages, and it is our contention that the outages of 2014 were the result of failures in equipment, operations, leadership, and communications. So the focus of this submission today is Hydro's failure to communicate.

The PUB is mandated to ensure Hydro provides safe and reliable service. Hydro's service was neither safe nor reliable leading up to or during the events of January 2nd to the 8th, 2014. Hydro failed to engage the public in the days leading up to January 2nd,

of the island's residents live in rural and remote communities, and would likely have to arrange travel to obtain supplies in bulk, two hours notice is inadequate. Persons with disabilities in our province may require certain supports during such an emergency, and many businesses were also impacted by lost revenue and lost product. It is incumbent on us to reflect on how the failure to

communicate impacted people differently. Giving residents only two hours notice to conserve energy was just not a practical solution. Hydro's handing of the 2014 power outages demonstrated a gross failure to communicate, and this failure to communicate

is what created the crisis. So what is the crisis or was it a crisis?

So while Government refused to utter the word, we had 190,000 customers without power, and Liberty pointed out that Hydro lacked a customer service strategy at the time, and while the Public Utility has since developed a customer service strategy road map, Liberty emphasized a need to commit the funding necessary to successfully implement such a

Page 9 - Page 12

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		Page 13		Page 15
1	plan. The coined phrase, "DarkNL" served as	1		three minutes before tweeting about problems
2	more than a brand for the fallout of Hydro's	2		at two units in Holyrood. Hydro attributed
3	failure to manage and mitigate the widespread	3		those outages in March to the combination of
4	electricity outages. It actually filled a	4		three factors which all related to equipment
5	void by creating a forum for the public to	5		failures and some that were known to them for
6	communicate with one another and to speculate	6		days. Tens of thousands of residents
7	in the absence of a reliable and advanced	7		experienced power outages that morning, and
8	communication from Hydro. On January 9th,	8		even before the notification was issued
9	2014, Hydro publicly apologized to the	9		children were on school buses enroute to
10	province through local media. It seemed Hydro	10		classes when Hydro finally issued a Level 3
11	had learned a lesson around open and	11		notification, and this delay in notification
12	transparent communications from DarkNL when	in 12		had safety implications on these children and
13	2014 the Public Utility committed to a new	13		parents were left in limbo, already gone to
14	colour coded advanced notification protocol to	14		work, and bus drivers were left to navigate
15	alert residents of a potential power shortage.	15		flashing traffic lights. Despite
16	The protocol was a recommendation coming ou	ıt 16		acknowledging the contributing factors to the
17	of Liberty's interim report and the Chair made	17		outages that morning, Hydro did not utilize
18	mention of that in April of 2014.	18		the advance notification protocol effectively.
19	The protocol was meant to keep the public	19		So less than three months after announcing the
20	better informed about supply issues so	20		protocol Hydro was clearly not following it.
21	residents can prepare for potential outages	21		So while Hydro has indicated it will
22	and conserve energy to prevent or at least	22		investigate these events surrounding the March
23	mitigate outages. It involves three levels of	23		4th, 2015, power outages, it is our belief
24	notification; power watch, power warning, and	24		that internal investigation is insufficient.
25	power emergency. Power watch, the first	25		In conclusion, fourteen months have
		Page 14		Page 16
	level, notifies the public that energy demand	_		passed since the 2014 blackouts highlighted
2	is approaching the system's capacity, but			Hydro's failure to provide adequate and
3	requires no immediate action from the publ			reliable and reasonable service as legislated.
4	Level 1 is symbolized by a green plug. Lev			So what is particularly troubling today in
5	2 or power warning notifies the public that	I		this hearing being further contextualized by
6	energy levels are approaching maximum de			the power outages of March 4th, 2015, Hydro's
7	and this warning asks the public to conserv			failures in equipment, operations, leadership,
8	energy and prepare for the possibility of			and communications were just not isolated to
9	outages, and Level 2 is symbolized color			DarkNL, the failures continue. 2015 marks the
10	coded by an orange exclamation point. Le	I		third consecutive year that rate payers have
11	3, or power emergency, reiterates the need to			experienced such significant power outages.
12	conserve power and notifies customers th			And the final report of Liberty Consulting
13	rotating outages are coming. Level 3 also			Group cautioned, even with the installation of
14	stresses the importance of safety when	14		the new combustion turbine, the new capacity
15	considering alternate sources of power duri			assistance arrangements with certain
16	these outages. Level 3, that's the red	16 16		industrial customers, generation reserves are
17	flashlight.	17		very low and the risk of outages remains high
	:15 a.m.)	18		for the 2015 to 2017 winter seasons.
19	This was Hydro's communication respons			Electricity is an essential service. As
20	from the lessons learned from the January			Newfoundlanders and Labradorians we live in
21	2014, power outages, but what we do know			one of the harshest climates in the world, and
22	even as in March of 2015, Hydro bypass			while we cannot control the weather, and while
23	Levels 1 and 2 of their advance notification			equipment is bound to fail from time to time,
24	protocol and issuing a Level 3 emergence			how the public utility like Newfoundland and
25	notification at 7:56 A.M. and this was just	•		Labrador Hydro communicates with the public
	10 1110 attori at 7.50 11.171. and tino was just	23		zaciasof iljero communicates with the public

Page 19

Page 17 and manages such crisis as DarkNL is within their control. The public ought to be valued as a partner in working together with these challenging times.

Unreliable service, poor communications,

Unreliable service, poor communications, and inadequate planning for winter service is inexcusable. The implementation of the recommendations from the Liberty Report requires close monitoring by the Public Utilities Board, and we have full faith in your ability to do just that.

On behalf of the Official Opposition, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity this morning to present and we look forward to the findings from Phase One, as well as the ongoing work that are being completed on Phase Two, the reliability issues that you mentioned earlier, Mr. Chair, on the Muskrat Falls post Muskrat Falls interconnection. So thank you very much.

21 CHAIR:

Q. Thank you, sir. Next we have Mr. Keith
 Morgan, Nu-Quest Distribution.

24 MR. MORGAN:

Q. Good morning. Thank you very much for the

Newfoundland Power in the distribution of power. They're also concerned about the accountability of both Newfoundland Hydro and Newfoundland Power relating to the management of the system. As with the comments of the Official Opposition, they are concerned with respect to how it has been managed over time, and how we got to this point, and, obviously, that has led to their interest in these proceedings.

From my own perspective, a legal one, obviously I've looked at - tried to come to what the duty was for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro as well as Newfoundland Power in trying to organize my thoughts and my presentation to you here today, and I've provided you with some materials outlining what I believe as to the duty that's there for the utilities in relation to the operation of the system. In that regard, I've provided you with an excerpt of the Electrical Power Control Act, and in particular, Section 3 of that particular legislation, 3(a)(1) and 3(b)(2), and 3, that all sources and facilities for the production, transmission,

Page 18

opportunity to present to the Board on behalf of my client, Nu-Quest Distribution Inc. I guess, one of the questions is who is Nu-Quest and I can indicate that they're just a small pharmaceutical wholesaler basically distributing throughout Newfoundland and Labrador. They have about ten employees and basically are Newfoundland owned and operated, and obviously take a very keen interest in the events that are occurring here today, and that's why they have me here.

What are their concerns? They are

What are their concerns? They are concerned about the future supply of power. Obviously, their business depends upon a reliable supply of power to their facility in order to be able to maintain critical care drugs, cancer drugs, and other drugs that are needed for treatment of patients, and regulation of temperature is critical in those particular products and they need to have a reliable supply of power for that. They are concerned regarding the process that occurred in relation to the regulation of the power failure that occurred in these events that led to this inquiry, and how that was regulated by

Page 20 and distribution of power in the province

should be managed and operated in a manner that will result in consumers in the province having equitable access to an adequate supply of power, and (3), that would result in power being delivered to consumers in the province at the lowest possible cost, consistent with reliable service. So this is, I guess, a codification of the requirement that they're equitable access, but also they're to be reliable. That's a statutory requirement as held out in the Electrical Power Control Act. This is also followed up in the various documentary materials that I've supplied to you. There is an excerpt from McGill Law Journal. This is relating to telecommunications, but it also speaks generally to the issues with respect to the obligation to the common law duty that's there associated with the obligation for the utility and I found - it's an old case, it's one that's from the Supreme Court of Canada back

in 1893, but it's quoted at page three of that

excerpt, and it indicates and the Chief

Justice basically delivering a majority

Page 23

	Page 21		Page 2
1	judgment said in relation to the water	1	Lastly, I've cited the case here or given
2	distribution, but it's akin to power	2	you the case of Nova Scotia Power and Caliper.
3	distribution as well, "The water company's	3	This is dealing with the issue of notice, and
4	statutory duty to supply meant that it was not	4	the issue here - this is a Court of Appeal
5	a mere commercial vendor of a commodity, but a	5	decision from Nova Scotia. This is a
6	public body intrusted with the management of	6	situation where they were going to cut the
7	the water for the benefit of the whole of the	7	power for a particular user. The user said,
8	inhabitants, a status which compelled them to	8	yes, as long as it's not too cold because I
9	supply this element necessary, not merely for	9	could have a freeze up in my water pipes if it
10	the private purposes and uses of individuals,	10	gets too cold. So they said, that's fine, but
11	but indispensable for the preservation of the	11	they cut the power anyway even though there
12	public health and the general salubrity of the	12	was extreme cold at the time, and as a result
13	city". He went on to say, "The city is, in a	13	the person did have freezing in their pipes
14	sense, a trustee of the water works, not for	14	and there were damages and they sued, and they
15	the body of rate payers exclusively, but for	15	were successful. That was upheld by the Court
16	the benefit of the general public or at least	16	of Appeal. So again there's a concrete
17	of that portion of the residents in the city".	17	instance in which the negligence of the
18	Again I put this - I've read this specifically	18	utility in the application of its own
19	to the Board because it makes the relationship	19	protocols resulted in liability for the
20	here between Newfoundland Power and	20	utility overall to the public. In this
21	Newfoundland Hydro akin to a trustee of these	21	particular case, we've already had the Liberty
22	resources for the benefit of the province. It	22	Mutual (sic.) Report and the Executive Summary
23	holds them to a very high standard, I would	23	that provided an explanation as to why, or
24	submit. I think that that's what has to be	24	least attempted to give an explanation as to
25	measured now by the PUB in making their	25	why this happened, and in my - I guess, if
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findings in relation to how the system is 1 2 managed and is to be managed. I guess, that's 3 where we are approaching this at this stage, and that particular type of analysis was also 4 5 in the case that I supplied to you with Hunt and West Bank, this is a water supply system 6 7 case, but it did in that case - this was in 8 the water distribution situation. 9 Paragraph 66, it says, "It must be borne in mind that the availability of the substance of 10 11 the Defendant is bound to distribute something 12 over which it has little control and the rate 13 of supply of the system through rainfall, etc, is not reasonably foreseeable with any degree 14 15 of precision. All the Defendant can do is distribute the water fairly and reasonably to 16 the users". This it did in this particular 17 case. However, in this case, we've got the 18 supply of power that is the issue and the 19 supply of power is something that is 20 21 foreseeable and it can be done with a degree 22 of precision. The question is whether that was done in this case, and has been done, and 23 will continue to be done within the province. 24 25 (10:30 a.m.)

Page 24 you're looking at page one of the summary, it says that there were two different sets of causes; the insufficiency of generating resources to meet customer demands, and issues with operation of key transmission system equipment. It then goes on in the second page of the Executive Summary to say that there was issues with respect to the failure to complete planned outage work needed to ensure the availability of a full range of generating facilities, needs to plan its resources to meet more severe weather than it assumed to date, needed to review the planning criteria Hydro has long used, adding new generation capacity. These things are all things that were clearly within the control of Newfoundland Hydro in assessing their own system, and even though it's not specifically said, this is a failure and it's a negligent operation and management of the system. This is what is of concern, obviously, to my client, that the system that they're critically relying upon is being negligently maintained and operated and planned for. That's what's being found in the Mutual

		Page 25			Page 27
1	Report. So the question coming	8	1	Avalon lost it regularly.	- 1.81 - 1
2	from the authorities that I've		2	There's also an indication that	
3	put forward, and I would		3	60 percent of the overall	
4	suggest is the law and it's		4	feeders that were there on the	
5	codified in the Electrical		5	Avalon are automatic as opposed	
6	Power Control Act, is did		6	to 40 percent being manual and	
7	Newfoundland Light and Power		7	that the automatic ones were	
8	and Newfoundland and Labrador		8	shut down more frequently than	
9	Hydro treat customers fairly		9	those who were on manual	
10	and reasonably on rotating and		10	because it was more accessible	
11	unplanned outages. That's the		11	than the manual shutdowns. We	
12	question that we are concerned		12	also know that there were	
13	with, and obviously it's only		13	critical customers that were	
14	an element of what you are		14	there and that were excluded	
15	determining as a Board, but		15	from the consideration, and the	
16	it's one that's critically of		16	evidence or the indication that	
17	concern to my client, and the		17	we have is that there's 57 of	
18	first issue is, were the		18	the feeders, now they're all	
19	customers treated fairly. In		19	located on the Avalon, but	
20	this regard, there's a number		20	those 57 feeders were all	
21	of different pieces of		21	excluded. We get to a	
22	information that we've received		22	situation where, I'd suggest,	
23	in relation to the feeder		23	that we've got a funnel, that	
24	selection. This is the actual		24	everything - the obvious ones	
25	outlets that are providing the		25	are being knocked off, so then	
		Page 26			Page 28
1	power to the various areas of		1	you've got a very few number of	
2	this city as well as throughout		2	feeders that are bearing the	
3	the province. We know from the		3	brunt of all the outages that	
4	interim report at page 20 that		4	are occurring to be able to	
5	the large feeders were		5	deal with this problem as	
6	specifically excluded from the		6	created by Newfoundland and	
7	power outages, the rotations		7	Labrador Hydro in the	
8	that were there as far as who		8	maintenance of its system, and	
9	was going to receive power and		9	that's not fair.	
10	who wasn't. We also know that		10	So if we look at the process that they	
11	the Avalon Peninsula bore the		11	used in the load shedding, it also is	
12	brunt of the load shedding, and		12	indicative of the fact that they used a	
13	that's from the Newfoundland		13	situation where it was all small feeders that	at
14	Power response to inquiries for		14	were used to reduce the overall load that v	vas
15	number 22 at note 7. It		15	required because they did it incrementally	, so
16	indicates that there is 160		16	that it was a systemic type of discrimination	on
17	feeders that were on the Avalon		17	on the rate users. If the load was getting	
18	and it bore the brunt of the		18	critical, they'd knock off another feeder, a	nd
19	outages, and I think		19	that's the process. They're not knocking of	off
20	anecdotally, everybody knows		20	large feeders, and they were specifically	У
21	that has communication with		21	excluded, anyways, so then you have sr	nall
22	people that are outside of the		22	feeders that are all being incrementally	
23	Avalon, that they may have lost		23	knocked off, so anyone that has any great	deal
24	their power once, if at all,		24	of load is going to be maintained, but the	e
25	but the people that are on the		25	ones with the small are going to bear the	e

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brunt, and I would submit that its not in accordance with their obligation that's there to distribute the power fairly to all customers.

So that's of concern to my client. They're also concerned with respect to these critical customers. There's a critical customer list that we've become aware of. This is something that until this event occurred we had no knowledge of, but the thing about the critical customer list and it's there as indicated in what material has been filed, that those critical customers are selected, determined, and maintained exclusively and solely by Newfoundland Light and Power. Nobody else has any input into it, nobody has any involvement with it. It's there sole and exclusive preserve to determine who is going to be critical, and why is that an issue; because those critical customers are the ones that are going to be preserved on the power if there's power available, and they're going to be the first ones reconnected if the power is out. We would again submit that that's not fair. It shouldn't be this

have a peak that reaches this particular level, they will be knocked off, this is the list of numbers that are going to be knocked off over the next 24 hours potentially. If you don't lose your power, nobody is going to be worried about it, but if you lose your power, well, then you know that you're going to lose your power and you can prepare for it. The suggestion that we're going to reduce the number of people in order to forecast it, and then we're obligated to knock people off the system, it makes no sense. So if it doesn't make any sense, why, in fact, did they do

this. I don't know. I don't know the answer

industrial customers who are on large feeders

to that question, but I do know that their

public question. Now we have no public

notice, we have no accountability to the

knocked off, and it's put on the guise that

that are excluded. It doesn't accord with

to do is give notification that these

public as to what and who are going to be

that reduces the number of overall customers

commonsense because ultimately all they have

particular areas may be knocked off, but if we

exclusive reserve of the utility to be able to determine as to who stays on and who stays off. There should be some public oversight there.

The second point that we wish to raise was whether the obligation to treat customers reasonably has been maintained. In this regard, what we take critical issue with is relative to the notice, the fact that there was no notice provided to anyone in relation to the outages that occurred. justification that was provided in the response to the inquiries was that this is required to be able to make sure that there was a minimal number of people that were knocked off the system at any one particular time. We don't accept that. It doesn't make any sense, it doesn't accord with commonsense, and we wonder whether there's anything else that's at play in that particular circumstance. If we had advance notice and everybody knew the number of feeders that were being excluded was a very small number of feeders, and it was all localized in a

all have a right to sue a negligence for loss of power, as you do as well, the Public Utilities Board. All those large feeders were excluded from power outages, and it's not there may be an explanation, the reason may be part of it, I don't know, but the fact that the smaller customers generally accept it and they take it and they go on and they say, okay, it's a cost of doing business, we lost our power, as with my client they lost their power. It cost them \$40,000.00, they estimate. Are they going to bear that cost? They are. There's no action started, there's nothing been doing about it, but if it were a large industrial customer, they would have a right of action and they would have a right of action in negligence, and I would submit, based upon the findings of the Liberty Mutual Report, they might be successful. So there is an opportunity there that is an issue. It's one that, I think, is not in accordance with the duty that's there, that's incumbent upon the utilities to provide, and, therefore, it's something that the Board, in its capacity as a public oversight body, can, in fact, be

particular area, then it would be open to

Page 33 Page 35 involved and this is what is being requested 1 1 understand that Mr. Henderson, Rob Henderson, 2 of you now in this report. 2 Vice President, and Dawn Dalley, Vice 3 Moving forward, from our perspective, how President, Corporate Relations Customer 3 can the system be improved to be able to deal 4 4 Service, Mr. Paul Humphries, another Vice 5 with these concerns that we've brought to the 5 President of System Operations are going to be PUB. I think first and foremost, the critical 6 jointly making this presentation. 6 customer selection and maintenance of those 7 7 MR. MACDOUGALL: 8 particular lists has to be one that has to 8 O. Mr. Chair, while the Newfoundland and Labrador 9 have some formal protocols imposed upon it. 9 Hydro panel get situate, I would just like to 10 It also has to have some public oversight. It 10 mention, unlike the earlier presenters, this can't be specifically limited to the exclusive 11 11 is a panel from one of the parties who has 12 discretion of the power utility to be able to filed significant evidence in the proceeding 12 13 determine as to who and when the power is to here, and they will be available for cross-13 14 be allowed to be maintained on a critical 14 examination, so I'm assuming they will be basis. I think that needs to be expanded. As 15 15 affirmed because they will be under cross-16 far as the feeder selections are concerned, 16 examination following the presentation. 17 the process in relation to rotating blackouts, 17 CHAIR: again that needs to have public oversight and 18 18 Q. Oh, okay, you want them sworn in. 19 involvement, and it may be a situation where, 19 MR. MACDOUGALL: yes, in practical purposes to be able to 20 20 Q. Yes. preserve the utility and the reliability and 21 21 CHAIR: 22 the rates that are there, that the commercial 22 Q. Okay, all right. 23 - the customer base has to be looked at to be 23 MS. GLYNN: able to bear the brunt of power outages as 24 24 Q. That wasn't the intention, these are just 25 opposed to industrial customers, but that's 25 presentations with questions, it wasn't Page 34 Page 36 one that has to have some involvement to be supposed to be an evidentiary based 1 1 2 able to make sure that the obligations that 2 proceedings here. 3 are there to all customers are met, and that 3 MR. MACDOUGALL: 4 they're treated fairly in the overall system. 4 Q. So the cross-examination is not forming part 5 So that this process needs to be opened up, 5 of the evidentiary base? We are at your and, I guess, finally that there must be - the pleasure, Mr. Chair. I assumed it was since 6 6 7 process relating to the rotating of blackouts 7 it was a continuation of the public -8 must be improved such that there is notice 8 MS. GLYNN: 9 given. You cannot have these random blackouts Q. It was intended just to be questions. that nobody knows where they're coming from, 10 10 CHAIR: 11 and all of a sudden you're in the process of 11 Q. Okay, so you're happy with that? going down into your basement and your power 12 12 MS. GLYNN: 13 goes out. I mean, it makes no sense. You 13 Q. That there would be no sworn evidence know, you can't prepare for it, you can't deal 14 14 presented. 15 with it. The cost on the public is inordinate 15 CHAIR: to be able to deal with the situation that is 16 Q. Okay, so we're not going to be swearing you 16 17 not justified or justifiable. 17 in, sir. 18 Those would be my comments, and I thank 18 MR. MACDOUGALL: 19 you very much for the time that you've 19 Q. That's no problem, Mr. Chair. provided to us. 20 20 MR. HENDERSON: 21 CHAIR: 21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Chair, and Commissioners. Q. Thank you, sir. So there's no other members 22 My name is Rob Henderson. I'm the Vice 22 of the public who may wish to appear? Nobody President of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro. 23 23 24 has asked to. Okay, I guess, now we'll 24 I will ask my - the others at the table to proceed with presentation from Hydro, and I 25 introduce themselves. 25

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March 30, 2015	Multi-Page	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 37	Page 39
1 (10:45 a.m.)	1	began really in December, 2013, when Hydro was
2 MS. DALLEY:	2	experiencing difficulty with its generating
3 Q. Dawn Dalley, Vice President of Corp	orate 3	facilities in a number of different plants.
4 Relations and Customer Service v	vith 4	We actually had five different plants that had
5 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro.	5	problems, and they began in the middle of
6 MR. HUMPHRIES:	6	December. We had a problem with Hardwood's
7 Q. Paul Humphries, Vice President of S	ystem 7	combustion turbine which had a failure of a
8 Operations and Planning with Newfound	dland and 8	fuel control valve that initiated - that
9 Labrador Hydro.	9	basically prevented that unit from coming on
10 MR. HENDERSON:	10	and staying on after it just went through a
11 Q. I'd like to start first of all by saying that	11	major overall. We had some difficulties with
Hydro apologizes for the impact of	the 12	the ice in Exploits River, and we had some
interruptions that occurred back in Janu	ary,	difficulties with the Holyrood Plant. Two
14 2014. We certainly understand the sign	ificant 14	different units had difficulties. One was a
impact that it had on our customers and	the 15	forced draft fan motor problem on Unit 3, and
users of electricity in the province. We	are 16	we had a control valve problem on Unit 2. The
very much committed to preventing	the 17	combination of all those generation problems
18 reoccurrence of such events. Immedi	ately 18	resulted in a limited amount of capacity that
following it, we went into an investigati	on of 19	we had on the power system to meet customer
our own to look into what happened	and 20	demand. As a result of that, we started to
understand what happened, and do wha	t we can 21	experience outages to customers, we had
to prevent such things from happening a	gain. 22	experienced the rotating outages that began on
Over the course of the last year, we've	e 23	January 2nd. Those continued on January 3rd.
provided a considerable amount of infor	mation 24	While we were working to repair and take care
to the Board through the - to the public	as 25	of the issues, we did not have sufficient
	Page 38	Page 40
well. There was the initial utility reports	- I	capacity to meet customer demands during that
2 that you mentioned earlier, and our response		period of time.
3 to those reports, and to the many interve	nor 3	Ms. Dalley will talk a bit about the
4 R-5s to help people understand how we		communications about that. Right now, I'll
5 the system and what we do.	5	just give you the technical facts of what
6 We undertook a substantial amount	of 6	happened on the system, but there was some

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the recommendations that came from those reports, and took action over the course of last year and made significant progress with respect to those last year. In this presentation, we're going to address the specific areas of interest that were previously indicated by the presenters that we were provided, and then we'll also be available for any questions that anybody may have.

I'll start with giving a little bit of background, and then with respect to outage coordination and communications that we were asked to speak to, Mr. Humphries and Ms. Dalley will each speak to that, and then I'll come back and speak to the combustion turbine questions and with some concluding remarks. To provide some background, this incident

understood the significant impact that it had. Throughout all of the time that this was occurring, we had coordination going on with Newfoundland Power where we were sharing information with them on what was happening on the power system, as well as involved with the communications out to the customers and to the general public.

We did an internal investigation of events with specific review of the outages. I didn't mention that after we had the problem with the generation, we had a secondary problem which was with the transmission system, which initiated the failure of a transformer at Sunnyside, which that transformer failed and it resulted in significant widespread transmission problems on January 4th and 5th, and they carried on an

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Page 43

Page 41 impact on the generation supply through to January 8th when we were able to restore sufficient generation that we were able to meet customer demands following January 8th. I wanted to indicate those issues.

When we received the Liberty Report and initial Board recommendations, we accepted those, and a lot of those aligned with items that we had previously identified in our own report and we continued to work on those throughout 2014, as I previously mentioned. We recognized that there was a necessity to provide thorough and timely reporting to customers, and all stakeholders, including the Board with respect to potential service disruptions and the status of those. Our internal investigation focused on short term load forecasting, which Mr. Humphries will speak to in a minute, generation planning and winter readiness; winter readiness being a very strong focus of the entire team at Hydro to get all of the annual maintenance work, our capital program complete, so that we had everything ready for December 1st, 2014, going into the winter that's just ending now.

instruction T-001, which deals with generation reserves. The two operating groups continually monitor the level of reserves on the system, but now this instruction requires that as the generation reserves fall to a level within 70 megawatts of the triggers that will activate the advance notification protocol which Ms. Dalley will talk about in more detail in a few moments, our operations staff enter into communications at that point to understand the implications of the events that may become happening, discuss mitigations that they take to prevent an event, and also to start preparation for the eventuality that the event could escalate and end up in a situation where we are either in a notification process or, in fact, we get to a stage where we have a rotating outage situation.

In addition, we've also increased the access of information, online real time information which Newfoundland Power operators see from the Hydro system. This would include online status of both generation and transmission assets, so that as events happen,

Page 42

So we've accepted those and we're going to continue to carry on that work. There was a number of those items that were identified in 2014 which we'll carry on in 2015. There was also the recommendations that came out of Liberty's final report which we've taken and they are now part of our action plan and a part of our work plan for 2015, which we will continue to execute and report on our

I'll now ask Mr. Humphries to speak to the communications between the utilities.

13 MR. HUMPHRIES:

Q. Thank you. I guess, at the system operations 14 15 level, communications between the two utilities is continually, it happens on a 16 daily basis, and, in fact, an hourly basis, 17 24/7, 365. Since the events of last winter, 18 19 we have made some changes at both increase or enhance the information transfer between the 20 21 two control centres, and also tried to ensure 22 that the proper discussions happen in a timely manner as we approached an event similar to 23 24 what we had in the winter of 2014.

We have modified our system operating

Page 44 Newfoundland Power operators will be aware of 1

this firsthand, so that they will already have

seen what has happened and this will sort of 3

enhance the discussions between the two 4 5

utilities in mitigating and reacting to events. 6

7 Now I'll pass it on to Ms. Dalley to get into some more of the external communication 8 9 aspects.

10 MS. DALLEY:

11 Q. From a general perspective, I thought I would start by explaining, I guess, the grounding of 12 our communications principles overall. Really 13 it comes from a position of trying to be open 14 15 and honest in our communication with the public, treating people with -16

17 MS. GLYNN:

Q. Ms. Dalley, I don't think we can hear you 18 quite in the back. Sorry about that. 19

20 MS. DALLEY:

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Q. I'll snuggle a little closer with Mr. Henderson. Treating our customers and the public with respect and dignity, and also foundationally on team work across the company because the information that we are provided

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Page 47

Page 45 from operations, field operations and system operations, is critical in forming the messages that we send to our customers and the public. Overall our objective is to be transparent, accessible, and provide timely information to all stakeholders. Some other pieces which we've understood at the time and I would say we understand more

today would be that we need to use as many, for lack of a better word, channels to reach customers because when we communicate with the public at large, we don't have a direct customer relationship with many of them, so we're relying on our largest customer, Newfoundland Power, to reach their customers as well as the public, so we don't have direct channels to them in many cases, so we rely on mass media, which means that we actually need more notification, more time than otherwise you might have if you had new technologies like texting and items like that.

The other things that we try and do in situations like this is manage expectations. We know very well from customers that the expected time to restore is the critical piece

as much information out as quickly as we could 1 2 to members of the public. When we look at that today from the surveying we've done with 3 customers, we completed a joint outage 4 5 communication survey with Newfoundland Power to customers across the province, and we 6 7 understood from that survey that customers 8 needed - about 60 percent of customers would 9 want to have within the day notice of rotating 10 outages, and about 40 percent wanted one day's 11 notice.

> During that day on January 2nd, we got out as duly noted by the other presenter this morning, that we were out within about two hours before the rotating outages, but we also weren't warning of rotating outages at the time. We were asking people to conserve to try and prevent the rotating outages. So even the messages at that point weren't a warning of rotating outages, it was a call for conservation to assist us in stopping and preventing those rotating outages. We did over the course of the coming six or seven days during those outages, we did numerous media interviews, as everyone I'm sure is

Page 46

of data that customers want. They want to know - if there's an outage, they know there's an outage, their power is gone. They want to know when it's coming back, so that ETR, as we call it, the estimated time of restore, is absolutely critical, and that during the outages last January, one of the things that we found we were doing quite extensively, which is not uncommon, is to correct misinformation that may get out as well because we've got a proliferation of media channels, that information happens quite quickly and flows quite quickly from those social channels often to traditional media, so we find ourselves live, I guess, in a situation monitoring media, responding, and answering questions and correcting information that goes out during that time.

First I'll acknowledge, I guess, the Leader of the Opposition's point this morning that there wasn't enough notification in the January outages, and there certainly was not. From our perspective, once we kicked into gear and started communicating, we moved quite rapidly to make ourselves accessible, to get

Page 48 aware of, we made ourselves completely accessible during that timeframe to both

traditional media, the radio stations who ran 3 - very gratefully actually, ran call in shows 4 during that time, which made it much, much 5

easier for us to communicate to the public, 6 7 and advise them of what was happening. We

8 also did numerous social media updates on Twitter and Facebook, which may not reach 9 everyone, but we also understand that you need 10

a multi-channelled approach when you're communicating with customers. You need radio,

you need TV, you need those social media outlets. Now we have - I know Newfoundland

Power, to their customers, have texting options available on outages. So you have to

take all opportunity for all of those channels to try and reach people in as timely a way as you can. We did website updates, we handled

numerous briefings, I think seven press

briefings, over that period, with Newfoundland Power and, in some cases, with government

officials during that time, and we also did a joint energy conservation advertising campaign

to try and, again, push the message out very

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Page 51

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	1	quickly. So there was some coordination to	1	and call between utilities, that isdoesn't
	2	organize that and get it into the media as	2	involve any contact with customers or any
	3	soon as we could. One of the key	3	notification to customers, it prompts an
	4	recommendations coming out of the Liberty and	4	well, I guess an additional level of
	5	the Public Utilities Board recommendations was	5	communication, and Mr. Humphries points, the
	6	a Joint Storm and Outage Communications Plan,	6	control centres are consistently chatting
	7	so what we discovered during the outages was	7	daily, so this prompts a discussion to say,
	8	both utilities had teams that were working	8	you know, hey, our reserves our getting tight,
	9	quite hard and were able to respond to their	9	and I believe the level on the initial
	10	own outages, but when it came to that	10	notification is 240, yes?
	11	coordination, which was critical when the	11	(11:00 a.m.)
	12	Hydro supply had an issue on the Newfoundland	12	MR. HUMPHRIES:
	13	Power customers, was we needed to outline the	13	Q. Yes. That sounds right.
	14	roles and responsibilities clearly. We need a	14	MS. DALLEY:
	15	process for inter-utility sign off of	15	Q. So it's 240 megawatts on system-wide basis,
	16	information, to make sure both utilities were	16	which is the largest unit, 170 megawatts,
	17	aware of the messages were; make sure that	17	which would be, you know, the largest unit at
	18	communications activities and timelines were	18	Holyrood, for example, then plus an additional
	19	clearly outlined; that we had pre-prepared key	19	70 megawatts, and what that would do is
	20	messages and templates. For the most part,	20	prompt, again, a discussion between utilities,
	21	what is happening from a customer perspective	21	so that as utilities we have the ability, in
	22	is, although the cause may change, the impact	22	advance, to start planning in case we have to
	23	on the customer is very similar, and the	23	provide notification. So then you head to a
	24	information the customer wants is almost	24	Level 2, which isyou're in the 24-hour
	25	exclusively the same around when is my power	25	period at that point, and just to provide some
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coming back, and then getting updates on what has happened, and that was validated during the outage communication research that we did last year. Making sure everyone had key contact information that we understood, to be honest, where people were 24/7, so we could contact them and reach them if we needed to, and then we also worked with our Systems Operations Team to design the advance notification protocol, which folks spoke about this morning. So that advance notification protocol was specifically designed coming out of last January, and it was prompted upon a system reserve basis, so there would be certain levels of system reserves which would prompt us to head to the advance notification protocol. So the next slide shows that. So what you've got here is the green, orange and red, I'm making sure the colours are the same when they're on the screens, and then aside it, the T001, which is the operating protocol used by the system operators. So you'll see that the T001 there at the top, on the right-

Page 52 context around this, we are consistently monitoring the system over, really, a sevenday window. So we look forward seven days every day on the reserves. We now have a new--and I'll talk about our response to some of this in a second, but we have a new process for the winter monitoring of the system now, which is a daily status briefing which happens every morning, which involves system operations, our system on-call individuals, folks from our Regulatory Team, Shareholder Relations and Communications, and we go through that status report on the seven-day basis to make sure, internally, everyone is aware of what is happening on the system, what the seven-day forecast looks like, whether or not we see any vulnerabilities in the system as we look forward, and a discussion of any oncoming system events that may indeed take us into a reserve issue and a notification. So looking forward then, from the public's perspective, if we see the reserves getting less than the largest generating unit, which is 170 megawatts, on a 24-hours basis, so if today we see that tomorrow, the reserves would

hand side, starts with a Level 2. There is

actually a Level 1, which prompts a discussion

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Marc	ch 30, 2015 Multi	-Pag
	Page 53	
1	be less than 170 megawatts, that prompts us to	1
2	issue a public notification and a Power Watch.	2
3	So the point to customers is there's no	3
4	immediate action required, but that we are	4
5	watching the system closely and that they	5
6	should be prepared to conserve if we need them	6
7	to conserve. Then from that, we go to the	7
8	Level 3 Notification, which is a current-day	8
9	generation, so and again, Mr. Humphries could	9
10	speak better to how the forecasting systems	10
11	pick up in the current day, but the current-	11
12	day generation margin is less than half of the	12
13	largest generating unit, so you're down to 85	13
14	megawatts on that day at that point, and your	14
15	forecast is moreyou know, I guess you're in	15
16	the same day, so it'sI'm trying to think of	16
17	the right frame, but it's more accurate,	17
18	because you're in the day, and the system is	18
19	picking up the load and the customer behaviour	19
20	through the day. So at that point, we would	20
21	issue a Power Warning to conserve electricity.	21
22	This is a warning that current-day electricity	22
23	supply is getting close to the maximum demand,	23
24	and people should be prepared for power	24
25	rotating power outages. So if I take that	25
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bigger, that that is not meant to cover off immediate supply issues. So when something happens that you don't have that foresight of seeing it coming. So often on the system, for example, I'll use the example of under frequency load shedding when you have an immediate power outage that happens, in which case it would be difficult to apply a notification system of this magnitude. This was really developed coming out of last January's outages, where we would have advanced notification of generation shortfalls at a system level and a system-reserve level. From a customer service perspective, and Mr. Chair, you noted this in the beginning of your remarks, that Newfoundland Power is the primary distribution company in the province with, I believe, close to 80 percent of direct customers. Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro has a distribution to the remaining customers, both in Labrador and rural areas of the province, on the island. We provide direct distribution service to areas on the Great Northern Peninsula, the Baie Verte Peninsula, some of our real remote communities on the

Page 55

back to last January, on New Year's Day, we would have been issuing a Power Watch, or before that. There is some utility in doing it close to the time, so that you don't lose the momentum if you see an event coming. So to issue something, for example, five or six days ahead, you may actually not gain the traction you require on the day when you need action to be taken, and then on the day of, the January 2nd, we would have issued a Power Warning that day to conserve and to prepare for the possibility of rotating outages, and then the T001, again, the operating protocol, takes you into a generation shortfall is imminent and there are no reserve margins, and then we go to a Power Emergency, which means rotating outages are in effect, we're asking customers to conserve electricity, and we're warning them about the safety protocols that are required if indeed they are in a power outage situation. That notification system, I will note, if you can't see the footnote here on the slide, but when that notification was developed and filed with the Board, it was

Page 56 south coast, and then up on the coast of Labrador and Labrador Interconnected System. So from a customer service perspective, we had, again, several of the very similar issues, albeit on a much smaller magnitude, at the distribution level, during those supply disruptions last year. We did some of the same processes that Newfoundland Power has done for their customers, we looked at our list of priority feeders, we've made sure--in our case, they were maintained by the three regional areas, so we took those lists, consolidated them into one common list, and made sure that we identified the critical customers that were there on those lists, because customers self-identified, so we made sure that we had a consolidated list, and that it was current and up to date, and then we identified those sensitive customers and developed a feeder rotation list. We also completed, as I mentioned earlier, the joint customer research project with Newfoundland Power, to better understand customer-outagerelated needs and expectations, which was incredibly helpful to both utilities and the

footnoted, maybe it should have been a little

Marci	n 30, 2015 Mult	ı-Page	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 57		Page 59
1	joint outage communications protocol, but I	1	and technologies. I'll turn it back to Mr.
2	think as practitioners inside the utility	2	Henderson.
3	world, understanding your customers is	3 MI	R. HENDERSON:
4	absolutely critical, and that outage research	4	Q. Okay. Again, responding to the issues that
5	was very, very good and provided some great	5	were presented to us last week, we put
6	information to us on how to design our	6	together some points regarding the new
7	communication programs to make sure we were	7	combustion turbine. So some background on the
8	better able to reach those customers. We	8	combustion turbine. We made application to
9	streamlined processes for information sharing	9	the Board back on April 10th, 2014, to install
10	between system operations and other internal	10	a new combustion turbine. The combustion
11	stakeholder groups thatI spoke to the daily	11	turbine was in Hydro's plans, for installation
12	systems meetings, that's one step that we took	12	of a combustion turbine in 2015, to be
13	over the winter, and we'll be evaluating the	13	completed before the end of 2015, but we
14	utility of that as we head into the summer and	14	accelerated that project after the events of
15	into next winter. Another step that we took	15	January, 2014, and looking at customer load
16	was to get a direct channel to the	16	growth and what we might be able to do based
17	communications on call. So what happens now,	17	on what we were able to understand from the
18	if there's a system event inside the control	18	available already-built combustion turbines.
19	room, the control centre calls the system on	19	We decided to accelerate that and went to
20	call, and the next call is made to the	20	tender for that, for installation of a new
21	communications on call, so that there is	21	combustion turbine, a 100-megawatts combustion
22	immediate notification. We are also	22	turbine, inlate in 2014, and the Board
23	continuing to evaluate an expansion of our	23	approved that on May 7th, and at that time,
24	online and customer contact and outage	24	the Board acknowledged that this was aI'll
25	management technologies. As I mentioned, we	25	say a fast-tracked project that required fast
	Page 58		Page 60
1	have a very small distribution business, so we	1	action, and so we moved on that right away.
2	don't have the same magnitude of technology in	2	The public tender was issued on April 7th, in
3	place right now that a large utility would	3	advance of the application, and it closed on

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3 place right now that a large utility would 4 have, however we are in the process of 5 updating our customer information system, and so we'll be looking, as we go forward, to 6 7 include new technologies, like texting to 8 customers and other mediums, to make sure that 9 we can do more immediate notification to our 10 customers--direct customers in that situation, 11 and we're also looking at the possibility that 12 we can even implement that over into our 13 website to provide more public notification, 14 because again, when there's an outage, 15 customers generally have a tendency to go to 16 their utility, but the outage communication 17 survey, if I recall, showed that about 30 18 percent of either of our customers, 19 Newfoundland Power's and Hydro's, would go to 20 the other utility's websites to look for 21 information. So we understand that we need to 22 be aware of that, that customers will come to 23 our site looking for, you know, the outage 24 that's impacting them and what is happening. 25 So again, we'll look at future communications

advance of the application, and it closed on April 21st, and the contract was awarded on May 16th, and then on June 9th, we began clearing of the site to enable the full construction of the facility. As I mentioned, it's an extremely aggressive timeline for this project and for a project of this magnitude. Typically for us, we estimate it to be an 18to 24-month project, and we were setting out here with an aggressive timeline to get this done in seven to eight months. We provided regular updates to the Board throughout the construction. They began in July, I think, of--was our first report, and then biweekly starting in August. The project is very-well, right now it's within budget. We carried it out safely, and of course, with due regard to the environment. The unit was first synchronized to the system on January 21st in 2015, and it was fully available to the power system on February 27th, and at that point, we were including it in our reserves. Prior to that, the CT was not required, we were meeting

March	n 30, 2015 Mu	ıltı-Pa	ge	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page	61		Page 63
1	customer requirements and the system reserves	1 (CHAIR:	
2	were good up to that point in time, and so at	2	Q. Okay.	Mr. Dumaresque is next.
3	that point, right now the unit is part of our	3 1	MR. DUMARI	ESQUE:
4	reserves, it has been operated, and the	4	Q. Yes.	Гhank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I have a
5	industrial customers indicated they were	5	numbe	er of questions. First of all, I would
6	interested in how much it has been used, and	6	like to	point out a recommendation of Liberty
7	we'vesince it became available to the	7	10.2, v	when it comes to the governance of Hydro
8	system, we've operated onwe've had 16 starts	8	or lac	k thereof, and they point out that
9	of the unit, and we've operated it on 15	9	certair	aly the present structure of governance
10	separate days. It's run, well, primarily from	10	is not	acceptable, and that indeed, there
11	a system spinning reserve requirement. In all	11	should	be a change where Hydro should have its
12	of those cases there, it was brought on to	12	own so	eparate executive, and indeed, have its
13	enable the power system to have additional	13	own st	tructure, so that it would be able to
14	spinning reserve. There was nothing in	14	respon	nd in a more appropriate manner, and I
15	particular on the system that was an issue	15	_	n Hydro's submission to the Board as a
16	that required it, other than just to have that	16	result-	-in response to the recommendation of
17	extra reserve of connected generation. There	17	Libert	y, that the senior-most position
18	was one day, on March 4th, in which it was put	18	respon	sible for Hydro continues to be the
19	on and did directly supply load in addition to	19	Presid	ent and CEO, and I guess my first
20	providing the spinning reserve. So in	20	questic	on is, today we are having the first
21	conclusion, Hydro does apologize to customers	21	formal	l presentation to the people of the
22	for the hardship that they experienced due to	22	provin	ice in response to the crisis of January
23	the events of last January. Hydro has taken	23	2014,	and I would like to know where is the
24	action in response to its own investigation	24	Presid	ent and CEO of Nalcor? Why is he not
25	and the recommendations of the Phase One	25	here to	answer? Because, as you say, he is
	Page	62		Page 64
1	Outage Inquiry. We are committed to ensuring	1	the fina	al power.
2	a reliable and least-cost power supply to the	2 1	MR. HENDERS	•

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residents and businesses of the Province, and to timely and effective communications with our customers and stakeholders. Hydro will continue to work with all stakeholders in meeting this mandate and ensuring there is confidence in Hydro's system. Hydro would also like to thank all of our employees. We are committed to delivering safe and reliable electricity every day, and acknowledge those who worked very hard during the outages to restore the power, and continue to work throughout 2014 to complete the significant amount of work that we did in 2014 to be ready for the winter of 2014 and '15. Thank you, and we'll take any questions.

18 CHAIR:

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19 Q. The order of questioning, then, is we'll start now with Newfoundland Power, if they have any 20 21 questions.

22 (11:15 a.m.)

23 MR. KELLY:

24 Q. We have no questions at this time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25

Q. When we put together the panel today, we put this panel together in response to the issues that were indicated to us that we'd be speaking to today, and so we put forward the three of us as being the most appropriate to respond to those issues that had been put forward. For that reason, Mr. Martin wasn't asked to attend.

11 MR. DUMARESQUE:

12 Q. Okay. I would like to deal with, first of 13 all, as I indicated to the Board, about the 14 communications between utilities. So I know 15 Mr. Humphries, you spoke about an enhanced communication protocol. I wonder if you could 16 17 explain exactly what you did different after 18 DarkNL and what you were doing before in the 19 communicating between you and Newfoundland 20 Power? 21 MR. HUMPHRIES: 22

Q. Well, really there's not a whole lot we've done different, other than the fact that from the issue of monitoring the system reserves, we've now made this change to our protocol,

Ma	arch 30, 2015	Multi-P	age TM	Verbatim Court Reporters
		Page 65		Page 67
1	that it is required, that as we approach a	1	1	communications people on call to start the
2	level of alert, the 240 megawatt range, if w	ve 2	2	chain of reaction and communications that
3	see that, the probability of that happening	g 3	3	would be required, based on the severity of
4	within a seven-day period, we initiate the	e 4	1	the event.
5	formal discussions between the two utilities	es 5	5 MR. DI	UMARESQUE:
6	to ensure that we're aware of it, we	6	5 Q.	So when you say the system on call, obviously
7	understand it, we are looking at the	7	7	somebody from the control room of either
8	mitigations and also preparing for the	8	3	Newfoundland Power or Newfoundland Hydro, in
9	eventuality that we do end up in an emerge	ency 9)	this case Newfoundland Hydro, who would they
10	that weso that we are ready to act.	10)	call? If it was a situation in Holyrood,
11	MR. DUMARESQUE:	11	i	would they be calling the manager of the
12	Q. You mentioned in your communication t	that 12	2	Holyrood plant, or who would they be calling?
13	earlier to us, that access online by	13	3 MR. H	UMPHRIES:
14	Newfoundland Power is now available. So	o does 14	4 Q.	The system on call person is an operations
15	that mean that Newfoundland Power coul	ld not 15	5	manager whohe would be called by the
16	see what the status of your generating	16	5	dispatcher or the energy control centre person
17	capacity would be online leading up to Jan	nuary 17	7	when an event happens, and then that person
18	of 2014?	18	3	would reach out. If it were a Holyrood issue,
19	MR. HUMPHRIES:	19)	he would reach out to the Holyrood people.
20	Q. Leading up to January of 2014, Newfound	dland 20)	Obviously, if it involves executive
21	Power did have access to certain portions	of 21	i	requirement, he'd reach to the executive on
22	the system, but since 2014, we've made a	lot 22	2	call, and as well, notify the communications
23	more of the information available so now t	that 23	3	people.
24	they can see down at our generation level,	at 24	4 MR. H	ENDERSON:
25	our transmission level, throughout the who	ole 25	5 Q.	If I just may just interrupt for a sec, just
		Page 66		Page 68
1	system. So they are aware of events as the	ey 1	1 1	to add an extra level of clarity there, for
2		2		each of our areas of our operations, for
3	MR. DUMARESQUE:	3		instance the Holyrood plant, there is on-call
4	Q. When it comes to the communication or	n an 4		people for the plant. So if there is an issue
5	urgent basis, I guess, or when youobviou	ısly, 5		that occurs within that plant, the operators
6		-		of that plantand there's operators in that
7		7		plant 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, they
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8 communications after you are presented with an 9 urgent situation, what would be the protocol? For example, hypothetically, if 2:00 a.m. in 10 11 the morning, something happened, what would 12 happen between the two utilities, who would 13 call whom, and is there a protocol, is there 14 somebody on call or what is--where is the 15 executive of both utilities at that stage in the supply of electricity? 16

17 MR. HUMPHRIES:

18 Q. Well, first, in the Hydro organization, we 19 would have an individual that's our system on 20 call representative, so if there is an event, 21 obviously the two control centres communicate 22 first, our system operators would notify our 23 system on call, and that system on call person 24 would reach out to the other individuals. 25 There is an executive on call, there is

would call their on call, who would then arrange for whatever action needs to be--is required in the plant, whether it's to bring in instrumentation people, additional operators, various different types of tradesworkers, to come in and deal with the issue in the plant. So there is an on-call person who is responsible for each of the facilities. We have the same for each of our regions. We have operating regions in Central Newfoundland for our transmission and distribution operations, same in Labrador, and on the Northern Peninsula, our Hydro generation facilities have people on call as well. So all of those people will react and address any issues within those facilities. The system on call is another level of on call that deals with broader system events, which

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		1 age Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 69		Page 71
1	Mr. Humphries was addressing.	1	1 MR. HENDERSON:
1	R. DUMARESQUE:	2	2 Q. That would be correct.
3	Q. So the system on call, for example, at	3	3 MR. DUMARESQUE:
4	Holyrood, if you had a situation where one of	4	3
5	the units was not available and you knew it	5	5 Hydro executive and/or his or her designate?
6	wasn't going to be available, who on the	6	6 MR. HENDERSON:
7	executive of Nalcor would be called, and when	7	7 Q. No, that's correct. It's a Nalcor corporate
8	would they be called? Would they be called	8	8 emergency response plan, so all of the
9	within five minutes after knowing that or half	9	9 executives within Nalcor take a turn in the
10	an hour, or when would the call come to	10	rotation for executives on call.
11	whoever would be on that list, then? And is	11	11 MR. DUMARESQUE:
12	that list that you have at the executive	12	
13	levelbecause somebody has to make decisions,	13	•
14	so on that list, is that restricted only to	14	-
15	the senior executive of Hyrdo, or does it		15 MR. HENDERSON:
16	extend to executive of Nalcor?	16	
1	R. HENDERSON:	17	
1	Q. In addition to our system on call, which is a	18	•
19	person dealing with the power system, we have,		19 MR. DUMARESQUE:
1	at Nalcor-well, we have a corporate emergency	20	
20	1		
21	response plan, and in the corporate emergency	21	1
22	response plan, there is an executive that's on	22	
23	call. There's always one executive on call	23	<i>5</i>
24	for Nalcor, all throughout the whole year. So		24 MR. HENDERSON:
25	the system on call person, if the event is	25	Q. That's correct.
	Page 70		Page 72
1	significant, whichthat the system on call	1	1 MR. DUMARESQUE:
2	person will determine, they will make a call	2	2 Q. Okay. I'd like to touch on the public
3	to the executive on call. The executive on	3	3 communications, and I know it's easy to
4	call will then determine the level of response	4	4 understand the colour schemes, like we see it
5	required corporately, and whether they	5	
6	activate our corporate emergency response	1	5 at street lights, you know, red, green, and
1 _		6	
7	plan, which would bring in a number of	6 7	6 yellow, but could you please go over that
8	plan, which would bring in a number of		yellow, but could you please go over thatprotocol again, and the levels of Power Watch,
1	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which	7	 yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say
8 9	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people,	7 8 9	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well?
8 9 10	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply	7 8 9 10	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY:
8 9 10 11	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different	7 8 9 10 11	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the
8 9 10 11 12	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called	7 8 9 10 11 12	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's
8 9 10 11 12 13	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called out to support a corporate emergency, and that	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's very hard to look at the michit the mic at
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR 16 17 18 19 20 21	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called out to support a corporate emergency, and that would be initiated by the executive on call. 8. DUMARESQUE: Q. Yeah. So is it fair to conclude, then, that the executive on call would extend to, say, the Vice President of Communications of Nalcor, or the Vice Presidentthe Chief Operating Officer of Nalcor? Outside of the Hydro executive, as per your position, is that	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's very hard to look at the michit the mic at the same time. MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. That's okay. MS. DALLEY: Q. So the T001 has a Level 1 in there, which is a pre-notification between utilities. It prompts, again, I guess an advanced level of discussion between the utilities, to notify
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called out to support a corporate emergency, and that would be initiated by the executive on call. 2. DUMARESQUE: Q. Yeah. So is it fair to conclude, then, that the executive on call would extend to, say, the Vice President of Communications of Nalcor, or the Vice Presidentthe Chief Operating Officer of Nalcor? Outside of the Hydro executive, as per your position, is that fair to say, that all executives, and indeed,	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's very hard to look at the michit the mic at the same time. MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. That's okay. MS. DALLEY: Q. So the T001 has a Level 1 in there, which is a pre-notification between utilities. It prompts, again, I guess an advanced level of discussion between the utilities, to notify them of the forecast. As my fellow panelists
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called out to support a corporate emergency, and that would be initiated by the executive on call. 2. DUMARESQUE: Q. Yeah. So is it fair to conclude, then, that the executive on call would extend to, say, the Vice President of Communications of Nalcor, or the Vice Presidentthe Chief Operating Officer of Nalcor? Outside of the Hydro executive, as per your position, is that fair to say, that all executives, and indeed, all executives are rotated during various	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's very hard to look at the michit the mic at the same time. MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. That's okay. MS. DALLEY: Q. So the T001 has a Level 1 in there, which is a pre-notification between utilities. It prompts, again, I guess an advanced level of discussion between the utilities, to notify them of the forecast. As my fellow panelists have indicated, the utilities, both
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	plan, which would bring in a number of different resources within the company, which would include our engineering support people, our health and safety people, the supply chain. There's a whole range of different parts of the business that would get called out to support a corporate emergency, and that would be initiated by the executive on call. 2. DUMARESQUE: Q. Yeah. So is it fair to conclude, then, that the executive on call would extend to, say, the Vice President of Communications of Nalcor, or the Vice Presidentthe Chief Operating Officer of Nalcor? Outside of the Hydro executive, as per your position, is that fair to say, that all executives, and indeed,	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	yellow, but could you please go over that protocol again, and the levels of Power Watch, Power Warning, Power Emergency. You say there's also a Level 1 that operates, as well? MS. DALLEY: Q. That's right. So it works closely with the T001, which is the operatingI'm sorry, it's very hard to look at the michit the mic at the same time. MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. That's okay. MS. DALLEY: Q. So the T001 has a Level 1 in there, which is a pre-notification between utilities. It prompts, again, I guess an advanced level of discussion between the utilities, to notify them of the forecast. As my fellow panelists have indicated, the utilities, both Newfoundland Power and Hydro, are aware that

March	1 30, 2015	Multi-	Page	e	Verbatim Court Reporters
		Page 73			Page 75
1	the level of system reserves, but this prompts		1	N	ow I'll say that these are guidelines based
2	a discussion that really leads to whether or		2		f of last January fromvery specifically.
3	notyou know, or I guess of advanced		3		you know, we looked forward at that work
4	notification of whether we head into the next		4		ith Newfoundland Power to design a protocol,
5	level. So the Level 2 notification is a 24-		5		nd this is what came out of those
6	hour generation reserve forecast. When you're		6		scussions. The Level 4, which is the
7	looking at that, it's, again, system-wide		7		eneration shortfall is imminent, essentially
8	reserves right across the island, and whether		8	_	serve margins have fallen to the point where
9	those reserves are less than the largest		9		e will not be able to meet the projected
10	generating unit. So the first level, again,	1	10		stomer demand, and that would invoke a Power
11	just to go back, is 240 megawatts, which is	1	11	Eı	mergency where rotating power outages were in
12	the largest generating unit of 170 plus an	1	12		fect, we would be asking customers to
13	additional 70 megawatts that would, if it fell	1	13		onserve electricity, and again, doing as much
14	below that, 239, that would prompt a		14		we could to promote safety in light of that
15	discussion between utilities, and if you go to		15		hen utilizing alternative sources of
16	the T001 Level 2, that gets us to a discussion		16		eneration or candles or other things that
17	when your reservesexpected reserves in the		17	_	cople have a tendency to use during power
18	24-hour window, so today for tomorrow, for		18	_	itages.
19	example, it would be falling below the largest				ARESQUE:
20	unit on the system, which is the Holyrood Unit		20		hank you, and as you said earlier in your
21	at 170 megawatts. At that level, what that		21		resentation, you stand convicted, I guess, of
22	would prompt from a communications perspect		22	_	ot applying proper public notification in
23	is the issue of a Power Watchthe issuance of		23		nuary of 2014. So at that time, what was
24	Power Watch. So we would be telling customer		24		e protocol that was in place?
25	that there's no immediate action required from			S. DALI	_
					Page 76
		Page 74	1	O I4	
1 2	them, but we're watching the system closely.		1		was generally following our general outage
$\frac{2}{2}$	We would let them know that essentially,		2		ontocol. So that day what happened was
3	demand for tomorrow looks to be getting in the		3		eneration shortfall for that evening that
4	area where we would be below the largest unit,		4	_	•
5	and that they should be prepared to conserve		5		orning, and it was a situation rightful that
6	if we're askedif they are asked, and we		6		e hadn't been in many times before, certainly
7	would start educating them on what it is we'd		7		ot to the point ofand the level that we had
8	be looking for them to do as part of that		8		sperienced that day, so we immediately
9	conservation call. In the day of, so the		9		arted to prepare materials to issue a notice customers for conservation that evening.
10	current-day generation one, again, the		l0	1:30 a	•
11	forecast is much tighter and more accurate.		,		
12	You'd be getting into a Level 3, where we saw				MARESQUE: o as you will recall, on Boxing Day, December
13	the reserve margin less than half of the				o as you will recall, on Boxing Day, December of the could be
14	largest generating unit, so 85 megawatts. So		14		
15	on that morning, when we woke up and went in		15		assified as part of this event, because on
16	to the office, we looked at the daily forecast		l6		at day you lost the fan and motor and that
17	and saw that the peak forecast for that		17		est 100 megawatts on Unit 3. So at that
18 19	evening was going to be less than 85 megawatts		18 19	_	oint, would you have talked to Newfoundland ower and said to them, listen, we just lost
	on the reserve margin, again, across the				
20	island, we would start putting out a Power		20		is and no, there's no spare part in the ailding, or indeed in the province, so would
21	Warning, asking folks to conserve electricity,		21		-
22	that there's a warning that current-day		22		ou then have Newfoundland Power on standby
23	electricity supply is getting close to the		23		lying we got cold temperatures, weyou know, e're now in a situation? Would that
24	maximum demand, and we would be telling the		24		
25	to be prepared for possible rotating outages.		25	CC	onversation have taken place at that time?

March 30, 2015 Mu		ılti-F	'age T	Werbatim Court Reporters		
Г	Page			Page 79		
	1 MS. DALLEY:		l	forget the exact terminology, but certainly		
1	Q. I'm going to turn over to Paul, Mr. Humphries,	2	2	would not be classified for in service,		
	I guess, because it's within the System	3	3	because there was still some vibration issues		
1	4 Operations protocols.			to be addressed. Is that correct?		
	5 MR. HUMPHRIES:	4	MR.	HENDERSON:		
1	6 Q. Well, at that time, the fact that the unit was	1	5 O	. I would have to check the record on that, but		
	7 not available would have been made known to	7	-	the Unit 1 at Holyrood had gone through		
	8 Newfoundland Power, and that there was a	8	3	significant balancing runs through November,		
	general concern that it was a peak-load	و)	and on December 1st, it was available to the		
1		10)	system. The vibration issues, which are		
1	not envisage an issue within the next 24 hours	11	l	corrected by balancing on the turbine, that		
1	during that period, but they werewould have	12	2	was complete by December 1st.		
1		13	MR.	DUMARESQUE:		
1		14	l Q	. Yes. As we discussed on December the 9th,		
1		15	5	when I went to Holyrood and talked to the		
1	6 MR. DUMARESQUE:	16	5	control room operators and yourself, I think		
1	7 Q. So at that point, you could haveyou would	17	7	we concluded that there were a number of run-		
1		d 18	3	ups on that particular unit, Unit 1, and of		
1	Power, but you didn't think it would be	19)	course, Unit 1 was also the unit that had to		
2	appropriate to communicate with the public in	20)	be totally replaced as a result of the		
2	a formal way that you had lost 100 megawatts	21		incident of January 11th, 2013. So at that		
2	of the 150 on that particular machine?	22	2	point, I know that certainly I wondered if, in		
2	3 MR. HENDERSON:	23	3	fact, the unit was not being returned		
2	Q. I have to say, at that time, we did not have a	24	1	prematurely, but as you're saying now, on that		
2	5 protocol for notifying the public, so at that	25	5	date, that you were confident that that unit		
	Page '	78		Page 80		
	time, it was something that we were managing,		l	would be performing as you expected all the		
1	and until we had the events and did our review	2	2	rest of them to be. There was nothing unusual		
	this yearwe've basically identified these	3	3	about that unit at that time?		
Ι.	4 types of situations and scenarios where they		MR.	HENDERSON:		
	would be more communications to the publicat	t 5	5 Q	. The unit had been totallythe balancing had		
	6 that time, we would not have identified, as a	1		all been done, and it met all of the		
	7 concern, that we had to notify the public, so	7	7	requirements for continuous reliable operation		
	8 it didn't happen, but as Ms. Dalley said, in	8	3	throughout the winter.		
	hindsight, we feel that if that would have	و	MR.	DUMARESQUE:		
1	been an event in the future, we would.	10) Q	. And as a result, I guess, of you having this		
1	1 MR. DUMARESQUE:	11		report filed with the PUB, and as a result of		
1	Q. Yeah. So at that time, there was no plan, but	12	2	applying all the due diligence to asset		
1	of course, now you have a plan. As you know,	13	3	readiness, you embarked upon a province-wide		
1	on December the 1st, 2014, you had to file a	14	ļ	advertising campaign. I know several weeks		
1	5 report to the Public Utilities Board showing	15	5	ago, youwell, just tofor people's		
1	the availability of generation, and certainly	16	5	clarification, I don't know how you would not		
1	7 the Board mandated you to provide updates	17	7	know about it, but anyway, it was the Ready		
1	regularly before that, but the December 1st	18	3	for Winter advertising campaign. Can you		
1	deadline was extremely real, and indeed, you	19)	please tell me why that was done, and what the		
2	1	20)	cost of doing that was?		
2	particular time, I noted to you, and that was	21	MS.	DALLEY:		
1 ~	2	100		Visit VV and advisor design of the construction of the constructio		

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24

25

Q. Yeah. We embarked upon that coming out of

last year, because what we wanted to do was

provide information to people of the province

around the state of readiness for the winter.

during my tour of Holyrood plant on December

the 9th, that although you had filed a report

and said that all things were ready, Unit 1

was classified--and that report as not--I

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Page 81 We understood that confidence in the clockericity system coming out of lust winter had been seriously diminished, our research told us that as well, so we wanted to advise people of the work that Hydro had put into the system, that we had accepted the system, that we had accepted the recommendations coming out of the various inquiries, and that we had done substantial work in getting ready for winter. We also work in getting ready for winter. We also work in getting ready for winter. We also wanted to provide information to customers on what they should do in light of outages to the deducate them on the advance notification protocol that was put in place, so that when we issued a Power Watch, Warming or Fimergency, they were aware of why that was happening and each of or, in particular, to conservation. There was confusion coming out of last January about whether the messages that we were asking customers—things we were asking customers to conversity they were aware of way that was happening and conversity about whether the messages that we were asking customers—there was confusion coming out of last January about whether the messages that we were asking to to them. So we wanted to provide advance in officiation. I guess, the information that you're asking—I guess, the information vou're giving them and the request that you're making to to them. So we wanted to provide advance notification. I guess, and awareness and education to customers to that ed. The cost of that program was about \$400,000, about that? MR. DIMARESQUE: New Foundard Payer of Department of the asks and the messaging, as you just indicated, is that correct? MR. DIMARESQUE: O, Veal. Throw, I saw a number of the ads, and- werever I went, but I don't recall seeing the green, orange or red notification protects. MR. DIMARESQUE: O, We attered vent, but I don't recall seeing the green, orange or red notif	Mai	ch 30, 2015 White	1-L	age	verbaum Court Reporters
We understood that confidence in the electricity system coming out of last winter 2 of the basis for that advertising campaign, the three system, that we had accepted the system, that we had accepted the remainadiant conting out of the various 7 MR. DIMARESQUE SMR. DIMARESQUE 2 Of the work in getting ready for winter. We also wanted to provide information to customers on what they should do in light of outages to more of surply, be it heat and Coleman operation of alternative generation and other stores of surply, be it heat and Coleman operation of portocol that was put in place, so that when operation of portocol that was put in place, so that when on several that we issued a Power Watch, Warming or Emergency, they were aware of why that was happening and essentially, they can take steps accordingly and also for, in particular to conservation. Three was confusion coming out of lists January about whether the messages that we were asking communication survey with same-day not find that was put in place, so that when the service of the work in the did, you know, 60 percent of customers—things we were asking customers to that end. The cost of surply is acceinct and tight in the information by the conservation. It means you need to be really succeinct and tight in the information that you're asking—l guess, the information hat you're asking—l guess, the information that you're asking—and awarened to provide advance nortification on, you know, rotating outages and calls for conservation. It means you need to be really succeinct and tight in the information that you're asking—l guess, the information that you're asking—and awarened to provide advance nortification of the supplies and calls for the supplies and calls for the supplies and the request that you're making to them. So we w		Page 81			Page 83
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had been seriously diminished, our research to dus that as well, so we wanted to advise people of the work that flydro had put into the system, that we had accepted the recommendations coming out of the various inquiries, and that we had done substantial wanted to provide information to customers on wanted to provide information to customers on was used to provide information to customers on owanted to provide and the place, so that well to the advance on the	2		2		
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5 MS_DALLEY: 5 mosple of the work that Hydro had put into the system, that we had accepted the recommendations coming out of the various inquiries, and that we had done substantial work in getting ready for winter. We also work in getting ready for winter. We also wanted to provide information to customers on the wanted to provide information to customers on their operation of alternative generation and other sources of supply, be it heat and Coleman sources of supply, be it heat and Coleman the like, and we also wanted to propose that was put in place, so that when the clustes them on the advance notification process and the like, and we also wanted to educate them on the advance notification process and sessentially, they can take steps accordingly and also for, in particular, to conservation. It means you need to be really research that we did, you know, 60 percent of customers were okay with same-day notification on, you know, rotating outages and calls for conservation. It means you need to be really succinct and tight in the information that you're asking-! Quest, the information to the very asking of the conservation. It means you need to be really succinct and tight in the information volus of the research on people before that or after that you're asking-! Quest, be after the conservation of the request that you're asking-! Quest, be information you're giving them and the request that you're making to them. So we wanted to provide advance of the reason of the research on people before that or after that you're asking-! Quest, be after the reason of	4	•	4	1	
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7 MR DUMARESQUE: 8 inquiries, and that we had done substantial 9 work in getting ready for winter. We also 10 wanted to provide information to customers on 11 what they should do in light of outages to 12 make sure that they were safe in their 13 operation of alternative generation and other 14 sources of supply, he it heat and Coleman 15 stoves and the like, and we also wanted to 16 educate them on the advance notification 17 protocol that was pur in place, so that when 18 we issued a Power Watch, Warning or Emergency, 19 they were aware of why that was happening and 20 essentially, they can take steps accordingly 21 and also for, in particular, to conservation. 22 There was confusion coming out of last January 23 about whether the messages that we were asking 24 customers-things we were asking customers to 25 do were clearly understood in the tight 26 research that we did, you know, 60 percent of 27 succinct and tight in the information that 28 you're asking-1 guess, the information that 29 you're asking-1 guess, the information that 39 you're asking-1 guess, and awareness and 210 cideaction to customers to that end. The cost of them. So we wanted to provide advance of the research on people before that or after that? 19 MS. DALLEY: 10 Q. What research in particular? The outage to munication survey was done jointly by Newfoundland Power and Newfoundland and datal for in the Hondard. 21 Was that there, or did I miss it? 22 Was that there, or did I miss it? 23 MR. DUMARESQUE: 24 Q. It was the edity forecasting, you do daily status briefing prior 25 to January of 2014 and - 21 MS. DALLEY: 20 Q. No know, rotating outages and calls for customers were okay with same-day notification on, you know, rotating outages and calls for lives in protocol and the outage-subsequent outage when did that take effect? 3 MS. DALLEY: 3 MS. DALLEY: 4 O. That was intere. So that came in after, and when we started it. 5 In Was late November. 5 MR. DUMARESQUE: 6 Q. So as a result to that communication, did you do the res			6	5 O	. Yes.
8	1	•	7	-	
9 work in getting ready for winter. We also 10 wanted to provide information to customers on 11 what they should do in light of outages to 12 make sure that they were safe in their 13 operation of alternative generation and other 14 sources of supply, be it heat and Coleman 15 stoves and the like, and we also wanted to 16 educate them on the advance notification 17 protocol that was put in place, so that when 18 we issued a Power Watch, Warning or Emergency, 19 they were aware of why that was happening and 20 essentially, they can take steps accordingly 21 and also for, in particular, to conservation. 22 There was confusion coming out of last January 23 about whether the messages that we were asking 24 customers—things we were asking 25 do were clearly understood in the tight 25 timeframes. Even in the advanced notification 26 protocol and the outage—subsequent outage 37 research that we did, you know, 60 percent of 48 customers were okay with same-day notification 49 giving them and the request that you're making 40 to them. So we wanted to provide advanced notification of them. So we wanted to provide advanced notification, I guess, and awareness and education to customers to that end. The cost of that program was about \$400,000, about \$1.4 g. Page \$2. them. So we wanted to provide advanced notification, I guess, and awareness and education to customers to that end. The cost of that program was about \$400,000, about \$1.4 g. Page \$2. there's no point in asking why it wasn't, it was late November. 19 MS. DALLEY: 19 MS. DALLEY: 20 Q. So as a result of that communication, did you do the research on people before that or after that? 19 MS. DALLEY: 19 MS. DALLEY: 20 Q. What recal Revenue and Face them on the tight wasn't there, of dark there, or did I miss it? 21 MS. DALLEY: 22 Q. No, it was not. 23 MS. DALLEY: 24 Q. It was not? Okay, it was not. I guess there's no point in asking why it wasn't, it here's no point in asking why it wasn't, it here's no point in asking why it wasn't there. So that came in a	8	_			-
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25 MR. DUMARESQUE: 25 MR. HENDERSON:	1				
	25 N	IR. DUMARESQUE:	25	MR.	HENDERSON:

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8 MR. MACDOUGALL:

Stephenville, Star Lake and Unit 3.

Obviously, 560 megawatts at that time was gone from the system. That was the status that you

filed with this Board as to where you were.

Why did it take that extra 30 or 29 minutes to

advise the public that we were indeed into a

note your comments at the beginning, for the

March 4th events. Certainly, we're aware that

the March 4th events are something that was

This panel would be able to go to some level

recent and that people have an interest in.

undergoing, and it is not part of the formal

planning for this process, so we're in your

hands, if you would like us to go farther. We

probably can't go too deep, we would be open

to continue to answer some questions, but I'm

cognizant of your comments at the beginning, and just wanted to re-raise those, and to let

you know that we could only go so far, in that

our investigations continue on that subject

on that, but investigations are still

record, that we weren't going to get into the

Q. Mr. Chair, before the panel responds, I do

Power Emergency system?

Page 87

Page 88

			Page 8
1	Q.	The process would have been the same.	The
2		power system operator, once the event or	issue
3		is identified, would be notifying the syste	em
4		on call person, who would then initiate the	he
5		communications out, and then the determine	ination
6		of the appropriate reaction or action to tak	te
7		with that event. In addition, like I said, if	
8		it was an issue at the Holyrood plant, the	en
9		the plant people would also be addressing	g it
10		through their on call.	
11	MR. I	DUMARESQUE:	

Q. Okay. So you know, without getting into the 12 cause of what happened on March the 4th, at 13 2:00 a.m. in the morning you knew that Unit 1, 14 the one that was--had vibration issues noted 15 16 in its December 1st report was down. You knew at 2:00 a.m. she would not be available. You 17 18 knew at 6:00 p.m. that when you tried the new CT Unit, she did not start. And why did it 19 take until 7:56 a.m., as the leader of the 20 Opposition pointed out for you, to issue a 21 22 Power Emergency notice and over--jump over the 23 other two notices, which you have told us that you had in place, you were going to abide by, 24 but obviously you did not do it? 25

Page 86

matter as well. 1

2 CHAIR:

Q. Well, I think we should hear on--I mean, this is not a technical question, this is a procedural question relating to corporate communications, I presume, Mr. Dumaresque, is it?

8 MR. DUMARESQUE:

Q. Absolutely. I'm not looking for any technical briefing on why this occurred. I'm asking only questions on exactly the timeline that occurred, and it has been published and recorded and filed with the Public Utilities Board, and indeed, I would like to know what communication took place at 2:00 a.m., who did you, Hydro, call? Which executive was called at 2:00 a.m. and say that our 170 megawatt Unit 1 is not available? When did you call Newfoundland Power and tell them that that Unit would not be available that day?

21 MS. DALLEY:

Q. So again, I'm going to look to Mr. Humphries. I can talk about when Corporate Communications was notified and the steps to the public, but I can't speak to the processes before that.

1 MS. DALLEY:

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24

25

Q. So from the perspective that--first of all, 2 the advance notification system, as I 3 mentioned earlier, was well designed in 4 5 response to the January supply outages of last year, and the triggers are actually, I guess, 6 7 prompted based on island-wide system reserves, 8 so at no point during those outages on March 4th and 5th did the system reserves actually 9 drop below the notification level. So that's 10 11 something that we will correct going forward 12 with I guess early notifications on what we're 13 looking at, a system--what we would I guess, 14 categorize, as system 15 vulnerabilities. So if we have a unit out, we have a line out for maintenance, the system 16 17 reserves are fine, but it turned out there are other contingencies that we need to be aware 18 19 of, so we will be implementing a new communications protocol to advise the public 20 of those, in essence, vulnerabilities. 21 22 MR. DUMARESOUE:

18 19 20 22 Q. Vulnerabilities, yes. According to your own 23 24

published report, which you gave and filed

with the PUB, at 7:25 a.m., we lost Hardwoods,

		I-I ag	-
	Page 89		Page 91
1 MR.	DUMARESQUE:	1	didn't trigger the system notifications, and
2 Q	So Corporate Communications was not notified	2	saying, okay, what advance notification do we
3	beforeat 2:00 a.m. or at any -	3	need in place, and are our timelines
4 MS.	DALLEY:	4	appropriate, considering that situation? You
5 Q	No.	5	know, so we're looking at seeing whether or
6 MR.	DUMARESQUE:	6	not we can get to a 15-minute window to get
7 Q	When were you notified?	7	information out. We're trying to also
8 MS.	DALLEY:	8	determine how we can streamline the processes
9 Q	So Corporate Communications received	9	between utilities once again. So one of the
10	notification at 7:18 a.m. in the morning. The	10	things which we've recommended to Newfoundland
11	communications team, like most everyone else,	11	Power, for example, is that once there is an
12	were actually in their homes, and getting	12	immediateor a system event that is immediate
13	their families and kids ready to go to school,	13	and impacts their customers as well as ours,
14	etcetera, so we had a remote mobilisation of	14	that is system prompted, that we get their
15	that team. Contact was made with Newfoundland	15	system operations and communications team on a
16	Power from the communications team at 7:25.	16	conference call with our system operations and
17	There are various conversations that take	17	communications team, so that we eliminate a
18	place in Newfoundland Power between their	18	lot of the web of calls that are happening as
19	communications team and their systems	19	we clarify, and just get on a call and have
20	operations team, and our side between our	20	that determination made, and then move from
21	system operations team and our communications	21	there. So there are things like that that
22	team, to make the determination around whether	22	we're investigating, that we hope to
23	or not it was a power emergency or a power	23	streamline the situation that we experienced
24	warning. The determination was made, and you	24	on March 4th.
25	can appreciate the public and customer	25 (1	11.45 a m)
25	can appreciate the public and customer	23 (1	1:45 a.m.)
25		<u> </u>	·
	Page 90		Page 92
1	Page 90 pressure that happens, because they lose their	1 M	Page 92 IR. DUMARESQUE:
1 2	Page 90 pressure that happens, because they lose their power immediately, so they want information	1 M	Page 92 IR. DUMARESQUE: Q. Thank you. So 7:18, Corporate Communications
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1 2 3 4 5	Page 90 pressure that happens, because they lose their power immediately, so they want information immediately. From our perspective, we have to assess the situation, understand what's happening, so I've used the example before or	1 M 2 3 4 5	Page 92 IR. DUMARESQUE: Q. Thank you. So 7:18, Corporate Communications was informed. At 2:00 a.m., after having the unit down then for some 60 to 70 hours, at 2 a.m., the operator of the control room knew
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Page 95

Marc	11 50, 2015 William	1-1 aş	se verbatili Court Reporter
	Page 93		Page 9:
1	time, with that coming on, there would have	1	to make sure after January 2nd to the 8th that
2	been no issue from the system perspective. So	2	this would not happen again? And I'm only
3	it was actually when the combustion turbine	3	trying to recreate real life experiences. No
4	failed to start in the morningis really when	4	research, no theory, no fancy drawings. I'm
5	it became apparent that the situation had	5	talking about what happened in a
6	gotten to the point that there may need action	6	communications protocol in real life.
7	to be taken. At that time, there was a number	7 N	AS. GLYNN:
8	of phone calls. As Ms. Dalley talked about,	8	Q. And the investigation into those events is
9	there wascommunications got involved, but it	9	continuing.
10	was more in aroundwithin a half an hour, I'd	10 N	MR. DUMARESQUE:
11	say, of 6:00 a.m. that the phone calls started	11	Q. The cause of them, I understand and respect,
12	to notify people, and I don't have all the	12	is continuing, but I'd like to knowbecause
13	details in my head as to how all of that	13	this is the only real example that we can see
14	happened, but I know that, for instance,	14	how the improved communications was really
15	myself, I was notified in that timeframe, and	15	tested, and how the protocols that were in
16	in discussions with people tomaking phone	16	placewhether they worked or now, and I mean,
17	calls to understand the situation and	17	I'm hearing right now that with one unit gone
18	understand what the impact might be of the	18	at Holyrood, there was no call made from the
19	situation. Knowing that it wasn't a system	19	control room to anybody on the Nalcor
20	reserve situation with respect to the protocol	20	executive or the Hydro executive, and if
21	that had been established, this was a	21	that's the case, I mean, that's pretty
22	different situation that was evolving that	22	alarming. Obviously, this system is broken,
23	morning, which was very specific to the Avalon	23	fundamentally just as broken now as it was in
24	Peninsula and the voltage levels on the Avalon	24	January of 2014.
25	Peninsula.	25 N	AS. GLYNN:
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Page 96

1 MR. DUMARESQUE:

Q. Okay. So are you saying, then, that at 2:00 a.m. when the 170 megawatts of power was 3 schedule to come back and it could not come 4 5 back because the operator couldn't get the machine to go, are you saying that the 6 7 operator then decided, on its own, not to call 8 anybody, knowing that we were into a very cold 9 morning and that the demand would rise dramatically? And you're saying that he made 10 11 no call whatsoever to anybody?

12 MS. GLYNN:

13 Q. Mr. Dumaresque, the events of March 4th, none of this information that is being asked has 14 15 been provided on the written record by Hydro. The information that you're asking for the 16 17 panel to provide is beyond the scope of this 18 hearing.

19 MR. DUMARESQUE:

Q. Well, I take my direction from the Chair, with 20 21 respect, and at this point, I understood that 22 I'm talking about only the procedural communications, which is central to what was 23 24 done. What did Hydro do to change the 25 communications internally and with the public

Q. So the cause of that event and the response to that event is still under investigation by Hydro and is still pending before this Board.

4 MR. KENNEDY:

Q. With all due respect, though, we're still just asking a question about communication. It's a simple question, can be asked simply or answered. It should be answered simply by saying this person called this person. That did not happen, and again, we go back to the point that Mr. Dumaresque was making insofar as there is supposed to have been a new and improved communication system, but it doesn't appear that there was any communication system or in fact, any change in a communication system, or certainly not one that this panel is willing to discuss, and again, I mean, we could ask, what is the change that was made in January of 2014? Where is that? Where is the hard copy? Where is the change? And it's not being answered.

22 MR. MACDOUGALL:

Q. Mr. Chair, with respect, on the record, I 23 24 believe that the panel has been attempting to 25 address the questions as best they can within

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	Page 97		Page 99
1	the ambit of the point I just recently raised,	1	Q. I think youdid you answer that question or
2	and the panel, particularly Ms. Dalley, has	2	not?
3	specificallyexcuse me.	3	MR. HENDERSON: (phonetic)
4	CHAIR:	4	Q. I did.
5	Q. That is a hard one for me.	5	CHAIR:
6	MR. MACDOUGALL:	6	Q. Well, repeat for the record what the answer
7	Q. Specifically stated that the protocol that was	7	is, so that we'll clearly know.
8	put in place deals with the amount of system	8	MR. DUMARESQUE:
9	reserves that are in place, and then Mr.	9	Q. Yes. At 2:00 a.m., when the operator in the
10	Henderson specifically stated also that this	10	plant knew that your scheduled return of Unit
11	issue came on quickly, and that the situation	11	1 would not be happening for that day, where
12	that occurred was not specifically within that	12	who made the call, or was there a call made
13	protocol, and then he's explained what was	13	from Holyrood to the Executive of Nalcor, and
14	occurring on that day, and Ms. Dalley has	14	if so, who was the call made to, and what did
15	indicated that those events are continuing to	15	they do after receiving such a call?
16	be under investigation and that they will be	16	MR. HENDERSON:
17	reviewed with respect to potentially taking	17	Q. There was no call made. The issue that day
18	the protocol and enhancing it and making the	18	was not a system reserve, which fell into our
19	protocol better going forward. So I think	19	protocol. On that day, there was two units on
20	that is the record to date, which I don't	20	start up for that morning. It wasn't until
21	think, respectfully, is the comments that have	21	6:00 or, well, shortly after 6:00 a.m., that
22	just been made by Mr. Dumaresque and his	22	the situation became evident, that the
23	counsel. So I just wanted to point that out,	23	combustion turbine would not be on, and
24	and I do believe Hydro is able to answer	24	therefore the situation evolved at that point
25	questions with respective communication within	25	
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1	Page 98	1	Page 100
1 2	Page 98 that ambit.	1 2	Page 100 communications going on atstarting in around
2	Page 98 that ambit. MR. KENNEDY:	2	Page 100 communications going on atstarting in around 6:30, in which the system -
2 3	Page 98 that ambit. MR. KENNEDY: Q. And Mr. Chair, this Board should have appeared	2 3	Page 100 communications going on atstarting in around 6:30, in which the system - CHAIR:
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March 30, 2015	Multi-P	age TM	Verbatim Court Reporters
Paş	ge 101		Page 103
1 MR. DUMARESQUE:	1	MR. HI	ENDERSON:
2 Q. Yes, I have.	2	Q.	On March 3rd, it was on the system providing
3 CHAIR:	3		spinning reserve, which means that theit was
4 Q. And please don't feel, you know, I'm not	t 4		on at a very low load. It wasn't at full
5 trying to -	5		load, it was at a low load, and it was ready
6 MR. DUMARESQUE:	6		to move up to a higher load if the system
7 Q. Thank you very much. No, I have quite a fe	ew 7		required it.
8 more questions.	8	(12:30) p.m.)
9 CHAIR:	9	MR. DU	JMARESQUE:
10 Q. Okay, no. Well, let's take a 15-minute break	k. 10	Q.	Okay. So at 12:00, when you wentwell, you
11 MR. DUMARESQUE:	11		were probably home before that, but at 12:00
12 Q. I appreciate the break.	12		that night when she was shut down, certainly
13 CHAIR:	13		you had no reason to believe that she wouldn't
14 Q. Thank you.	14		start at 6:00 in the morning?
15 (RECESS 11:57 a.m.)	15	MR. HI	ENDERSON:
16 (RESUME 12:20 a.m.)	16	Q.	That's correct. It had been used on the
17 CHAIR:	17		previousas I said, that day on the 3rdon
18 Q. So Mr. Dumaresque, we are back to you, sir.	. 18		March 2nd and on February 28th withyou know,
19 MR. DUMARESQUE:	19		successfully.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we left it jus	st 20	MR. DU	JMARESQUE:
before the break, we heard that there was no	21	Q.	So can you please tell me what the start-up
call made at 2:00, between 2:00 and 6:00 a.m	m. 22		time would be after this unit has been idle
on March the 4th, knowing that we had 17	70 23		for any number of hours? What would be the
24 megawatts of power not available for that da	ay 24		start-up time for maximum capacity, knowing
25 with rising demand, very cold day, and as	25		that we were going to need 100 plus megawatts
Pag	ge 102		Page 104
we've heard from Mr. Anderson earlier, th	ne 1		now that the 170 wasn't available, what would
2 fall back plan, I guess, or the expectation	2		be the start-up time?
would be, without that generation, they would	ld 3	MR. H	ENDERSON:
4 be able to turn to the new combustion turbing	ie 4	Q.	Well, once the generator is put on to the
5 to kick in at 6:00 a.m. So I'd like to ask	5		system, connected, it's about 20 minutes to go
6 you, Mr. Henderson, you indicated earlier as	sa 6		from it's zero output to full output, and then
7 result of an inquiry from the industrial	7		from a start, it's in around 40 minutes from
8 customers that the CT had operated or had	8		start to full output.
9 performed several times prior to this, but at	9	MR. D	UMARESQUE:
any point fromin this year up to March the	e 10	Q.	Yeah. So it would take 40/45 minutes, and I
4th, was the combustion turbine called upon	to 11		think that's the evidence that you filed with
assist in a peak demand capacity?	12		the Board, around 45 minutes, it would take,
13 MR. HENDERSON:	13		to get it to full capacity assisting the
14 Q. The combustion turbine was put on for systematical quantities of the property of the pro	em 14		system. So I guess it's certainlymaybe you
reserves starting on February 28th. It ran	15		could also go back and indicate to us what
twice that day, during the morning peak, the			would normally be the peak period of demand on
evening peak. Then on March 2nd, it also ra	an 17		a cold winter's day? Would that be 9:00 or
for the morning peak and the evening peak	c. 18		what time?
March 3rd it ran all day, pretty well from			ENDERSON:
7:00 in the morning to midnight, and but the	en 20	Q.	The daily load shape changes throughout the
on March 4th, it didn't get on until 7:25,	21		year, but generally speaking, there's a peak

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in the morning when people first get up in the

morning and showering and getting ready for

work and school, and then there's another peak in the evening when people are having their

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23 MR. DUMARESQUE:

when it was expected to be on at around 6:00.

Q. So on March the 3rd, then, all day it was

contributing power to the grid as required?

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			Pag	e 105	
	1		supper and people are home from work and doing	<u>,</u>	1
	2		their home activities. So there's two times		2
	3		each day. Those peaks, in the evening they		3
	4		could be three or four hours long. That would		4 1
	5		be on a very cold day, it could run until		5
	6		later in the evening. And generally speaking,		6
	7		in the morning, it would probably run from		7
	8		7:30 until perhaps 9:30/10:00, in that range,		8 1
	9		and then it tends to fall off after that.		9
1	0		There can be, depending on the time of the		10
1	1		year, a bit of a peak around lunch time, and		11
1	2		that would be, I think, more typically in the		12
1	3		summer time when there's not so much heating		13
1	4		load involved.		14
1	5 M	R. D	UMARESQUE:		15
1	6	Q.	Yeah, so it's fair to say that on a cold		16
1	7		winter's morning, that peak would probably be		17
1	8		in the area of 7:00 to 7:30, and you knew at		18
1	9		2:00 a.m. that you didn't have 170 megawatts		19
2	0		available, and of course, you knew in the		20
2	1		event that the unit would not start, that you		21 1
2	2		were looking at about 45 minutes from start to		22
2	3		full performance. Certainly wouldn't it have		23
2	4		been prudent to have started up the unit		24
2	5		before 6:00 am. and see if, in fact, she was		25
			Pag	e 106	
	1		going to be able to perform as required?		1

option and put together a very aggressive project schedule to put together and establish

2 MR. HENDERSON:

Q. The unit had been operating successfully in 3 the previous seven days, coming on as required 4 5 at the time that the system operator asked for it to come on. Basically, the unit is put on 6 7 as needed, and we don't have it on for hours 8 when it's not, and it normally would perform 9 such that you're putting it on in advance, but you wouldn't put it in several hours in 10 11 advance. So we've been looking at that, 12 certainly, in the event that happened that 13 day, and looking at what is the appropriate time to start it up, and we're looking at 14 15 those protocols in terms of how much earlier the unit might be started to allow for some 16 17 starting failures.

18 MR. DUMARESQUE:

19 Q. Thank you. Okay, well, I'd like now to turn to the question of the process of acquiring 20 and putting the combustion turbine in place, 21 22 and a couple of things I'd like to start with, 23 and that is in your earlier presentation 24 today, you indicated that you were undertaking an aggressive timeline, that in the ordinary 25

Page 107 schedule of events to have such an addition to the generation as this, that it would take in the order of 18 to 24 months, is that correct? MR. HENDERSON: Q. That's generally correct. When we are putting

forward plans for that type of a plant, that would be the timeframe that you'd expect.

MR. DUMARESOUE:

Q. I'd like to draw your attention to your application that you made to the Public Utilities Board on April the 10th, 2014, Page 8, and you have indicated specifically that an analysis with budgetary quotations from suppliers as determined, that by going to the pre-owned but unused or after market, a combustion turbine can be brought into service at Holyrood in late 2014, and nowhere in your application did you ever raise any concern about not being able to put this unit in place by December of 2014, is that correct?

MR. HENDERSON: Q. What we were doing is we had identified this and commission a 120--or we were looking at

that time, 100-megawatt facility, and we were looking at an aggressive schedule to bring that in, which we knew was a much shorter timeframe than it would typically take, and so from it going to an already-built turbine, we could cut down, certainly, on the schedule, but it was still a very aggressive schedule, to take a site which had nothing there and construct all of the civil works, get all of your permitting and everything in place, and to construct and design and do all the engineering at the one time to establish a facility of that nature. It was very aggressive, and we put forward the aggressive schedule and worked with the supplier to keep on that, but with a strong focus of ensuring that what we put in is going to be there for the long term, that it would be a reliable facility built with required quality to ensure that it's--it will meet the long-term needs of our customers. So it was aggressive, and we stayed focused, and we had a lot of people working very long days to ensure that was done as quickly as we could, again ensuring proper safety and quality.

Page 108

Page 109 Page 111 Q. In your submission to the Public Utilities 1 MR. DUMARESQUE: 1 2 Q. Thank you for that response, but you never 2 Board, you indicated that a used or--not--what answered my question. Would you please tell was it--not previously used unit, but isn't it 3 3 me if you indicated, in your application to true that you had a choice? Isn't it true 4 4 5 the Board on April the 10th, at any time in 5 that there was a new capacity, 100 megawatts that presentation, which was tens of pages, of new capacity, brand new capacity, that was 6 6 and subsequent to evidence, at any time did available to you and came out through the 7 7 8 you indicate to the Public Utilities Board 8 tender process? 9 that you are looking at 18 to 24 months to be 9 MR. HENDERSON: 10 able to put this unit in place, and Q. There were four suppliers that bid on that 10 specifically, not only to the--that you didn't job, and I think--well, just let me make sure 11 11 12 give that indication, but indeed, you gave 12 I have it. Yes, there was four that bid on every indication that this would be done for the job, and I believe two of them were for 13 13 14 December or the winter season of 2014/2015, 14 new units, and the other two were for unused isn't that correct? units that had been previously constructed. 15 15 16 MR. HENDERSON: 16 MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. The schedule which we would have provided Q. Yes. So contrary to what you submitted in the 17 17 would have indicated that we were working and application to the Board on April the 10th, 18 18 19 had set out a schedule to have this in service 19 there were in fact brand new units that became late in 2014. available as a result of the tender process, 20 20 21 MR. DUMARESQUE: 21 but I'd just like to ask you, do you know a 22 Q. So at no point in the application did you 22 Mr. Kerry McDonough? 23 raise the concern, and therefore, I submit you 23 MR. HENDERSON: should never indicate to the public now that 24 Q. No, I don't. 25 there was ever any concern, that it would take 25 MR. DUMARESQUE: Page 112 Page 110 18 to 24 months, because, indeed, you gave 1 1 Q. Okay. I am not surprised that you wouldn't every piece of evidence to say that you would 2 know him, but Mr. McDonough is an employee of 2 3 be supporting--you would be able to have this 3 PW Power Systems, and PW Power Systems, I CT in place by the fall of 2014. Furthermore, 4 would submit to you, and this individual, is 4 5 could you please indicate to me in the tender 5 very well known to Newfoundland Hydro, and for document that you issued on April the 7th, did 6 6 two and a half years, he was working very 7 you specify an in-service date for this unit, 7 close with your--the engineering department as 8 this successful unit? Did you specify an into a possible configuration of additional 8 9 service date? 9 generation, and indeed, worked quite closely, 10 MR. HENDERSON: 10 and can you confirm that indeed his company, 11 Q. The tender did specify an in-service date, 11 PW Power Systems, put forward four brand new which would have been the--I think the first 12 12 Mitsubishi units in the tender of April 21st? 13 week of December. 13 MR. HENDERSON: 14 MR. DUMARESQUE: 14 O. There is an RFI that has all of this Q. I would like to draw your attention to that, 15 15 information there, it's GTCANLH004, and PW and as a matter of fact, you filed evidence 16 Power Systems was one of the bidders on the 16 17 with this Board indicating that the central--17 tender, and so the answer is yes, they did 18 one of the central conditions that you would 18 bid. 19 attach to your tender that you put out on 19 MR. DUMARESQUE: April the 7th was that it must be in service 20 20 Q. They did bid, and could you please indicate to 21 21 by December the 7th, is that correct? the public of the province if they gave an in-22 MR. HENDERSON: 22 service date of guarantee that this would be

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in place?

Q. They, like the other bidders that were

24 MR. HENDERSON:

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25 MR. DUMARESQUE:

Q. The tender was only for those facilities that

could meet that kind of aggressive timetable.

March 30, 2015	Iulti-Page TM	ye [™] Verbatim Court Reporters		
Page	113	Page 115		
considered, all had between the 5th and the	1	review, so I mean, we will have more detailed		
2 7th of December as their proposed in-service	2	information when that is done, and that may be		
3 date.	3	a better time for you to ask these questions		
4 MR. DUMARESQUE:	4	of Hydro, you know.		
5 Q. And can you please confirm that in this case,	5 MR. Γ	DUMARESQUE:		
6 their in-service date was December the 5th?	6 Q.	Well, I respectfully submit, Mr. Chairman,		
7 MR. HENDERSON:	7	that when we had this discussion, internal		
8 Q. That's right.	8	counsel, the prudency review was being done		
9 MR. DUMARESQUE:	9	particularly to deal with the costs and the		
10 Q. Yes, and the in-service date for the other	10	appropriateness of the costs, and I certainly-		
tender, ProEnergy, was December the 7th?	11	-at no point, am I going to be dealing with		
12 MR. HENDERSON:	12	that aspect of this purchase. I am speaking		
13 Q. ProEnergy, actually, was December 6th.	13	to the issues of reliability. What did Hydro		
14 MR. DUMARESQUE:	14	do as a result of the recommendations of		
15 Q. December 6th, sorry, yeah. It met your	15	Liberty to prepare us, that they would have		
December 7th requirement, and as you know	v, 16	the generation available, that the DarkNL		
these brand new units, contrary to the	17	would not happen again, and of course, Liberty		
application to the Public Utilities Board, and	18	insisted in one of its key recommendations		
I would submit, contrary to every piece of	19	that the generation they had planned for 2015		
20 evidence that has been given to the public,	20	be moved up to 2014, and I would like to know,		
indeed on April the 21st, Newfoundland Hydr	ro 21	on the questions of reliability. Reliability		
had a choice, either to accept a seven-year-	22	only, not on the costing, and I look forward		
old turbine, or they could go with brand new	23	to the prudency review and the time during the		
units. So, I'd like to ask you what gave you	24	GRA where the costing the appropriateness of		
25 the confidence, what gave you the reassurance	25	the costing will be thoroughly analyzed.		
Page	114	Page 116		
that you should proceed with the seven-year-	1 CHAI	R:		
2 old turbine and the five-year-old generator,	2 Q.	Well, I guess we'll -		
as opposed to a brand new generating capacity	3 MS. G	GLYNN:		
4 with -	4 Q.	So Mr. Dumaresque, are you finished with that		
5 CHAIR:	5	line of questioning or are you going -		
6 Q. Mr. Dumaresque, I mean, these are issuesyou	u 6 MR. D	DUMARESQUE:		
7 know, the Board has opened up a prudency	7 Q.	No, no. No, I'm not finished with that line		
8 review on these and related matters, and we'll	8	of questioning.		
9 be assisted by Liberty, and that report,	9 MS. G	GLYNN:		
naturally, of course, will be a matter of	10 Q.	Okay. So one of the things that Liberty will		
public record and the examination and	11	be looking at is the choices that were before		
consideration by the Board, so Ibut I don't	12	Hydro, and they will be providing a report to		
want to, you know, prevent you from asking	13	all of the interveners in this proceeding and		
14 your questions, but I do think that it's kind	14	addressing the choices that were available,		
ofyou're kind of getting beyondin the	15	the choice that was made by Hydro, and whether		
absence of theyou know, the reports and the	16	that was a reasonable choice in those		
examination that we're going to, in fact, do	17	circumstances, so that -		
on this whole March 15th event, so.	18 CHAI	R:		
19 MR. DUMARESQUE:	19 Q.	I mean, it's not just cost. There's the range		
20 Q. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit that	20	of alternatives that were available, and		
21 the prudency review -	21	whether the final decision made was what was		
22 CHAIR:	22	prudent with respect to cost and, you know,		
The array of the state of the s	1 = =			

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24 MR. DUMARESQUE:

operational consideration, so you know.

Q. Well, Mr. Chairman, I mean, the aspect of the

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Q. Yeah, I'm sorry, not just the--on the turbine-

-the turbine issue will be the--the combustion

turbine issue will be a part of our prudency

Mar	rch 30, 2015 Mult	i-P	age	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 117			Page 119
1	reliability and the appropriateness of this	1		know that quite well. We will leave no stone
2	decision, in my opinion, I certainly was not	2		unturned, that old hackneyed cliche.
3	led to believe that this would be a	3	MR. D	OUMARESQUE:
4	significant part of the prudence review and	4		Okay. Well, if that's your decision, then
5	but in light of the fact that on March the 4th	5		certainly I will abide by it, and keep my
6	at 6:00 a.m. whenthe first time that this	6		questions and issues relating to this
7	unit was called upon to provide emergency	7		generator for the appropriate time.
8	power, it would not start, and I would like to	8	CHAI	
9	know what gave them the confidence to go ahead	9	Q.	Yeah. Have you anything further?
10	with this unit, knowing that particular	10	MR. D	DUMARESQUE:
11	situation.	11	Q.	No, because when I was asked what I would be
12 C	CHAIR:	12		dealing with by the Board, it was quite clear
13	Q. Well, I can only repeat for you that the	13		in the public declaration of what I would be
14	events of March past are under consideration	14		dealing with that I would be dealing with the
15	and under examination and will be fullyyou	15		combustion turbine. Not whether she looked
16	know, fully documented and fully exposed to	16		good, or not whether there was, you know, a
17	public consideration and public comment.	17		record of performance. I never intended to
18 M	MR. DUMARESQUE:	18		come here and discuss the looks of her.
19	Q. Oh, yes, -	19		Obviously, I intended, and I think everybody
20 C	CHAIR:	20		expected that I would have some questions as
21	Q. I'm just wondering if you're not getting ahead	21		to why they chose to buy a seven-year-old
22	of your story. I know you have a story, and	22		turbine, and I mean, the very fact is, Mr.
23	you're certainly entitled to tell it, and that	23		Chairman, that on April the 21st, they
24	is your right, and you can certainly have it,	24		accepted, and on May the 16th, they signed a
25	but I wonder if you're not, perhaps in the	25		\$100-million contract to have this unit in
	Page 118			Page 120
1	advance of the Board having properly	1		service by December the 6th, and that did not
2	considered the matterwhether or not you're	2		happen, and therefore, I wanted to ask them
3	perhaps getting ahead of your story, not	3		why they would go this way, when they had
4	allowing us to proceed with the utility to	4		clearly the choice to buy brand new units that
5	address this situation. I mean, all these	5		came with a full manufacturer's warranty, as
6	questions, any and every question that you may	6		opposed to no warranty and many, many other
7	have, will certainly beyou know, obviously,	7		things that were wrong about this particular
8	as you know, you've been intimately involved	8		unit, that certainly the people of the
9	in this process, will be answered by the	9		province are not aware of and I believe should
10	utility and considered in the course of	10		be aware of.
11	proceedings.	11	(12:4	5 p.m.)
12 M	MR. DUMARESQUE:	12	MS. G	LYNN:
13	Q. Well, of course, Mr. Chairman, I'm guided by	13	Q.	Mr. Dumaresque, your indication to the Board
14	yourself and the Board, and if you don't feel	14		was that you wanted to speak to the combustion
15	it's appropriate at this time to deal with the	15		turbine not being online on December 6th. You
16	issue of reliability and what led the utility	16		did not indicate that you wanted to get into
17	to purchase this seven-year-old generator,	17		the background of that decision. That
18	certainly then I will adhere to your decision.	18		decision is being looked at by Liberty, and
19 C	CHAIR:	19		will be the subject of a separate review by
20	Q. Well, I honestly thinkI mean, we can go	20		this Board.
21	back, but I honestly think we should allow the			DUMARESQUE:
22	Board to proceed and do the job that it'sit	22		Okay, well, I guess I canI'm only allowed to
23	can and will do in this matter, and you will	23		ask -
24	have your questions answered in due course. I	24	CHAI	R:
125	can accure you at that ac you at course you	125	0	And on I won just reminded I meen work

Q. And as I was just reminded, I mean, your

can assure you of that, as you--of course, you

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TAT	arth 50, 2015	Mulu-F	rage verbaum Court Reporters
	Pa	ge 121	Page 123
1	questions now are in the public record, and	i	1 Q. What?
2	they will go to Hydro, and Hydro will have	to 2	2 CHAIR:
3	answer those questions in the course of the	, [3 Q. As you say, she looked good, though.
4	prudency, I mean.	4	4 MR. DUMARESQUE:
5	MR. DUMARESQUE:		5 Q. Well, actually on the JanuaryI think it was
6	Q. Okay. So I guess I can ascertain, then, that		6 December the 9th, when I went to visit
7		on /	7 Holyrood, I was actually steered aside, and
8	turbine, as contracted on May the 16th for	. {	8 was told I could look at her as I was passing
9	\$100 million, to be in service by December	the 9	9 for the four seconds it would take the bus to
10	6th, why was she not in service on Decemb	ber 10	go by, so I really never even got a good look
11		1	
12	MR. HENDERSON:	12	pictures that were all over the internet for
13	Q. There are many things that happen in the-	- 13	-
14			14 CHAIR:
15		1:	Q. Well, maybe we'll arrange a proper look for
16			you, at least. Anyway, have you got any
17	-		
18			18 MR. DUMARESQUE:
19			-
20		_	· · · ·
21	•		21 CHAIR:
22	-	22	Q. Okay. The next on the list is the Consumer
23		I	-
24			24 MR. JOHNSON:
25	•	I	Q. Just a couple of minor issues. Just to
	P _a	ge 122	Page 124
1	1.1 .1 .1 .1 .0.1100	_	clarify for those present, the Board has asked
2		I	back in February whether parties wanted to
3		I	provide further evidence and to cross-examine
4			on the basis of the voluminous record that has
5			5 already been put before the Board, and as I
6			6 indicated in my letter to the Board on
7			7 February 23rd, in light of the very
8			8 substantial agreement of Hydro, in particular,
9			9 and Newfoundland Power, and certainly
10			Newfoundland Power agreed with the
11		11	
12			Consumer Advocate would have no need to cross-
13		I	examine Hydro or Newfoundland Power on the
14		·	evidence filed to date in the inquiry, and I
15	·	1:	
ı	MR. DUMARESQUE:		to say that the Consumer Advocate regards the
17			
18			
19		I	matter, and their findings and recommendations
20	-	20	
21			-
22		22	-
ı	CHAIR:	23	
يرا	O Olean Assume and also leaded as ad though		Manager of the second of the s

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the appointed date, which has been agreed to

be April 27th. I'll also be engaged in

25 MR. DUMARESQUE:

Q. Okay. As you say, she looked good, though.

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	Page 125
1	Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro's ongoing
2	general rate application, which will be
3	precisely examining Hydro's prudence in
4	relation to Hydro's capital and operating
5	expenses associated with the supply issues and
6	power outages experienced by the island
7	interconnected customers last winter. So at
8	this stage, if I could use the vernacular,
9	with the voluminous record before the Board,
10	this is the furthest thing from who done it,
11	and so I just want to ask a question or two as
12	a follow up as regards the advance
13	notification protocol, and I don't intend to
14	go over the March 4th round again, but I just
15	want to get my head around the notification
16	that's been happening recently. For instance,
17	on March 12th, Hydro, as you're probably
18	aware, issued a customer advisory advising
19	that one of the three Holyrood units was taken
20	offline the previous night for an emergency
21	repair, and my question was, why was that
22	notification given? Was that something that
23	fit your Power Watch scheme, or was there
24	another reason for that notification?
25	MS. DALLEY:

Page 127

or do we, you know, have another level added to it. So we're still investigating it, but

on March 12th, we felt it was prudent, considering the recent experience, to advise

5 customers that there was a unit out of

6 service.

7 MR. JOHNSON:

Q. So your - is it the current expectation that the public of the province, at least the customers on the Island Interconnected System, will know when there's a unit down?

12 MS. DALLEY:

Q. I think that's what we're investigating and saying, yes, and that includes - you know, we're having discussions, and again this hasn't been finalized, so I apologize to the Board because it's discussions we're still having. As I think everyone here can appreciate, we have units coming in and out of service all the time, so they come off for regular repairs, they come off for maintenance, units in Holyrood come off for maybe three or four hours to have something happen, so we're trying to put some parameters around it so there's guidance on a consistent

Page 126

rage 120

1 Q. The answer is no, it doesn't fit the scheme that we currently have in place, because the 2 3 advance notification protocol, as it has been developed, is based on system reserves and 4 5 driven by a long-term--well, a seven-day window to the system reserves, but coming out 6 7 of the March 4th outage, which we're maybe not 8 speaking about, led us to understand that we 9 needed to communicate with people when there are what we would say are, you know, 10 11 vulnerabilities on the system or a 12 contingency--you know, our contingencies, I guess, are reduced. So we have a unit out in 13 Holyrood, we felt it was important to advise 14 15 people of that. If have a transmission line, a main transmission line out coming to the 16 17 Avalon Peninsula, we feel it's important to advise customers of that. To some degree, 18 19 we're going to--so we haven't completed this work, but we're looking at the advance 20 21 notification system now in light of the, you know, immediate events versus something we 22 have a preview to over a longer period, and 23 saying, okay, do we incorporate notifications 24

Page 128 basis versus judgment on a per incident basis

basis versus judgment on a per incident basis
where then you're relying on someone to make
that call. There are a number of

contingencies that we could be looking at. For
 example, if we have a line on the Great
 Northern Peninsula out of service for

7 maintenance in the summer, but the load

doesn't dictate there would be any issues, do
we provide notification to customers. I think

what is probably fair to articulate is that we understand that there is a desire amongst

customers to have had some warning that something is coming, and unplanned outages,

> while we understand most customers anticipate they might happen, they would like to have

some notification so that they can make plans.

You know, we have to balance that with educating them around the risk that is

inherent because we take units on and off all the time. So if we continue to notify people

of that, then indeed they may become somewhat

dull to that information and no longer respond. So it's a balance of providing that

information, but yet anticipating what the

risk is. We have people who are monitoring

of the type we issued on Holyrood into that,

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March 30, 2015 Multi		age Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page 129	Page 131
our system regularly now, looking at o	our 1	CHAIR:
2 reserves, you know, from a public perspec	ctive. 2	Q. I mean, I'll take your - I'll be guided by
3 Indeed, on social media, they're creating	ng 3	whatever you people feel is appropriate.
4 their own chats about what's happening o	on the 4	KELLY, Q.C.:
5 system. So we're trying, I guess, in real	1 5	Q. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would expect we
6 time to respond to that and put informati	ion 6	would finish. We anticipate about fifteen to
7 out there, but yet educate the public on w	hat 7	twenty minutes in the initial presentation,
8 that information is. A longwinded way		and then if there are a few questions.
9 saying it's in progress, and I don't have		CHAIR:
definitive plan around what that's going	to 10	Q. Okay, do the intervenors also think that we
look like going forward.	11	can get through by around 2 o'clock? Would
12 MR. JOHNSON:	12	1 ,
13 Q. Okay. The rest of my inquiries regardi		think that's possible?
March 4th, I think they have been hand	lled 14	MR. DUMARESQUE:
here, so that would be my question for y	ou. 15	Q. They got no CT, so - I think so, yes.
16 Thank you.	16	MS. GLYNN:
17 CHAIR:	17	Q. Well, then just a short time to change the
18 Q. So you're finished, sir.	18	presenter.
19 MR. JOHNSON:	19	CHAIR:
20 Q. Yes.	20	Q. Mr. Kelly, over to you, sir.
21 CHAIR:	21	KELLY, Q.C.:
22 Q. Mr. Coxworthy for the Industrial Custom		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
23 you -	23	1
24 MR. COXWORTHY:	24	
25 Q. Just a very brief comment, Mr. Chair, th	ank 25	Smith is the President and Chief Executive
	Page 130	Page 132
1 you. The questions of the Industrial	1	Officer of Newfoundland Power. He has held
2 Customers were addressed in the present	ation 2	that position since August of 2014. During
and in the questions that have been posed	d by 3	the January, 2014, event, Mr. Smith was the
4 the previous parties and answered by t	he 4	Vice President of Customer Operations and
5 panel, so we have no further questions.	5	Engineering at Newfoundland Power. Mr. Murray
6 CHAIR:	6	is the current Vice President of Engineering
7 Q. Okay, and the Grandriver Keepers.	7	and Operations. In January, 2014, he was the
8 MS. BENEFIEL:	8	Manager of the St. John's Region at
9 Q. Likewise, we have no further questions at	t this 9	Newfoundland Power. Mr. Smith.
10 time.	10	MR. SMITH:
11 CHAIR:	11	Q. Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, thank you for
12 Q. Does any member of the - okay, well, I gu	uess, 12	the opportunity to make this presentation
Newfoundland Hydro, you are finished. V		today. January, 2014, was a stressful time
proceed - do you think we should go ah	ead? 14	for Newfoundland Power's customers. Possibly
15 What do you think?	15	the most challenging power outages in over 30
16 MS. GLYNN:	16	years, very cold temperatures, and many hours
17 Q. No, we're finished.	17	<u> </u>
18 CHAIR:	18	
19 Q. I guess, I'll ask - we have an hour left.	19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Newfoundland Power is obviously up ne	xt. Do 20	
21 the parties think that we can get this	21	• 1
finished within an hour without having	to 22	
recall everybody here tomorrow?	23	
24 KELLY, Q.C.:	24	•
25 Q. I would think so.	25	service to our customers.

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March	1 30, 2015	Multi-P	age	Verbatim Court Reporters
	Page	e 133		Page 135
1 (1:0	0 p.m.)	1		reduce some of the distress for our customers.
2	Newfoundland Power buys over 90 percent	2		Gary Murray will now speak to each of
3	of the electricity it delivers to its	3		these areas.
4	customers from Newfoundland and Labrador	4	MR. N	MURRAY:
5	Hydro. Because of this, Newfoundland Power	5	Q.	Thank you, Gary. Let me begin by talking
6	and its customers are dependent on the	6		about customer communications during the
7	reliability of supply from Hydro. Over the	7		events. Customer communications is most
8	six days commencing January 2nd, Hydro's	8		critical in situations of electrical system
9	supply was interrupted on several occasions.	9		distress. Newfoundland Power aims to provide
10	These events occurred during the coldest part	10		information to its customers that is
11	of the year. This slide provides graphic	11		responsive, accurate, and timely regardless of
12	presentation of the sequence of events on the	12		how customers choose to communicate with the
13	electrical system from January 2nd to the 8th.	13		company.
14	It also shows a number of Newfoundland Power	14		During the electrical system distress of
15	customers without electricity. The yellow	15		January, 2014, the company's communications
16	bars show the periods during which	16		technologies were challenged. Newfoundland
17	Newfoundland Power was required to rotate	17		Power conducted focus groups and surveys with
18	power as a result of shortages in supply from	18		its customers to find out what is most
19	Hydro. The grey bars show the periods during	19		important to them. Customers have indicated
20	which Newfoundland Power's customers were	20		that they prefer to get their information from
21	without service due to major disruptions at	21		our website and the radio. Newfoundland
22	Hydro's electrical system. During this period	22		Power's strategy is to continue to enhance
23	the company rotated power on five different	23		these methods of communication. This reduces
24	days. These rotating outages affected up to	24		the demand on the telephone system. In
25	33,500 Newfoundland Power customers at any one	25		January, 2013, there were outages as a result
	Pag	e 134		Page 136
1	time. Rotating outages accounted for	1		of problems at Holyrood. At that time, we had
2	approximately 15 percent of the total time			156,000 website visits and 194,000 phone
3	Newfoundland Power customers were without			calls. In the 2014 event, we had 947,000
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service. Four major disruptions on Hydro's electrical system resulted in power outages for our customers. The largest of these occurred on the morning of Saturday, January 4th, when a transformer caught fire at Hydro's Sunnyside Station. This event, you will recall, triggered near collapse of the system and caused an outage to almost 190,000 Newfoundland Power customers. In total, these major disruptions at Hydro's electrical system accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total time customers were without service.

It is true the electrical system events of January 2nd to the 8th were extraordinary. Newfoundland Power's response to these events revealed opportunities for improvements in three specific areas. The first was in our customer communications, the second was improvements in Newfoundland Power's electrical system to permit more flexibility and better response, and the third was to improve coordination between the utilities to

website visits and only 140,000 phone calls. This demonstrates the increasing customer preference for website information.

Newfoundland Power's website was unavailable to some customers for 44 minutes on January 2nd, and 13 minutes on January 5th. In both incidents, the website was working to maximum capacity and displayed a message to some customers indicating the website server was busy. In early February, 2014, Newfoundland Power doubled its website capacity and improved its reliability to better manage the increased use during major system events. During the period, about 25,000 telephone calls were routed to the emergency overflow menu or resulted in a busy signal. To improve customer service and reduce wait times, 24 additional phone lines were added to provide extra capacity and redundancy.

Newfoundland Power's customers indicated an increasing preference to receive outage

Page 137 information on their mobile devices. The company has now implemented customer service technology that will sent text messages and email notifications to customers in the event of a power outage in their area. This technology was first tested in late 2014 and is now available to all Newfoundland Power customers.

Next I will address changes to our electrical system. The supply issues and power outages that occurred in January, 2014, created challenges for Newfoundland Power's electrical system. Automation of Newfoundland Power's distribution system allows the company to remotely operate certain distribution equipment from its System Control Centre. Otherwise, field staff are required to manually control the equipment. This limits the company's ability to conduct rotating outages and respond to large scale system events. In January, 2014, approximately 60 percent of Newfoundland Power's distribution system was automated. Today 68 percent of the system is automated, and it will be 78 percent by the end of this year. There were

three key changes. First, Newfoundland Power, in cooperation with Hydro, implemented a revised procedure for dispatch of our hydro plants to maximize water storage for periods of peak demand. Second, the Wesleyville gas turbine was overhauled to ensure continued reliability. Finally, the company installed a 100,000 litre fuel tank to provide additional fuel storage at our Greenhill thermal generating facility on the Burin Peninsula. On January 4th and 5th, the generating facility was without fuel because of a blizzard on the Burin Peninsula.

I'll now speak about inter-utility coordination. The operation of Hydro's generation and bulk transmission, and Newfoundland Power's distribution assets, is interrelated. It requires coordination between the two utilities. Coordination is required to manage electrical system issues, restore power following an outage event, and to keep the customers informed. Routine operational coordination between the utilities is good. However, the events of January, 2014, were not routine. Throughout 2014 the

Page 138

approximately 900 breaker operations required to rotate power supply. During nine of these operations, substation breakers did not operate correctly. This prolonged the duration of some customer outages. The majority of these mis-operations were due to cold weather affecting breaker mechanisms. In each of these cases, employees were dispatched to restore power to customers.

On January 6th and 7th, Newfoundland Power inspected every breaker on the Avalon Peninsula. The impact of cold weather on breaker operation is now a greater focus in substation maintenance in advance of the winter season. Newfoundland Power's generation accounts for approximately 7 percent of the total island generation. During times of system peak, this generation plays an important role in supply of electricity to customers. During December, 2013, and January, 2014, Newfoundland Power was required to run its generating plants more frequently than in the past. This has implications for water management. To improve generation availability, the company made

Page 140

utilities worked to improve coordination during such events. Newfoundland Power is able to monitor aspects of Hydro's generation and bulk transmission system through its System Control Centre. This provides timely information regarding electrical system conditions. It enables Newfoundland Power to provide more timely information to customers. Since January, 2014, the amount of electrical system information shared by Hydro has approximately doubled.

The approach to managing system reserves has also changed. Newfoundland Power provided input to Hydro in modifying its generation reserves system operating instruction. This instruction defines actions to be taken to forecast and maintain adequate generation reserves. It determines when customers are to be notified of a potential generation shortfall. Newfoundland Power and Hydro jointly developed a new customer notification protocol. This protocol guides communications when generation reserve margins deteriorate beyond normal conditions, and Hydro described this protocol earlier in its presentation.

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Page 143

Page 141 I will now speak about rotating power issue was examined by the company and it was 1 1 2 outages. Rotating outages involve the 2 addressed specifically in our interim report. connecting and disconnecting of a distribution 3 The last issue I'll discuss is critical 3 feeder to the electrical system. The purpose 4 4 customers. Newfoundland Power's primary of rotating outages is to maintain a balance 5 5 concern during large scale power outages is 6 between electricity supply and demand when public safety. Service disruption is 6 7 there is not enough generation available. minimized to those customers whose roles are 7 Insufficient generation for a long period of 8 8 essential to health, safety, and welfare of time causes distress to the system and to 9 the communities which the company serves. 9 10 Newfoundland Power's customers. When rotating 10 These customers include hospitals, seniors outages are required, Newfoundland Power 11 homes, and municipal infrastructure such as 11 determines which feeders will be rotated and 12 12 water treatment plants. The company's 13 when. The company's general approach to approach to restoring power to these critical 13 rotating outages is to best match customer 14 14 customers has not materially changed in load to available generation. Newfoundland 15 decades. During the course of the outages, 15 Power was required to conduct rotating outages 16 Newfoundland Power was in ongoing consultation 16 to its customers due to a supply shortage with fire and emergency services, provincial 17 17 during the January 2nd to 8th period. This and municipal officials, police services, 18 18 was the first time Newfoundland Power was 19 19 hospitals, senior homes, and the school required to rotate power to customers on a boards. The company's approach to maintaining 20 20 sustained basis in response to a forecast 21 21 service to critical customers is responsive to 22 generation shortfall on the system. 22 the circumstances of the particular emergency. From January 2nd to 8th, Newfoundland 23 23 For example, the outages that were experienced Power rotated outages on a minute by minute in January, 2014, occurred during a sustained 24 24 basis with the primary goal of keeping as many period of very cold temperatures. As a 25 25

Page 142 Page 144

customers connected to the electrical system as possible. Newfoundland Power also provided as much customer information as the circumstances would permit. Newfoundland Power's goal is to limit rotating power outages to less than an hour. On January 2nd, which was the first day of rotating power outages, the company did not meet its goal. The duration of rotating outages on that day averaged 88 minutes. This was due to a combination of the breaker mis-operations that I mentioned earlier, and inefficiencies of how rotating power outages were coordinated with Hydro. We addressed these issues. For the remaining four days, the company was able to limit the average duration of rotating power outages to less than one hour.

The company did not provide its customers with specific - having trouble with that word too, advance notice of the precise timing and location of rotating power outages. This was because of the dynamic and uncertain state of affairs on the electrical system. Advance notice would have required more customers to be without power at any given time. This

result, Newfoundland Power expanded its list of critical customers to include public warning stations that were established to protect the health and safety of citizens, and we also added fuel supply terminal on the Southside Hills to the list.

Newfoundland Power's primary criteria for designating critical customers focuses on the roles that are essential to the health and safety and welfare of our communities. These roles are critical in times of major electrical system failures. Newfoundland Power's criteria for designation of critical customers are broadly consistent with both commonsense and existing public utility practice.

I will now pass the presentation back to Gary to conclude.

19 (1:15 P.M.)

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20 MR. SMITH:

Q. Thank you, Gary Murray. Being prepared is important for Newfoundland Power and its customers. Severe weather events such as blizzards are routine occurrences on the Island of Newfoundland and typically occur

Page 145 Page 147 either. every year. Major disruptions on the bulk 1 2 electrical system are less routine, but are 2 CHAIR: Shortages in generation 3 not uncommon. Q. Mr. Dumaresque, do you have any questions, 3 requiring the rotation of power to customers sir? Specific questions? 4 4 are unprecedented in Newfoundland. 5 5 MR. DUMARESQUE: In its final report, the Liberty Q. Just a couple. One specific question that I 6 6 7 Consulting Group found that Hydro's generation have is when you identify your customers and 7 reserves are low. This is despite the new certainly in January of last year, you said 8 8 combustion turbine and the new capacity 180 customers were without power. You're 9 9 10 assistance arrangement with industrial 10 talking about units, like, buildings and customers. As Liberty noted, it will take a things like that? You're not talking about 11 11 number of years for Hydro to complete all the 12 12 individuals, are you? necessary activities affecting 13 13 MR. MURRAY: transmission system. The risk of outages Q. A customer is any service, basically, so that 14 14 remains high for the 2015 to 2017 winter 15 could be a house or it could be a building, or 15 16 seasons. The power outages experienced by 16 it could be a commercial enterprise. It's a customers on March 4th, 2015, also indicate a metered service, say. 17 17 need for continued concern for the reliability 18 18 MR. DUMARESQUE: 19 of the electrical system. The company's Q. So it's quite responsible of someone to conclude that when you have 180,000 customers, preparedness for generation supply shortages 20 20 and major electrical disruptions has improved you're actually talking about maybe 300,000 or 21 21 22 since January, 2014. Newfoundland Power has 22 more individuals in this province? improved its electrical system to provide more 23 23 MR. MURRAY: flexibility when restoring power and Q. Yeah, I'm not sure what the ratio would be, 24 24 conducting rotating power outages. but it would definitely be a good number of 25 25 Page 146 Page 148 company has also made changes which will people, yes. 1 1 2 improve the availability of its generation 2 MR. DUMARESQUE: 3 facilities. Newfoundland Power has also 3 Q. Yes, and even with our atrocious birth rate, we're still managing 1 or something, 1.4, so 4 enhanced its customer communications. We have 4 5 improved the capacity of our website and 5 probably got average of 2 telephone system, and are now offering 6 6 CHAIR: 7 customers a new text messaging and email Q. 2.1 is maintenance, 1.4 is not maintenance. 7 8 8 MR. DUMARESQUE: notification system. 9 Q. Not maintenance, no. New Brunswick just hit Finally, new protocols and procedures (phonetic) that too. Anyway, yeah, so we're have been developed with Hydro to improve 10 10 talking somewhere around 300,000 people, and 11 coordination and operation of the electrical 11 that's one thing that I think people don't 12 system and to keep customers better informed. 12 realize when we have those announcements about 13 I know the distress that major power outages 13 what part of the population is affected, that 14 cause our customers. Newfoundland Power will 14 15 you always announce it in your customers as continue to work to enhance our preparedness 15 opposed to people. for these types of events. Thank you. 16 16 17 KELLY, Q.C.: 17 MR. MURRAY: 18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Murray, and Mr. Q. Customers, that's correct. 18 19 Chairman, that's the presentation. 19 MR. DUMARESQUE: Q. I also want to know - not a question, but a 20 CHAIR: 20 21 comment. I really appreciate the CEO, new on 21 Q. Does Hydro have any questions at this time? 22 MR. MACDOUGALL: 22 the job and never had to appear before the public on January of 2014, but I appreciate Q. No, Mr. Chair, I have no specific questions. I 23 23 you being here. Obviously, I think the CEO of 24 just wanted to try and get that word on the 24

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Hydro should have taken your lead and been

record correctly. I have no general questions

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IVI	arch 30, 2015 Mul	tı-Pa	ge Werbatim Court Reporters
	Page 14	9	Page 151
1	here as well. I think it's remiss of him not	1	maintain the integrity of those drugs, is that
2	to do so. When you talk about critical	2	correct, Mr. Morgan?
3	customers, and expanding the definition of	3 1	MR. MORGAN:
4	critical customers, we had a presentation	4	Q. That's correct, yes.
5	earlier by a company, a pharmaceutical	5 (CHAIR:
6	gentleman representing the pharmaceutical	6	Q. So, I mean, I - I'm with Mr. Dumaresque on
7	company, and when you talk about medications	7	this one. I mean, I think that's - you know,
8	and things that are in jeopardy as a result of	8	I mean, how would - I mean, I think that's a
9	loss of power, are you giving consideration to	9	legitimate concern, and how would you propose
10	expanding that definition of critical	10	to address? We're talking about a lot of
11	customers to include companies like this?	11	money here potentially when these drugs go
12	MR. MURRAY:	12	off, I mean, but they need - should they - are
13	Q. Well, it's anything that involves the health	13	you telling them, boys, put in your own
14	and safety of the community. So, you know, of	14	generator, you can't rely on us, or what are
15	it's determined that a facility or a customer	15	you saying to him?
16	is critical to that - you know, to the		MR. SMITH;
17	community in that regard, we would consider	17	Q. I'd never advise someone to put in their own
18	it, but, you know, it would have to meet the	18	generator, but that would be their own choice
19	definition of what is critical in terms of	19	based on the commercial arrangement of their
20	scale and size.	20	own business. I think, in particular, if this
	MR. SMITH:	21	particular drug storage facility is part of
22	Q. I think it's important to note that again	22	the critical supply for the public, something
23	we've indicated that our critical customers	23	that Eastern Health would recognize perhaps,
24	list, we've developed this over many decades	24	something of that nature, then maybe it would
25	and it's not just Newfoundland Power by	25	fit more the critical nature of serving the
	Page 150		Page 152
	itself, you know, going through a spreadsheet	$\begin{vmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{vmatrix}$	public, but that type of information hasn't
2	saying what they are. We have lots of	2	been given to the company at this stage.
3	interactions with municipal leaders,		CHAIR:
4	government officials, fire and emergency	4	Q. I'm sorry, it hasn't been?
5	services about who are the critical services		MR. SMITH:
6	that service the public. So it's not just	6	Q. It has not been, no.
7	Newfoundland Power by itself that does that.		CHAIR:
8	There is lots of dialogue with those types of	8	Q. Okay. I'm sorry, Mr. Dumaresque, are you
9	agencies of governments and fire and emergency	9	finished?
10	services.		MR. DUMARESQUE:
	MR. DUMARESQUE:	111	Q. Not at all.
12	Q. But it's safe to say that you're certainly		CHAIR:
13	open to the communications with such companies		Q. Okay.
14	to see if, in fact, they would meet that		MR. DUMARESQUE:
15	definition.	15	Q. Not that I'm not at all finished. Like I
1	MR. SMITH:	16	said, I appreciate your interjection on that
17	Q. I think it's a function at the end of the day	17	one. I just have a last question. You noted
18	if it serves the public interest, and we get	18	what happened on March 4th, and for people's
19	clarification on that from public officials	19	understanding, it was 80,000 customers which
20	such as government, fire and emergency	20	would have been in the area of 200,000 people
21	services, then I think that's the route to go,	21	that were certainly in a cold winters day
22	and again -	22	without power, and we also went through, and
1	CHAIR:	23	you acknowledge the communications as between
24	Q. But that wouldn't necessarily address Mr.	24	the utilities, and I'm just wondering are you
25	Morgan's concern. They need to have power to	25	satisfied that the communication systems that
23	171015an 5 concern. They need to have power to		Saustica that the communication systems that

March 30, 2015		Multi-Page TM		e TM	Verbatim Court Reporters
	P:	age 153			Page 155
1	you developed between yourself and	-	1	0.	Yeah, I think there's no debating that the
2	Newfoundland Hydro actually worked that day		2		communications didn't work the way it should
3	because following social media, I know it was		3		have on March 4th. You know, it was probably
4	your company that first announced there would		4		not so much due to the particular protocol
5	be rolling blackouts, to be denied by		5		that was in place, more so as a communications
6	Newfoundland Hydro, but obviously subsequen	ntly 6	6		probably failure, if you want to call it that,
7	the public were advised that indeed rolling	·	7		in general, in terms of the amount of advance
8	blackouts would be taking place on March 4th.	8	8		notification that was provided.
9	Are you satisfied that the new protocols that		9 M		UMARESQUE:
10	have been established are indeed working well	10	0	Q.	Thank you. No further questions, Mr. Chair.
11	and meeting the requirements of the public	11	1 CI	HAIF	
12	interest?	12	2	Q.	Grandriver Keepers, do you have any?
13	MR. MURRAY:	13	3 M	S. BI	ENEFIEL:
14	Q. What I would say to that is the day to day	14	4	Q.	No, sir, we don't have any further questions.
15	communications with Hydro works really well	. 15	5		Thank you.
16	This - what happened on March 4th, as they	16	6 Cl	HAIR	k:
17	indicated, was kind of outside the protocol	17	7	Q.	Okay, and I don't -
18	the way it was envisioned, and that is	18	8 M	S. GI	LYNN:
19	something that both companies have to revisit	19	9	Q.	The consumer advocate.
20	and see that our protocol is broad enough to	20	0 Cl	HAIR	2:
21	encompass situations that happened on March	21	1	Q.	I'm sorry, I beg your pardon, sir, I skipped
22	4th. As we understand it now, and didn't	22	2		you.
23	probably quite understand at the time, this	23	3 M	R. JC	OHNSON:
24	was probably more of an Avalon Peninsula	24	4	Q.	No, that's fine, I have no questions for
25	affair versus a province-wide issue, and the	25	5		Newfoundland Power.
	Pa	age 154			Page 156
1	protocol probably needs to address those ty	pes 1	1 CI	HAIF	!:
2	of situations.	2	2	Q.	Okay. Industrial customers?
3	MR. DUMARESQUE:	3	3 M	R. C	OXWORTHY:
4	Q. So then it's fair to conclude that you feel	4	4	Q.	No questions.
5	the protocol has not worked, and, you kno	ow, 5	5 Cl	HAIR	t:
6	regardless of whether the 200,000 people	e, 6	6	Q.	I'm soon going to hand the chair over to the
7	where two of my children were going to sc	hool	7		Vice Chairman. She seems to have things more
8	or anybody else's, obviously that's a terrible		8		on the ball than I do.
9	discomfort and a terrible situation to have		9 M		OXWORTHY:
10	people in, and, I mean, the only reason we'				No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
11	here today is because of extenuating		1 Cl	HAIR	
12	circumstances, because of the reaction that				Okay. You're on, Madam.
13	utilities take to extenuating circumstances.		3 M		LYNN:
14	We're not here doing anything because y				Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have a couple of
15	could see this coming in seven days. I mea		5		remarks and reminders. Today's proceeding
16	these are things that you must have a protoc				allowed the opportunity for the public to
17	in place to deal with these emergencies, an				speak to both the Board and to the utilities,
18	when people are informed that there's goin	-			and it also provided the opportunity for the
19	be rotating outages, and it in this case on	19			public to hear from the utilities on issues of
20	March 4th, as I said, your company announ				continued interest to the public, and it
21	there would be rotating outages, only to be				allowed them the opportunity to ask questions
22	denied by Newfoundland Hydro, and then				if they wished. Those opportunities will
23	turn, of course, the proper protocol was	23			continue after we adjourn here today. There
24	issued at 7:58.	24			is an opportunity for any member of the public

25

who did not want to make a public presentation

25 MR. MURRAY:

March 30, 2015 -\$-**\$1.42** [1] 82:14 **\$100** [1] 121:9 **\$100-million** [1] 119:25 **\$40,000.00** [1] 32:11 **\$400,000**[1] 82:13 _'_ **'15** [1] 62:16 -and [1] 52:5 -at[1] 115:11 -saw [1] 83:9 -the [1] 114:24 -you [1] 122:14 -1-**1** [16] 14:4,23 19:23 50:25 72:9.18 78:24 79:7.18 79:19 84:23 85:14 88:18 92:6 99:11 148:4 **1.4** [2] 148:4,7 **10.2** [1] 63:7 **100** [5] 76:17 77:14,21 103:25 111:5 **100,000** [1] 139:8 **100-megawatt** [1] 108:1 100-megawatts [1] 59:21 **10:15** [1] 14:18 **10:30** [1] 22:25 **10:45** [1] 37:1 **10th** [4] 59:9 107:11 109:5 111:18 **11:00** [1] 51:11 **11:15** [1] 62:22 **11:30** [1] 76:11 **11:45** [1] 91:25 **11:57** [1] 101:15 11th [1] 79:21 **120** [2] 107:25 159:8

123 [1] 92:23

12:00 [2] 103:10,11

12:20 [1] 101:16

12:30 [1] 103:8

12:45 [1] 120:11

140,000 [1] 136:4

15-minute [2] 91:6

156,000 [1] 136:2

15th [2] 4:9 114:18

13 [1] 136:9

101:10

150 [1] 77:22

16 m 61:8

160 [1] 26:16

12th [2] 125:17 127:3

15 [3] 61:9 100:23 134:2

190,000 [2] 12:19 134:11 **194,000** [1] 136:2 **1949** [1] 10:6 **1:00** [1] 133:1 **1:15** [1] 144:19 **1:27** [1] 158:6 **1st** [6] 41:24 78:14,18 79:9,12 85:16 -2-**2** [13] 8:15 14:5.9.23 19:24 39:16 50:24 51:24 73:5,16 92:4 131:11 148:5 **2.1** [1] 148:7 **20** [2] 26:4 104:5 **200,000** [2] 152:20 154:6 **2013** [6] 1:10 39:1 76:14 79:21 135:25 138:21 **2014** [62] 1:7,11 4:5,10 4:11,16,19 9:6 10:14,15 10:24 12:13 13:9,13,18 14:21 16:1 37:14 41:11 41:24 42:4,24 59:9,15 59:22 62:14,15,16 63:23 65:18.20.22 75:23 78:14 83:20 84:13 95:24 96:19 107:11,17,20 109:20 110:4 115:20 132:2,3,7 132:13,21 135:15 136:3 136:13 137:6,11,21 138:21 139:25,25 140:9 143:24 145:22 148:23 2014/2015 [1] 109:14 **2015** [20] 4:25 7:19 8:3 8:12 14:22 15:23 16:6,9 16:18 42:4,8 59:12,13 60:22 115:19 145:15,17 157:2 159:8,13 **2017** [2] 16:18 145:15 **21st** [5] 60:4,21 112:12 113:21 119:23 **22** [1] 26:15 **239** [1] 73:14 23rd [1] 124:7 **24** [8] 31:13 68:7 73:5 77:11 107:3 109:9 110:1 136:21 **24-hour** [2] 51:24 73:18 **24-hours** [1] 52:24 **24-month** [1] 60:11 **24/7** [2] 42:18 50:6 **240** [4] 51:10.15 65:2 73:11

16th [3] 60:5 119:24

73:12,21 88:17 94:3

101:23 104:1 105:19

180,000 [1] 147:20

121:8

110:1

180 [1] 147:9

1893 [1] 20:23

24th [1] 4:5 **25,000** [1] 136:18 **170** [10] 51:16 52:24 53:1 **26** [1] 90:7 **26th** [2] 76:14 77:10 **27th** [3] 60:23 124:25 **18** [4] 60:10 107:3 109:9 157:14 **28th** [2] 102:15 103:18 **29** [1] 87:5 **2:00** [15] 66:10 84:20 85:14,17 88:15,17 89:3 92:3,11 94:2 98:22 99:9 101:22.22 105:19 **2nd** [15] 10:23,25 39:23 47:12 54:10 95:1 102:17 103:18 133:8,13 134:17 136:9 141:18,23 142:6 -3-**3** [15] 14:11,13,16,24 15:10 19:22,23,24,24 20:5 39:15 53:8 74:12 76:17 87:1 **30** [4] 58:17 87:5 90:20 132:15 **300,000** [2] 147:21 148:11 **30th** [1] 159:8 **31st** [1] 159:13 **33,500** [1] 133:25 **365** [1] 42:18 **37** [1] 9:14 3rd [5] 39:23 102:19,24 103:2,17

-4-

4 [1] 75:6 **40** [3] 27:6 47:10 104:7 40/45 [1] 104:10 **44** [1] 136:8 **45** [2] 104:12 105:22 4th [29] 8:3,12 15:23 16:6 40:25 61:18 85:13 86:9 87:12.13 91:24 94:13 101:23 102:11,21 117:5 125:14 126:7 129:14 134:8 139:11 145:17 152:18 153:8.16.22 154:20 155:3 157:17

-5-

560 [1] 87:2 **57** [2] 27:17,20 **5th** [6] 40:25 86:9 113:1 113:6 136:9 139:11

-6-

60 [5] 27:3 47:8 82:3 92:4 137:21 **66** [1] 22:9 **68** [1] 137:23 **6:00** [17] 85:18 92:12.22 92:23,24 93:11 98:22,24

99:21,21 100:4 101:22 102:5,22 103:14 105:25 117:6

6:30 [1] 100:2 **6th** [8] 113:13,15 120:1 120:15 121:10,11 122:20 138.10

-7-

7 [3] 26:15 68:7 138:16 70 [4] 43:6 51:19 73:13 92:4

78 [1] 137:24 **7:00** [2] 102:20 105:18 **7:18** [4] 89:10 90:6,15 92.2

7:25 [3] 86:25 89:16 102:21

7:30 [2] 105:8,18 **7:56** [3] 14:25 85:20 90:16

7:58 [1] 154:24

7th [12] 7:19 59:23 60:2 110:6,20,21 113:2,11,16 138:10 157:2,11

-8-

8 [1] 107:12 80 [2] 55:18 134:14 **80,000** [1] 152:19 **85** [3] 53:13 74:14,18 **88** [1] 142:10 **8:00** [1] 90:6 8th [9] 10:24 41:2,4 84:12 95:1 133:13 134:17 141:18,23

-9-

90 [1] 133:2 900 [1] 138:1 **947,000** [1] 136:3 9:00_[1] 104:17 **9:30/10:00** [1] 105:8 **9th** [6] 13:8 60:5 78:23 79:14 123:6,11

-A-

a.m [36] 14:18,25 22:25 37:1 51:11 62:22 66:10 76:11 84:21 85:14,17,20 86:25 88:15,17 89:3,10 91:25 92:3,5,11,22,23 92:24 93:11 94:3 98:23 98:24 99:9,21 101:15,16 101:22 102:5 105:19 117:6 **a.m.** [1] 92:12 **abide** [2] 85:24 119:5 **ability** [4] 17:11 51:21 137:19 159:10 **able** [27] 18:16 28:4 30:1

30:14 33:4,12,20,24 34:2

34:16 41:2,3 49:9 57:8 59:16,17 63:13 75:9 87:15 97:24 102:4 106:1 107:19 109:10 110:3 140:3 142:15

absence [2] 13:7 114:16 **absolutely** [4] 46:6 57:4 88:9 98:13

accelerate [1] 59:19 accelerated [1] 59:14 accept [3] 30:17 32:7 113:22

acceptable [1] 63:10 accepted [4] 41:7 42:1 81:6 119:24

access [5] 20:4,10 43:21 65:13.21

accessible [4] 27:10 45:5 46:25 48:2

accompanying [1] 10:3 **accord** [2] 30:18 31:6 **accordance** [2] 29:2 32:21

According [1] 86:23 **accordingly** [1] 81:20 accountability [2] 19:3 31:2

accounted [2] 134:1,14 **accounts** [1] 138:16 **accurate** [3] 53:17 74:11 135:11

acknowledge [3] 46:19 62:11 152:23

acknowledged [1] 59:24 acknowledging [1] 15:16

acquiring [1] 106:20 act [6] 9:15 10:3 19:22 20:12 25:6 65:10

action [16] 14:3 32:13,16 32:17 38:7,9 42:7 53:4 54:9 60:1 61:24 68:9 73:25 85:6 92:10 93:6

actions [3] 4:1,19 140:16 activate [2] 43:7 70:6 **activities** [3] 49:18 105:2 145:13

actual [1] 25:24 **add** [1] 68:1

added [3] 127:1 136:22 144:5

adding[1] 24:14 **addition** [7] 6:19 43:20 61:19 69:18 83:17 85:7 107:1

additional [10] 5:2 51:4 51:18 61:13 68:11 73:13 112:8 121:25 136:21 139:8

address [12] 4:13 6:17 6:22 8:12 38:12 68:23 96:25 118:5 137:9 150:24 151:10 154:1

addressed [6] 5:10 8:4

application [10] 23:18

79:4 130:2 142:14 143:2 addressing [4] 6:6 69:1 85:9 116:14 **adequacy** [3] 3:9,13 4:7 **adequate** [4] 9:13 16:2 20:4 140:17 adhere (1) 118:18 **adjourn** [1] 156:23 **adjusted** [1] 121:21 **adjustments** [1] 122:15 administrative [1] 10:5 **ads** (1) 83:8 **advance** [25] 4:14 14:23 15:18 30:21 43:7 50:9 50:11.16 51:22 60:3 81:16 82:10 86:3 90:17 91:2 106:9,11 118:1 125:12 126:3,20 138:14 142:20,23 155:7 **advanced** [6] 13:7,14 55:12 72:20 73:3 82:1 advertising [4] 48:24 80:14,18 83:2 **advise** [8] 48:7 81:4 86:20 87:6 126:14,18 127:4 151:17 **advised** [3] 5:1 6:22 153:7 **advising** [1] 125:18 **advisor** [1] 2:23 advisory [1] 125:18 **advocate** [7] 1:15 2:20 7:6 123:23 124:12,16 155:19 **affair** [1] 153:25 **affairs** [1] 142:23 affected [2] 133:24 148:14 **affecting** [2] 138:7 145:13 **affirmed** [1] 35:15 **again** [31] 21:18 23:16 29:24 33:18 37:22 48:25 51:20 53:9 54:13 56:4 58:14,25 59:4 72:7,20 73:7.10 74:10.19 75:13 88:22 91:9 95:2 96:10 96:17 108:24 115:17 125:14 127:15 149:22 150:22 **agencies** [1] 150:9 agenda [2] 8:17,18 **aggressive** [11] 60:8,12 106:25 107:23 108:2,7 108:14,14,21 110:24 121:15 ago [1] 80:15 agreed [4] 38:7 124:10 124:24 157:12 **agreement** [1] 124:8 ahead 61 54:7 66:7

117:9,21 118:3 130:14

aims [1] 135:9

akin [2] 21:2,21

alarming [1] 95:22 **albeit** [1] 56:5 alert [3] 13:15 65:2 100:19 **aligned** [1] 41:8 allow [2] 106:16 118:21 allowed [4] 33:14 120:22 156:16,21 allowing [2] 118:4 157:23 **allows** [1] 137:14 **almost** [3] 6:6 49:24 134:11 **along** [1] 2:22 already-built [2] 59:18 108:5 **alternate** [1] 14:15 alternative [2] 75:15 81:13 alternatives [1] 116:20 **always** [2] 69:23 148:15 **ambit** [2] 97:1 98:1 amongst [1] 128:11 **amount** [7] 37:24 38:6 39:18 62:15 97:8 140:9 **analysis** [3] 10:13 22:4 107:13 **analyzed** [1] 115:25 **Anderson** [1] 102:1 Andy [1] 1:3 **anecdotally** [1] 26:20 **announce** [1] 148:15 **announced** [2] 153:4 154:20 announcements [1] 148:13 **announcing** [1] 15:19 **annual** [1] 41:22 answer [12] 31:23 63:25 87:21 97:24 98:5,21 99:1 99:6 100:22 112:17 121:3 answered [7] 96:8,8,21 109:3 118:9,24 130:4 **answering** [1] 46:17 anticipate [2] 128:14 anticipating [1] 128:24 anyway [5] 1:22 23:11 80:17 123:16 148:10 anyways [1] 28:21 apologize [2] 61:21 127:16 apologized [1] 13:9 apologizes [1] 37:12 **apparatus** [1] 159:11 **apparent** [1] 93:5 **Appeal** [2] 23:4,16 appear [3] 34:23 96:14 148:22 **appeared** [2] 98:3,5

59:8 60:3 107:10,18 109:4,22 111:18 113:18 125:2 **apply** [1] 55:8 **applying** [2] 75:22 80:12 **appointed** [1] 124:24 appreciate [6] 89:25 101:12 127:19 148:21,23 152:16 approach [6] 48:11 65:1 140:12 141:13 143:13,20 approached [1] 42:23 approaching [3] 14:2,6 appropriate [13] 8:16 63:14 64:7 77:20 85:6 91:4 106:13 118:15 119:7 122:22 131:3 157:11,23 appropriateness [3] 115:10,24 117:1 **approved** [1] 59:23 **April** [18] 4:5 7:19 13:18 59:9 60:2,4 107:11 109:5 110:6,20 111:18 112:12 113:21 119:23 124:25 157:2,11,14 area [5] 30:25 74:4 105:18 137:5 152:20 areas [11] 5:10 6:21 26:1 31:9 38:13 55:21,23 56:12 68:2 134:20 135:3 **arise** [2] 6:6 11:6 arrange [3] 12:3 68:9 123:15 arrangement [2] 145:10 151:19 arrangements [1] 16:15 **articulate** [1] 128:10 **articulated** [1] 124:20 **ascertain** [1] 121:6 aside [2] 50:20 123:7 asks [1] 14:7 **aspect** [2] 115:12 116:25 **aspects** [2] 44:9 140:3 **assembly** [1] 5:15 assess [1] 90:4 **assessing** [1] 24:17 **asset** [1] 80:12 assets [5] 5:17,17,18 43:25 139:17 **assist** [4] 3:24 7:17 47:21 102:12 assistance [3] 4:17 16:15 145:10 **assisted** [1] 114:9 **assisting** [1] 104:13 **associated** [2] 20:20 125:5 **assumed** [2] 24:12 36:6 **assuming** [1] 35:14 **assure** [1] 118:25 **Atlantic** [1] 1:17

attend [1] 64:10 **attending** [1] 157:19 **attention** [2] 107:9 110:15 **attributed** [1] 15:2 **August** [2] 60:17 132:2 authorities [1] 25:2 automated [2] 137:23 137:24 **automatic** [2] 27:5,7 availability [5] 22:10 69:6 77:7.14.15 79:9 84:20 85:17 88:18,20 101:24 104:1 105:20 116:20 122:19 137:7 141:7,15 157:5 27:1,5,19 93:23,24 100:12 126:17 138:11 153:24 averaged [1] 142:10 awarded [1] 60:4 86:18 87:12 120:9,10 125:18 awareness [1] 82:11 away [2] 60:1 90:11 -B**b** (1) 19:24 **background** [4] 38:19 38:25 59:7 120:17 **Baie** [1] 55:24 **balance** [3] 128:17,23 141:5 **balancing** [3] 79:8,11 80:5 **ball** [6] 5:11 6:14 8:20 8:21,24 156:8 **Banfield** [1] 3:6 Bank [1] 22:6 bars [2] 133:16,19 **base** [2] 33:23 36:5 59:16 67:3 75:1 86:7 126:4 151:19 **basement** [1] 34:12 **basic** [1] 11:23 50:14 51:15 52:14,24

66:5 83:2 124:4 128:1,1 atrocious [1] 148:3 141:21,25 attach [1] 110:19 **batteries** [1] 11:22 attempted [1] 23:24 bear [3] 28:25 32:12 **attempting** [1] 96:24 33:24 **bearing** [1] 28:2 **became** [6] 9:6 61:7 93:5 99:22 100:4 111:19 **become** [3] 29:8 43:12 128:21 **beg** [1] 155:21 began [5] 39:1,5,22 60:5 60:15 **begin** [1] 135:5 **beginning** [3] 55:15 **Automation** [1] 137:13 87:10,22 **behalf** [3] 10:10 17:12 24:10 78:16 138:25 146:2 18:1 **available** [33] 5:5 29:22 **behaviour** [1] 53:19 35:13 38:16 48:16 59:18 **belief** [2] 11:10 15:23 60:22 61:7 65:14,23 69:5 **below** [4] 73:14,19 74:4 86:10 Benefiel [3] 2:25 130:8 111:7.20 115:16 116:14 155:13 **benefit** [3] 21:7,16,22 **best** [4] 96:25 141:14 **Avalon** [12] 26:11,17,23 157:22 159:10 **better** [10] 13:20 45:10 53:10 56:23 57:8 97:19 115:3 134:24 136:16 average [2] 142:16 148:5 146:12 **between** [30] 21:20 42:12 42:15,20 44:4 51:1,20 57:10 64:14,19 65:5 aware [16] 29:8 44:1 48:1 66:12 72:19,21 73:15 49:17 52:15 58:22 65:6 89:18.20 90:6 91:9 98:16 66:1 72:24 77:13 81:19 98:22 101:22 113:1 134:25 139:19,23 141:6 152:23 153:1 157:22 **beyond** [4] 11:11 94:17 114:15 140:24 **bid** [4] 111:10,12 112:18 112:20 bidders [2] 112:16,25 bigger [1] 55:1 Bill [1] 2:23 **birth** [1] 148:3 **bit** [3] 38:18 40:3 105:11 **biweekly** [1] 60:16 **blackouts** [6] 16:1 33:17 34:7.9 153:5.8 **blizzard** [1] 139:13 **blizzards** [1] 144:24 **Blundon** [1] 3:4 **Board** [66] 1:7 3:3,4,5 3:15 4:16,19 5:6 6:2,13 6:22 7:16,21,23 8:8 9:2 **based** [9] 6:24 32:18 36:1 10:2 17:10 18:1 21:19 25:15 32:3,24 37:25 41:7 41:15 49:5 54:24 59:9 59:22.24 60:14 63:15 64:13 78:15,17 82:24 87:4 88:14 96:3 98:3 **basis** [14] 33:15 42:17.17 104:12 107:11 109:5,8 110:17 111:2,18 113:18

114:7,12 118:1,14,22 119:12 120:13,20 124:1 124:5,6 125:9 127:17 132:22 156:17 157:14 159:4

Board's [12] 3:7,17,23 4:9,10 5:6 7:17 8:5,10 9:24 158:1 159:5

boards [1] 143:20 **body** [4] 21:6,15 32:25 124:22

boil [1] 11:25 **bore** [2] 26:11,18

borne [1] 22:9

bound [2] 16:23 22:11 **Boxing** [1] 76:13

boys [1] 151:13

brand [8] 13:2 111:6,19 112:11 113:17,23 114:3 120:4

break [5] 8:16 100:24 101:10,12,21

breaker [5] 138:1,7,11 138:13 142:11

breakers [1] 138:3 brief [1] 129:25

briefing [4] 52:8 83:19 83:19 88:10

briefings [2] 48:20,21

bring [3] 68:10 70:7 108:2

brings [1] 9:3 **broad** [1] 153:20

broader [1] 68:25 broadly [1] 144:14

broken [2] 95:22,23

Brook [1] 1:16

brought [4] 11:8 33:5 61:12 107:16

Brunswick [1] 148:9 **brunt** [5] 26:12,18 28:3 29:1 33:24

budget [1] 60:18 **budgetary** [1] 107:13

building [2] 76:21 147:15

buildings [1] 147:10 **built** [1] 108:19

bulk [4] 12:3 139:16 140:4 145:1

Burin [2] 139:10,13

bus [2] 15:14 123:9 **buses** [1] 15:9

business [5] 18:14 32:9 58:1 70:12 151:20

businesses [2] 12:7 62:3 busy [2] 136:13,19

buy [3] 119:21 120:4 123:13

buys [1] 133:2 **bypassed** [1] 14:22 -C-

Caliper [1] 23:2 **calls** [11] 57:19 82:5 90:7 90:12 91:18 93:8,11,17 136:3.4.18

campaign [4] 48:24 80:14,18 83:2

Canada [1] 20:22 **cancer** [1] 18:17 candles [1] 75:16 **cannot** [2] 16:22 34:9 capacity [19] 14:2 16:14 24:15 32:24 39:18 40:1 65:17 102:12 103:24 104:13 111:5,6,6 114:3

136:11,15,22 145:9 146:5 capital [2] 41:23 125:4 care [2] 18:16 39:24

carried [2] 40:25 60:19 carry [2] 42:2,4 **carrying** [3] 121:14

122:3,12 case [18] 20:21 22:5,7,7 22:18,18,23 23:1,2,21 51:22 55:8 56:11 67:9 92:9 95:21 113:5 154:19

cases [4] 45:17 48:22 61:12 138:8

categorize [1] 86:14 caught [1] 134:8

caused [3] 121:25 132:17 134:11

causes [4] 4:1,11 24:3 141:9

cautioned [1] 16:13 **central** [4] 68:17 94:23

110:17,18

centre [4] 57:19 67:16 137:16 140:5

centred [1] 9:11 **centres** [3] 42:21 51:6

66:21 **CEO** [4] 63:19,24 148:21 148:24

certain [7] 7:24 12:6 16:15 50:15 65:21 137:15 157:24

certainly [28] 37:14 40:7 46:22 63:9 76:6 78:16 79:1,22 87:12 96:16 98:19 103:12 104:14 105:23 106:12 108:6 115:10 117:2,23,24 118:7 118:18 119:5 120:8 124:9 147:8 150:12 152:21

CERTIFICATE [1]

159:1 **certify** [1] 159:2 chain [2] 67:2 70:11 **chair** [80] 1:1 2:2,13,17 3:2 9:2 13:17 17:18,21 34:21 35:8,17,21 36:6 36:10,15,19,21 55:15 62:18 63:1 87:9 88:2

94:20 96:23 97:4 98:3,8 98:13,25 99:5 100:3,14 100:21 101:3,9,13,17 114:5,22 116:1,18 117:12 117:20 118:19 119:8 120:24 122:23 123:2,14 123:21 129:17,21,25 130:6.11.18 131:1.9.19 146:20,23 147:2 148:6 150:23 151:5 152:3,7,12 155:10,11,16,20 156:1,5 156:6,10,11,14 157:18

Chairman [20] 1:3 2:10 2:19,22 62:25 63:4 100:11 101:20 114:20 115:6 116:25 118:13 119:23 122:17 123:19 131:5,22 132:11 146:19 156:7

challenged [1] 135:16 **challenges** [1] 137:12 challenging [2] 17:4 132:15

change [9] 49:22 63:11 64:25 71:20 94:24 96:15 96:18,20 131:17

changed [3] 92:16 140:13 143:14

changes [5] 42:19 104:20 137:9 139:1 146:1

channel [1] 57:16 **channels** [5] 45:10,17 46:12,14 48:17

chats [1] 129:4 **chatting** [1] 51:6

check [2] 79:6 84:5 **checking** [1] 121:20

Cheryl [1] 3:4 Chief [3] 20:24 70:19 131:25

children [3] 15:9,12

154:7

choice [6] 111:4 113:22 116:15,16 120:4 151:18 **choices** [2] 116:11,14

choose [1] 135:12 **chose** [1] 119:21

circumstance [1] 30:21 circumstances [5]

116:17 142:4 143:22 154:12.13

cited [1] 23:1 **citizens** [1] 144:4

city [4] 21:13,13,17 26:2 civil [1] 108:9

clarification [2] 80:16 150:19

clarify [3] 5:15 91:19 124:1

clarity [1] 68:1 **classes** [1] 15:10 **classified** [3] 76:15

78:25 79:2

clear [1] 119:12 **clearing** [2] 60:6 90:11 clearly [8] 10:7 15:20 24:16 49:14,19 81:25 99:7 120:4

cliche [1] 119:2 **client** [5] 18:2 24:22 25:17 29:5 32:10

climates [1] 16:21 **close** [6] 17:9 53:23 54:4

55:18 74:23 112:7 **closed** [11 60:3

closely [4] 53:5 72:11 74:1 112:9 **closer** [1] 44:21

coast [2] 56:1,1 coded [2] 13:14 14:10 codification [1] 20:9 **codified** [1] 25:5

cognizant [1] 87:22 **coined** [1] 13:1

cold [15] 11:3 23:8,10,12 76:23 94:8 101:25 104:17 105:5,16 132:16 138:7 138:12 143:25 152:21

coldest [1] 133:10 Coleman [1] 81:14 **collapse** [2] 90:9 134:10 colleague [1] 2:5 **colour** [3] 13:14 14:9 72:4

colours [1] 50:19 combination [3] 15:3 39:17 142:11

combustion [26] 16:14 38:23 39:7 59:7,8,10,10 59:12,18,21,21 92:21,22 92:24 93:3 99:23 102:4 102:11,14 106:21 107:16 114:24 119:15 120:14 121:7 145:9

coming [26] 11:20 13:16 14:13 25:1 34:10 39:9 46:4 47:23 49:4 50:1,12 54:5 55:4,10 80:22 81:2 81:7,22 92:6 93:1 106:4 126:6,16 127:19 128:13 154:15

commenced [1] 1:7 **commencing** [1] 133:8 commend [2] 10:9,11 **comment** [5] 117:17 129:25 148:21 157:3,23 **comments** [7] 7:14 19:5 34:18 87:10,22 97:21

commercial [4] 21:5 33:22 147:16 151:19 **commission** [1] 107:25 Commissioner [11 1:6] Commissioners [8] 1:5

131:22 132:11 commissioning [1] 10:12

commit [1] 12:24

2:2.10.19 9:3 36:21

committed [4] 13:13 37:17 62:1,10

commodity [1] 21:5 **common** [2] 20:19 56:13 commonsense [3] 30:18 31:7 144:15

communicate [12] 10:19 12:10,15,15 13:6 45:11 48:6 66:21 77:18,20 126:9 135:12

communicated [1] 11:16

communicates [1] 16:25

communicating [3] 46:24 48:12 64:19

communication [25] 11:1 13:8 14:19 26:21 44:8,15 47:5 50:3 51:5 57:7 58:16 64:16 65:12 66:4 82:16,21 88:15 90:16 96:6.13.14.15

97:25 135:23 152:25 communications [64] 9:17 10:17 11:12 13:12 16:8 17:5 38:20 40:4,7 40:14 42:12,15 43:10 44:13 49:6.18 52:12 57:1 57:17,21 58:25 62:4

64:14 66:8 67:1,2,22 70:18 72:3 73:22 76:3 78:5 85:5 86:20 88:6,23 89:2,9,11,16,19,21 90:19 91:15,17 92:2 93:9 94:23 94:25 95:6,14 98:15 100:1 134:21 135:6.7.15 140:22 146:4 150:13 152:23 153:15 155:2,5

communities [5] 11:25 12:2 55:25 143:9 144:10

community [2] 149:14 149:17

companies [3] 149:11 150:13 153:19

company [21] 44:24 55:17 70:8 112:10 133:23 135:13 137:2,14 138:25 139:7 142:8,15,18 143:1 143:9 146:1 149:5,7 152:2 153:4 154:20

company's [7] 21:3 135:15 137:19 141:13 143:12,20 145:19

compelled [1] 21:8 **complaint** [2] 9:4,11 **complete** [6] 8:11 24:8 41:23 62:14 79:12 145:12

completed [5] 17:16 47:4 56:21 59:13 126:19

completely [2] 6:6 48:1 complex [1] 122:3

concern [12] 24:21 25:17 29:5 77:9 78:7 107:18 109:23,25 143:5 145:18 150:25 151:9

concerned [7] 18:13.22 19:2,6 25:12 29:6 33:16

concerns [4] 3:9 9:21 18:12 33:5 **conclude** [4] 70:16 144:18 147:20 154:4 **concluded** [1] 79:17 **concluding** [1] 38:24 conclusion [3] 15:25 61:21 158:6 **conclusions** [2] 4:6 7:10 conclusively [1] 158:2 **concrete** [2] 11:14 23:16 **conditions** [3] 110:18 140:7,24 **conduct** [3] 6:25 137:19 141:16 **conducted** [1] 135:17 **conducting** [1] 145:25 **conference** [1] 91:16 **confidence** [5] 10:8 62:8 81:1 113:25 117:9 **confident** [1] 79:25 configuration [1] 112:8 **confirm** [2] 112:10 113:5 **confusion** [1] 81:22 **connected** [3] 61:17 104:5 142:1 **connecting** [1] 141:3 **consecutive** [1] 16:10 conservation [6] 47:21 48:24 74:9 76:10 81:21 conserve [14] 11:14 12:12 13:22 14:7,12 47:17 53:6,7,21 54:11 54:18 74:5,21 75:13 **consider** [2] 7:22 149:17 considerable [1] 37:24 consideration [6] 27:15 114:12 116:23 117:14,17 149:9 considered [3] 113:1 118:2,10 considering [3] 14:15 91:4 127:4 **consistent** [3] 20:7 127:25 144:14 consistently [2] 51:6 consisting [1] 1:16 consists [1] 5:16 consolidated [2] 56:13 56:17 **construct** [2] 108:9,11 **constructed** [1] 111:15 constructing [3] 121:18 122:5,7 construction [2] 60:7 60:15 **consultant** [2] 3:7,17 consultants [2] 3:19 4:17 **consultation** [1] 143:16

10:12 16:12 124:17 145:7 **consumer** [7] 1:15 2:20 7:6 123:22 124:12,16 155:19 consumers [2] 20:3.6 **contact** [5] 50:5,7 51:2 57:24 89:15 **contention** [1] 10:15 context [1] 52:1 contextualized [1] 16:5 contingencies [3] 86:18 126:12 128:4 **contingency** [1] 126:12 **continually** [2] 42:16 43:3 continuation [1] 36:7 **continue** [13] 16:9 22:24 42:2,9 62:6,13 87:21,25 128:20 135:22 146:15 156:23 157:25 **continued** [7] 4:16 39:23 41:10 139:6 145:18 156:20 157:6 **continues** [2] 10:10 63:18 continuing [5] 3:15 57:23 95:9,12 97:15 continuous [1] 80:7 **contract** [2] 60:4 119:25 **contracted** [1] 121:8 contrary [3] 111:17 113:17,19 contributing [2] 15:16 102:25 **control** [22] 16:22 17:2 19:22 20:12 22:12 24:16 25:6 39:8,16 42:21 51:6 57:18,19 66:21 67:7,16 79:16 92:5 95:19 137:16 137:18 140:5 controlled [1] 9:8 conversation [1] 76:25 conversations [1] 89:17 **convicted** [1] 75:21 **cooperation** [1] 139:2 **coordinated** [1] 142:13 **coordination** [11] 38:20 40:10 49:1,11 134:25 139:15,18,19,23 140:1 146:11 **copy** [1] 96:20 **Corner** [1] 1:16 **corporate** [12] 35:3 37:3 69:20,21 70:6,13 71:7 88:5,23 89:2,9 92:2 corporately [1] 70:5 correct [18] 46:9 71:2,7 71:25 79:4 83:4 86:11

146:25 **cost** [9] 20:7 32:9,11,12 34:15 80:20 82:12 116:19 116:22 **costing** [3] 115:22,24,25 **costs** [3] 7:24 115:9,10 counsel [6] 2:3.6 3:5.6 97:23 115:8 couple [4] 106:22 123:25 147:6 156:14 course [22] 1:12 5:4 8:21 9:7 11:7 37:23 38:9 47:23 60:19 78:13 79:19 105:20 114:10 115:17 118:10.13.24.25 121:3 124:22 143:15 154:23 **Court** [3] 20:22 23:4,15 cover [1] 55:1 Coxworthy [6] 2:15,16 129:22,24 156:3,9 **created** [3] 12:16 28:6 137:12 **creating** [2] 13:5 129:3 **crisis** [5] 12:16,17,17 17:1 63:22 **criteria** [3] 24:13 144:7 144:13 **critical** [36] 18:16,19 27:13 28:18 29:7.7.11 29:13,19,20 30:8 33:6 33:14 45:2,25 46:6 49:11 56:14 57:4 135:8 143:3 143:13.21 144:2.8.11.13 149:2,4,10,16,19,23 150:5 151:22,25 critically [2] 24:23 25:16 cross [4] 6:25 35:13,15 124:12 cross-examination [1] cross-examine [1] 124:3 **crucial** [1] 9:18 **CT** [5] 60:25 85:19 102:8 110:4 131:15 current [6] 53:11,11 56:18 84:15 127:8 132:6 **current-day** [4] 53:8,22 74:10,22 customer [45] 5:25 12:21 12:23 24:4 29:8,11 32:15 33:7.23 35:3 37:4 39:19 40:1 41:4 45:13,14 49:21 49:23,24 53:19 55:14 56:3,22 57:24 58:5 59:15 61:1 75:10 82:14 89:25 125:18 132:4 134:21 135:6,7 136:5,20 137:2 138:5 140:21 141:14 142:3 146:4 147:14

149:15

56:23

customer-outage [1]

customers [139] 1:16

2:14,17 7:6 12:19 14:12

29:7,13,20 30:6 31:5,25

16:16 25:9,19 27:13 29:4

32:7 33:25 34:3 37:15 39:21 40:7,14 41:14 44:22 45:3,11,15,24 46:1 47:4,6,7,8 48:12,15 49:13 51:2.3 53:3 54:18 55:19,20 56:9,15,16,19 57:3,8 58:8,10,10,15,18 58:22 61:5.21 62:5 73:24 75:12 76:10 81:10.24.24 82:4,12 91:13 102:8 108:21 125:7 126:18 127:5,10 128:9,12,14 129:22 130:2 132:14.18 132:23,25 133:4,6,15,20 133:25 134:3,6,12,15 135:1,10,12,18,19 136:8 136:12,24 137:4,8 138:9 138:20 139:22 140:8,18 141:10,17,20 142:1,18 142:24 143:4,7,10,14,21 144:2,8,14,23 145:4,11 145:17 146:7,12,14 147:7 147:9,20 148:15,18 149:3 149:4,11,23 152:19 156:2 cut [3] 23:6,11 108:6 -D**daily** [8] 42:17 51:7 52:8

57:11 74:16 83:18.19 104:20

Dalley [33] 35:2 37:2,3 38:22 40:3 43:8 44:7,10 44:18,20 51:14 72:10,17 75:25 77:1 78:8 80:21 82:19 83:5,13,21 84:3 84:14 86:1 88:21 89:4,8 93:8 97:2,14 100:8 125:25 127:12

damages [1] 23:14 Danny [2] 1:19 2:22 **DarkNL** [7] 9:7 13:1,12 16:9 17:1 64:18 115:16

Darlene [1] 1:4 data [2] 46:1 72:25 date [18] 6:2 7:11,20 24:13 56:18 79:25 97:20 110:7,9,11 112:22 113:3 113:6,10 124:14,24 157:1 157:8

Dated [1] 159:12 Dave [1] 157:4 **David** [1] 2:3 Dawn [2] 35:2 37:3 day's [1] 47:10 days [14] 10:25 15:6 47:24 52:3 54:7 61:10 66:6 68:7 106:4 108:23 133:8,24 142:15 154:15

deadline [1] 78:19 deal [11] 28:5,23 33:4 34:14,16 64:12 68:13 115:9 118:15 154:17 158:2

dealing [6] 23:3 69:19 115:11 119:12,14,14 **deals** [3] 43:1 68:25 97:8 **debating** [1] 155:1

decades [2] 143:15 149:24 **December** [31] 1:10 4:19 39:1,6 41:24 76:13 78:14 78:18.22 79:9.12.14 85:16 107:20 109:14 110:13,21 113:2,6,11,13 113:15,16 120:1,15 121:9 121:10 122:19 123:6,11 138:20 **decide** [1] 8:17 decided [2] 59:19 94:7 **decision** [7] 23:5 116:21 117:2 118:18 119:4 120:17 18 **decisions** [1] 69:13 declaration [1] 119:13 deep [1] 87:20

Defendant [2] 22:11,15 **defer** [1] 122:20 **defines** [1] 140:16 **definitely** [1] 147:25 **definition** [4] 149:3,10 149:19 150:15 **definitive** [1] 129:10

degree [3] 22:14,21 126:18

delay [2] 15:11 122:1 **delivered** [1] 20:6 **delivering** [2] 20:25 62:10

delivers [1] 133:3 **demand** [14] 14:1,6 39:20 53:23 74:3.24 75:10 94:9 101:25 102:12 104:16 135:24 139:5

demands [3] 24:4 40:1 41:4

demonstrated [1] 12:14 demonstrates [1] 136:5 **denied** [2] 153:5 154:22 **department** [1] 112:7 **dependent** [1] 133:6 **depending** [1] 105:10 **described** [1] 140:24 design [5] 50:9 57:6 75:4 108:11 121:19 designate [1] 71:5 designating [1] 144:8 **designation** [1] 144:13 **designed** [2] 50:12 86:4 **desire** [1] 128:11 **despite** [2] 15:15 145:8 detail [1] 43:9

details [11 93:13 **deteriorate** [1] 140:23 determination [4] 85:5 89:22,24 91:20

detailed [1] 115:1

determine [6] 29:18 30:2 33:13 70:2,4 91:8 determined [4] 7:24

Consulting [6] 3:18 4:21

100:7 103:16 107:3,5,20

109:15 110:21 148:18

corrected [1] 79:11

correcting [1] 46:17

correctly [2] 138:4

151:2,4 159:3

29:14 107:14 149:15 **determines** [2] 140:18 141:12 determining [1] 25:15 developed [9] 12:22 54:24 55:10 56:20 126:4 140:21 146:10 149:24 **devices** [1] 137:1 **dialogue** [1] 150:8 **dictate** [1] 128:8 **different** [13] 24:2 25:21 39:3,4,14 64:17,23 68:12 70:8,11 93:22 122:1 differently [1] 12:10 **difficult** [1] 55:8 difficulties [4] 39:11,13 39:14 132:18 **difficulty** [1] 39:2 dignity [1] 44:23 **diligence** [1] 80:12 diminished [1] 81:3 **direct** [6] 45:12,16 55:18 55:22 57:16 58:10 **direction** [1] 94:20 directly [1] 61:19 disabilities [1] 12:5 **discomfort** [1] 154:9 disconnecting [1] 141:3 discovered [1] 49:7 **Discoveries** [1] 159:15 **discretion** [1] 33:12 discrimination [1] 28:16 discuss [4] 43:12 96:17 119:18 143:3 **discussed** [1] 79:14 discussion [10] 50:25 51:7.20 52:18 72:21 73:2 73:15,16 99:25 115:7 discussions [7] 42:22 44:4 65:5 75:6 93:16 127:15,17 **dispatch** [1] 139:3 dispatched [1] 138:8 dispatcher [1] 67:16 displayed [1] 136:11 **disruption** [1] 143:6 disruptions [7] 41:16 56:7 133:21 134:4,13 145:1,21 **distress** [5] 135:1,9,14 141:9 146:13 distribute [3] 22:11,16 distributing [1] 18:6 distribution [23] 5:13 5:18,21 6:4,4 17:23 18:2 19:1 20:1 21:2,3 22:8 55:17,20,23 56:6 58:1

68:19 137:14.15.22

139:17 141:3

document [1] 110:6 **documentary** [1] 20:14 documentations [1] 5:5 **documented** [1] 117:16 doesn't [8] 30:17,18 31:6 31:21 51:1 96:13 126:1 128:8 done [20] 10:9 22:21,23 22:23,24 47:3 56:9 60:13 64:23 80:6.19 81:8 82:21 94:24 108:23 109:13 115:2,8 125:10 132:23 doubled [2] 136:14 140:11 **down** [9] 27:8 34:12 53:13 65:24 85:16 92:4 103:12 108:6 127:11 **draft** [1] 39:15 dramatically [1] 94:10 **draw** [2] 107:9 110:15 drawings [1] 95:4 **driven** [1] 126:5 **drivers** [1] 15:14 **drop** [1] 86:10 drug[1] 151:21 **drugs** [5] 18:17,17,17 151:1,11 due [10] 60:19 61:22 80:12 96:5 118:24 133:21 138:6 141:17 142:10 155:4 dull [1] 128:22 duly [1] 47:13 **Dumaresque** [102] 1:19 2:21,22 6:19 7:5 63:2,3 64:11 65:11 66:3 67:5 69:2 70:15 71:3,11,19 72:1,15 75:19 76:12 77:16 78:11 79:13 80:9 82:15,25 83:7,15,23 84:9 84:16 85:11 86:22 88:6 88:8 89:1,6 92:1 94:1,13 94:19 95:10 96:11 97:22 98:9.12 99:8 100:22 101:1,6,11,18,19 102:23 103:9,20 104:9 105:15 106:18 107:8 109:1.21 110:14,25 111:16,25 112:19 113:4,9,14 114:6 114:19 115:5 116:4.6.24 117:18 118:12 119:3,10 120:13,21 121:5 122:16 122:25 123:4,18 131:12 131:14 147:3,5,18 148:2 148:8,19 150:11 151:6 152:8,10,14 154:3 155:9 duration [3] 138:5 142:9 142:16 **during** [43] 10:23 12:6 14:15 40:1 46:6,18 47:12 47:24 48:2,5,23 49:7 50:2 56:6 62:12 70:23 70:24 71:22 75:17 77:12 78:22 84:21 86:8 90:7 102:16 115:23 132:2 133:10.16.19.22 135:6

135:14 136:16,17 138:2

141:4 142:1,23 144:12 energy [8] 11:14 12:12

Multi-Page TM 138:18,20 140:2 141:18 143:5,15,24 **duty** [5] 19:13,18 20:19 21:4 32:22 **Dwanda** [1] 1:6 **dynamic** [1] 142:22 -Eearly [3] 1:11 86:12 136:13

easier [1] 48:6 **Eastern** [1] 151:23 easy [1] 72:3 educate [2] 81:16 129:7 **educating** [2] 74:7 128:18 **education** [1] 82:12 **effect** [3] 54:17 75:12 84:2 **effective** [1] 62:4 effectively [1] 15:18 **effort** [1] 11:14 **eight** [1] 60:13 either [6] 43:16 58:18 67:7 113:22 147:1 157:7 elaborate [1] 9:4 **electrical** [28] 5:16 19:21 20:12 25:5 121:23 132:24 133:13,22 134:5,13,16 134:23 135:8,14 137:10 137:13 139:20 140:6,9

145:2,19,21,23 146:11 **electricity** [18] 9:25 13:4 16:19 37:16 53:21.22 54:18 62:11 66:16 74:21 74:23 75:13 81:2 132:17 133:3,15 138:20 141:6 **element** [2] 21:9 25:14 **elements** [1] 122:5 **eliminate** [1] 91:17 **email** [2] 137:4 146:7 **embarked** [2] 80:13,22 emergencies [1] 154:17 emergency [26] 12:6 13:25 14:11,24 54:16 65:9 69:20.21 70:6.13 71:8,23 72:8 75:11 81:18 85:22 87:7 89:23 117:7 125:20 136:19 143:17,22 150:4,9,20 emphasize [1] 8:2

emphasized [1] 12:24 **employee** [1] 112:2 employees [3] 18:7 62:9 138:8 **enable** [2] 60:6 61:13 **enables** [1] 140:7 **encompass** [1] 153:21

end [6] 43:15 59:13 65:9 82:12 137:25 150:17 ending[1] 41:25

10:23 15:22 18:10,24

13:22 14:1,6,8 48:24 43:25 44:6 52:19 59:14 67:16 61:23 66:1 68:25 78:2 engage [1] 10:24 87:12,13 94:13 95:8 engaged [3] 3:24 11:13 97:15 107:1 117:14

engineering [7] 3:7 70:9 108:12 112:7 121:19

132:5,6 enhance [5] 42:20 44:4 132:24 135:22 146:15

enhanced [2] 64:15 146:4

enhancing [1] 97:18 **enroute** [1] 15:9 **enshrined** [1] 10:2 ensure [8] 10:1,20 24:9 42:21 65:6 108:19,23

ensuring [4] 62:1,7 108:16,24 **enter** [1] 43:10 **enterprise** [1] 147:16 **entire** [1] 41:21 **entitled** [1] 117:23 **environment** [1] 60:20 **envisage** [1] 77:11 envisioned [2] 9:14 153:18

equipment [12] 9:16 10:16 11:5,9,11 15:4 16:7.23 24:6 121:23 137:16.18

equitable [2] 20:4,10 **escalate** [1] 43:15 essence [1] 86:21 **essential** [3] 16:19 143:8 144:9

essentially [3] 74:2 75:7

establish [2] 107:24 108:12

established [4] 93:21 100:18 144:3 153:10

esteemed [1] 10:4 estimate [2] 32:12 60:10 **estimated** [1] 46:5

etc [1] 22:13 etcetera [2] 89:14 90:11 ETR [1] 46:4

evaluate [1] 57:23 **evaluating** [1] 57:13 **evening** [8] 74:18 76:4

76:10 102:17,18 104:25 105:3.6

event [27] 29:9 42:23 43:13,15 54:5 57:18 66:20 67:4.17 69:25 76:15 78:10 84:20 85:2 85:7 91:12 92:16 96:1,2 105:21 106:12 114:18 132:3 134:9 136:3 137:4 139:21

events [40] 8:3,7,10,13

37:18 40:17 42:18 43:11 126:22 132:20 133:10,12 134:16,18 135:7 136:17 137:21 139:24 140:2 144:23 146:16

eventuality [2] 43:14

everybody [5] 26:20 30:22 119:19 130:23 157:21

everywhere [1] 8:19 **evidence** [11] 5:2 27:16 35:12 36:13 104:11 109:7 110:2,16 113:20 124:3 124:14

evident [1] 99:22 **evidentiary** [2] 36:1,5 evolved [1] 99:24 **evolving** [1] 93:22 **exact** [1] 79:1 **exactly** [2] 64:17 88:11 examination [6] 7:1 35:14,16 114:11,17

117:15

examine [1] 124:13 **examined** [1] 143:1 **examining** [1] 125:3 **example** [12] 51:18 54:6 55:5,5 66:10 69:3 73:19 90:5 91:11 95:13 128:5

excerpt [3] 19:21 20:15 20:24

excess [1] 100:17 **exclamation** [1] 14:10 **excluded** [7] 26:6 27:14 27:21 28:21 30:23 31:6 32:4

exclusion [1] 9:19 **exclusive** [3] 29:18 30:1 33:11

exclusively [3] 21:15 29:15 49:25

excuse [1] 97:3

execute [1] 42:9

executive [28] 23:22 24:7 63:12 66:15,25 67:20,21 69:7,12,15,16,22,23 70:3 70:3,14,17,21 71:5,22 84:24 88:16 92:7 95:20 95:20 98:21 99:13 131:25

executives [4] 70:22,23 71:9,10

existing [1] 144:15 **expanded** [2] 33:15

expanding [2] 149:3,10 **expansion** [1] 57:23 **expect** [3] 107:7 122:19

expectation [3] 92:21

102:2 127:8 **expectations** [2] 45:23 56:24 **expected** [7] 3:20 45:25 73:17 76:3 80:1 102:22 119:20

expenses [1] 125:5 **experience** [3] 39:21 127:4 157:20

experienced [10] 1:9 15:7 16:11 39:22 61:22 76:8 91:23 125:6 143:23 145:16

experiences [1] 95:3

experiencing [1] 39:2 **expert** [1] 5:2 **explain** [1] 64:17 **explained** [1] 97:13

explaining [1] 44:12 **explanation** [3] 23:23 23:24 32:5

Exploits [1] 39:12

exposed [1] 117:16 **extend** [2] 69:16 70:17 **extended** [2] 11:11,18 **extensively** [1] 46:8

extenuating [2] 154:11 154:13

external [2] 2:3 44:8 **extra** [4] 61:17 68:1 87:5 136:22

extraordinary [1] 134:17

extreme [1] 23:12 **extremely** [3] 60:8 78:19 124:20

-F-

Facebook [2] 48:9 83:9 facilities [8] 19:25 24:11 39:3 68:16,21,23 110:23 146:3

facility [9] 18:15 60:7 108:1,13,19 139:10,12 149:15 151:21

fact [20] 5:23 11:6 28:12 30:9 31:22 32:6,25 42:17 43:17 64:23 77:6 79:23 96:15 105:25 110:16 111:19 114:17 117:5 119:22 150:14

factors [2] 15:4,16 facts [1] 40:5 fail [1] 16:23 failed [3] 10:24 40:2

failed [3] 10:24 40:23 93:4

failing [1] 11:1 **failure** [13] 9:12 10:18 12:9,14,15 13:3 16:2 18:24 24:8,19 39:7 40:21 155:6

failures [9] 9:16 10:16 11:8,11 15:5 16:7,9 106:17 144:12

fair [8] 28:9 29:25 70:16 70:22,25 105:16 128:10 154:4

fairly [5] 22:16 25:9,19 29:3 34:4

faith [1] 17:10 **fall** [6] 8:1 43:5 102:2 105:9 110:4 122:11

fallen [1] 75:8 **falling** [1] 73:19

fallout [1] 13:2 **Falls** [5] 3:12,14 4:15 17:18,19

families [1] 89:13 **fan** [2] 39:15 76:16

fancy [1] 95:4

far [3] 26:8 33:16 87:24

farther [1] 87:19 **fast** [1] 59:25

fast-tracked [1] 59:25 **fault** [1] 98:7

February [6] 60:23 102:15 103:18 124:2,7

feeder [5] 25:23 28:18 33:16 56:20 141:4

feeders [15] 26:5,17 27:4 27:18,20 28:2,13,20,22 30:22,24 31:25 32:3 56:10 141:12

feels [1] 157:21 **fell** [2] 73:13 99:18

fellow [1] 72:22

felt [2] 126:14 127:3 **few** [5] 28:1 43:9 71:18

101:7 131:8 **field** to 45:1 137:17

field [2] 45:1 137:17 **fifteen** [1] 131:6

file [2] 5:2 78:14 **filed** [19] 3:21 4:24 9:5 29:13 35:12 54:24 78:20 78:23 86:24 86:24 86:24

29:13 35:12 54:24 78:20 78:23 80:11 82:23 86:24 87:4 88:13 104:11 110:16 124:14,21 157:13,16

filing [1] 7:20 **filled** [1] 13:4

final [7] 4:20 7:23 16:12 42:6 64:1 116:21 145:6

finalized [1] 127:16 **finally** [5] 15:10 34:6

139:7 146:9 158:2 **findings** [6] 4:10 17:15 22:1 32:18 124:11,19

22:1 32:18 124:11,19 **fine** [4] 23:10 86:17 92:25

155:24

finish [1] 131:6 **finished** [8] 116:4,7 129:18 130:13,17,22 152:9.15

fire [5] 134:8 143:17 150:4,9,20

first [29] 1:24 6:10 7:4 8:25 13:25 25:18 29:23

33:6 37:11 46:19 60:16 60:20 63:5,19,20 64:12 66:18,22 73:10 86:2 104:22 110:12 117:6 134:20 137:6 139:1 141:19 142:7 153:4

firsthand [1] 44:2 **fit** [3] 125:23 126:1 151:25

five [4] 39:4 54:6 69:9 133:23

five-year-old [1] 114:2 flashing [1] 15:15 flashlight [1] 14:17 flashlights [1] 11:22 flexibility [2] 134:23 145:24

flows [1] 46:13 focus [5] 10:17 41:21 108:16 135:17 138:13 focused [3] 4:1 41:17

focuses [1] 144:8 **folks** [4] 50:10 52:11 74:21 90:10

108:22

follow [1] 125:12 followed [3] 7:4,8 20:13

following [12] 6:13 7:14 7:16 9:6 15:20 35:16 37:19 41:4 76:1 92:15 139:21 153:3

food [1] 11:21 footnote [1] 54:22 footnoted [1] 54:25

forced [1] 39:15 forecast [10] 31:19 52:16

53:15 72:22 73:6 74:11 74:16,17 140:17 141:21

forecasting [3] 41:18 53:10 83:18

foregoing [1] 159:3 **foremost** [1] 33:6

foreseeable [2] 22:14 22:21

foresight [1] 55:3

forget [1] 79:1 **form** [1] 84:15

formal [6] 33:9 63:21 65:5 77:21 87:17 124:22

formed [1] 83:1

forming [2] 36:4 45:2 **forum** [3] 9:21,23 13:5

forward [19] 2:8 8:21 17:14 25:3 33:3 52:3,18 52:21 58:6 64:6,9 75:3 86:11 97:19 107:6 108:14

112:11 115:22 129:11 **found** [5] 6:2 20:21 24:25 46:8 145:7

foundationally [1] 44:24

four [8] 105:4 111:10,12 112:11 123:9 127:23 134:4 142:15

fourteen [1] 15:25 **frame** [1] 53:17

Frampton [2] 2:24,25

freeze [1] 23:9 freezing [1] 23:13 frequency [1] 55:6

frequently [2] 27:8 138:23

fuel [5] 39:8 139:8,9,12 144:5

full [9] 17:10 24:10 60:6 103:4 104:6,8,13 105:23 120:5

fully [4] 60:22 117:15,16 117:16

function [1] 150:17 fundamentally [1]

95:23 **funding** [1] 12:24 **funnel** [1] 27:23

Furthermore [1] 110:4 furthest [1] 125:10 future [3] 18:13 58:25

78:10

-G-

gain [1] 54:7 **Gary** [6] 131:24,24 135:2 135:5 144:18,21

gas [1] 139:5 gasoline [1] 11:21 gather [1] 11:20 gathering [1] 8:6

gathering [1] 8:6 **gear** [1] 46:23

general [10] 21:12,16 40:15 44:11 76:1 77:9 125:2 141:13 146:25 155:7

generally [7] 20:18 32:7 58:15 76:1 104:21 105:6 107:5

generating [13] 24:3,10 39:2 52:23 53:13 65:16 73:10,12 74:14 114:3 138:22 139:10,11

generation [52] 5:17,18 6:7 11:2 16:16 24:14 39:17 40:19 41:1,3,19 43:1,5,24 53:9,12 54:14 55:12 61:17 65:24 68:21 73:6 74:10 75:7,16 76:4 77:13 78:16 81:13 102:3 107:2 112:9 115:16,19 138:16,17,18,25 139:16 140:3,14,17,19,23 141:7 141:8,15,22 145:3,7,20 146:2

generations [1] 11:21 generator [7] 104:4 114:2 118:17 119:7 122:6 151:14,18

gentleman [1] 149:6 **Geoff** [1] 2:6 **Gerard** [1] 2:11 **given** [11] 7:1 9:15,18,23 23:1 34:9 70:25 113:20 125:22 142:25 152:2

giving [4] 12:11 38:18 82:9 149:9 **Glvnn** [15] 3:5 35:23

Glynn [15] 3:5 35:23 36:8,12 44:17 94:12 95:7 95:25 116:3,9 120:12 130:16 131:16 155:18 156:13

goal [3] 141:25 142:5,8 **goes** [3] 24:6 34:13 46:18 **gone** [5] 15:13 46:3 79:7 87:2 95:17

good [15] 1:2 2:2,10 8:25 17:25 36:21 57:5 61:2 100:23 119:16 122:24 123:3,10 139:24 147:25

governance [2] 63:7,9 **government** [4] 12:18 48:22 150:4,20

governments [1] 150:9 GRA [1] 115:24 Grand [4] 1:19,21 3:1

Grandriver [2] 130:7 155:12

graphic [1] 133:11 gratefully [1] 48:4 great [4] 28:23 55:23 57:5 128:5

7:7

greater [1] 138:13 green [4] 14:4 50:18 72:5 83:11

Greene [1] 3:5 Greenhill [1] 139:9 grey [2] 2:5 133:19

grid [1] 102:25 gross [1] 12:14

grounding [1] 44:12 **Group** [6] 3:18 4:21 10:13 16:13 124:17 145:7

groups [3] 43:2 57:11 135:17

growth [1] 59:16 GTCANLH004 [1] 112:15

guarantee [1] 112:22 guess [39] 1:23,25 8:16 18:3 20:8 22:2 23:25 34:6,24 42:14 44:12 46:15,19 51:4 53:15 63:19 66:5 72:20 73:3 75:21 76:14 77:3 80:10 82:8,11 83:24 86:6,12 86:14 92:8 102:2 104:14 116:2 120:22 121:6 126:13 129:5 130:12,19

guidance [1] 127:25 guided [2] 118:13 131:2 guidelines [1] 75:1 guides [1] 140:22 guise [1] 31:4

-H-

hackneyed [1] 119:2 **half** [5] 53:12 69:9 74:13 93:10 112:6 **hand** [2] 50:24 156:6

handing [1] 12:13 handled [3] 48:19 90:7 129:14

hands [1] 87:19 happening [14] 37:22 40:12 43:12 48:7 49:21 52:15 58:24 65:3 81:19 90:5 91:18 99:11 125:16 129:4

happy [1] 36:11 **hard** [5] 49:9 62:12 72:13 96:20 97:5

hardship [1] 61:22 Hardwood's [1] 39:6 Hardwoods [1] 86:25 harshest [1] 16:21 Hayes [1] 2:11 he'd [2] 6:19 67:21 head [6] 50:16 51:23 57:14 73:4 93:13 125:15 health [7] 21:12 70:10

hear [4] 7:3 44:18 88:3 156:19

143:8 144:4,9 149:13

151:23

heard [3] 101:21 102:1 159:7

hearing [11] 1:8 3:6,22 5:7 8:4 9:18 16:5 94:18 95:17 159:3,7

heat [1] 81:14 **heating** [1] 105:13

held [2] 20:12 132:1 **help** [1] 38:4

helpful [1] 56:25

Henderson [46] 35:1,1 36:20,22 37:10 44:22 59:2,3 64:2 67:24 69:17 71:1,6,15,24 77:23 79:5 80:4 84:7,25 92:13 97:10 99:3,16 100:6,10,16 102:6,13 103:1,15 104:3 104:19 106:2 107:4,21 109:16 110:10,22 111:9 111:23 112:13,24 113:7 113:12 121:12

hereby [1] 159:2 **hey** [1] 51:8 **high** [3] 16:17 21:23 145:15

higher [1] 103:6 highlighted [1] 16:1 highlights [1] 132:20

Hills [1] 144:6 hindsight [1] 78:9 hit [2] 72:13 148:9

holds [1] 21:23

Holyrood [23] 15:2 39:13 51:18 67:10,12,18 67:19 68:3 69:4 73:20 78:22 79:7,15 85:8 95:18 99:13 107:17 123:7 125:19 126:14,25 127:22 136:1

home [4] 90:10 103:11 105:1,2

homes [3] 89:12 143:11 143:19

honest [2] 44:15 50:6 honestly [2] 118:20,21 hope [2] 91:22 157:20 hospitals [2] 143:10,19

hour [7] 69:10 73:6 93:10 130:19,22 142:6,17

hourly [1] 42:17 **hours** [14] 11:19 12:4,11 31:13 47:15 68:7 77:11 92:4 103:23 105:4 106:7 106:10 127:23 132:16

house [1] 147:15 **Humphries** [19] 35:4 37:6,7 38:21 41:18 42:11 42:13 51:5,12 53:9 64:15 64:21 65:19 66:17 67:13 69:1 77:2,5 88:22

hundreds [1] 11:24 **Hunt** [1] 22:5

hydro [102] 1:13,24 2:4 2:6 4:2.23 5:20 6:1.9.15 6:21.22 7:4 8:9 9:12.17 10:20,24 11:4,12,16 12:20 13:8,9,10 14:22 15:2,10,17,20,21 16:25 19:3.14 21:21 24:14.17 25:9 28:7 34:25 35:9 36:23 37:5,9,12 39:1 41:21 43:23 49:12 55:19 61:21,23 62:5,8 63:7,11 63:18 66:18 67:8,9 68:20 70:21 71:5 72:24 81:5 82:23 88:16 94:15,24 95:20 96:3 97:24 112:5 113:21 115:4,13 116:12 116:15 121:2,2 124:8,13 125:17 130:13 133:5.7 133:19 139:2.3 140:10 140:14,20,24 142:14

153:2,6,15 154:22 **Hydro's** [24] 10:18,21 11:9 12:13 13:2 14:19 16:2,6 58:19 59:11 62:8 63:15 98:10 125:1,3,4 133:8,22 134:4,8,13 139:15 140:3 145:7

145:12 146:10,21 148:25

hypothetically [1] 66:10

Hyrdo[1] 69:15

-I-

Ian [1] 2:11 ice [1] 39:12 identified [9] 4:12 41:9 42:3 56:14,19 78:3,6 85:3 107:22

identify [2] 1:23 147:7 idle [1] 103:22 immediate [12] 14:3 53:4 55:2,7 57:22 58:9

53:4 55:2,7 57:22 58:9 73:25 90:8,24 91:12,12 126:22

immediately [6] 7:16 37:18 76:8 84:10 90:2,3

imminent [2] 54:15 75:7 impact [7] 37:12,15 40:8 41:1 49:22 93:18 138:12

impacted [2] 12:7,10 impacting [1] 58:24 impacts [1] 91:13

implement [2] 12:25 58:12

implementation [1] 17:7

implemented [3] 84:4 137:2 139:2

implementing [1] 86:19 implications [3] 15:12 43:11 138:24

importance [1] 14:14 **important** [6] 126:14 126:17 135:19 138:19 144:22 149:22

imposed [1] 33:9 **improve** [7] 132:24 134:25 136:20 138:24 140:1 146:2,10

improved [8] 33:4 34:8 95:14 96:13 136:15 145:21,23 146:5

improvements [2] 134:19,22

in-house [1] 2:6 **in-service** [5] 110:7,11 113:2,6,10

inaccurate [1] 5:24 inadequate [2] 12:4 17:6 Inc [2] 18:2 159:15

incident [3] 38:25 79:21 128:1

incidents [1] 136:10 include [6] 43:23 58:7 70:9 143:10 144:2 149:11

included [1] 122:6 includes [3] 3:16 9:24 127:14

including [3] 3:20 41:14 60:24

incorporate [1] 126:24 Incorporated [1] 1:20 increase [1] 42:19 increased [2] 43:20 136:16

increasing [2] 136:5,25 incredibly [1] 56:25 incrementally [2] 28:15 28:22

incumbent [2] 12:8

32:22

indeed [22] 52:19 54:20 63:10,12 70:22 76:21 78:19 87:6 88:14 92:10 98:16,21,23 109:12 110:1 112:9,10 113:21 128:21 129:3 153:7,10

indicate [9] 18:4 41:5 104:15 109:8,24 110:5 112:20 120:16 145:17

indicated [23] 6:19,24 8:22 15:21 29:12 38:14 61:5 64:5,13 72:23 83:3 97:15 102:6 106:24 107:12 109:4,18 111:2 124:6 135:19 136:24 149:23 153:17

indicates [2] 20:24 26:16 indicating [2] 110:17 136:12

indication [5] 27:2,16 109:12,13 120:13 indicative [1] 28:12

indispensable [1] 21:11 individual [3] 1:21 66:19 112:4

individuals [5] 21:10 52:10 66:24 147:12,22 industrial [14] 1:15 2:14

2:16 7:6 16:16 31:25 32:15 33:25 61:5 102:7 129:22 130:1 145:10 156:2

inefficiencies [1] 142:12 inexcusable [1] 17:7

inform [1] 132:22 information [45] 7:22 8:6 25:22 37:24 40:12 42:20 43:21,22 44:25 45:6 46:12,17 47:1 49:16 49:24 50:5 57:6,9 58:5 58:21 65:23 80:24 81:10 82:7,8 90:2,13 91:7 94:14,16 112:15 115:2 128:22,24 129:6,8 135:10 135:20 136:6 137:1 140:6 140:8,10 142:3 152:1

informed [5] 13:20 92:3 139:22 146:12 154:18 infrastructure [1]

143:11 inhabitants [1] 21:8 inherent [1] 128:19 initial [6] 3:25 4:10 38

initial [6] 3:25 4:10 38:1 41:7 51:9 131:7 initiate [2] 65:4 85:4

initiate [2] 65:4 85:4 initiated [3] 39:8 40:21 70:14

inordinate [1] 34:15 input [2] 29:16 140:14 inquiries [4] 26:14 30:13 81:8 129:13

inquiry [5] 18:25 62:1 102:7 124:14,23 inside [3] 57:2,18 90:21 insisted [1] 115:18 insofar [1] 96:11 inspected [1] 138:11 install [2] 59:9 122:6 installation [3] 16:13 59:11,20 installed [1] 139:7

installing [1] 122:8 instance [4] 23:17 68:3 93:14 125:16 instead [2] 11:18 83:17

instead [2] 11:18 83:17 instruction [4] 43:1,4 140:15,16

instrumentation [1] 68:11

insufficiency [1] 24:3 **insufficient** [2] 15:24 141:8

integrity [1] 151:1 intend [1] 125:13 intended [3] 36:9 119:17 119:19

intention [1] 35:24 inter-utility [2] 49:15 139:14

interactions [1] 150:3 interconnected [7] 1:10 3:11 4:8 56:2 125:7 127:10 159:7

interconnection [4] 3:12,15 4:14 17:19

interest [8] 6:21 18:9 19:9 38:13 87:14 150:18 153:12 156:20

interested [1] 61:6 interim [5] 4:4,9 13:17 26:4 143:2

interjection [1] 152:16 internal [5] 15:24 40:16 41:17 57:10 115:7

internally [3] 52:14 90:6 94:25

internet [2] 83:9 123:12 interrelated [1] 139:18 interrupt [1] 67:25 interrupted [1] 133:9 interruptions [1] 37:13 interveners [1] 116:13 intervenor [1] 38:3

intervenors [12] 1:14 1:18 2:14 3:19 5:1,14 6:10,24 7:1,12 131:10 157:13

interviews [1] 47:25 intimately [1] 118:8 introduce [2] 2:8 36:25 intrusted [1] 21:6 investigate [1] 15:22 investigating [3] 91:22 127:2.13

investigation [17] 1:7 1:12 3:8,17,24 4:15 8:11 9:23 15:24 37:19 40:16 41:17 61:24 95:8 96:2

97:16 159:5 investigations [2] 87:16 87:25 **inviting** [1] 5:7 invoke [1] 75:10 involve [2] 51:2 141:2 involved [7] 33:1 40:13

involvement [3] 29:17 33:19 34:1

122:9

93:9 105:14 118:8 122:4

involves [4] 13:23 52:9 67:20 149:13

island [13] 1:9,15 2:16 3:10 4:8 55:22 73:8 74:20 125:6 127:10 138:17 144:25 159:6

island's [1] 12:1 **island-wide** [1] 86:7 **isolated** [1] 16:8 **issuance** [1] 73:23

issue [36] 7:22 22:19 23:3 23:4 25:18 29:20 30:8 32:20 49:12 52:20 53:2 53:21 54:6 61:15 64:24 67:18 68:4,14 73:23 76:9 77:11 85:2.8.21 90:13 93:2 97:11 99:17 100:5 100:12 114:24,25 118:16 143:1,3 153:25

issued [10] 4:9 15:8,10 54:10 60:2 81:18 110:6 125:18 126:25 154:24

issues [39] 1:8 3:13 6:3,5 6:7.8.18.23 11:5 13:20 17:17 20:18 24:4,8 39:25 41:5 55:2 56:5 59:4 64:4 64:8 68:23 79:3,10 85:15 114:6 115:13 119:6 121:23 122:21 123:25 125:5 128:8 137:10 139:20 142:14 156:19 158:3 159:6

issuing [2] 14:24 54:2 items [5] 4:12 41:8 42:3 45:21 121:17 itself [2] 150:1,7

-J-

Jacqui [1] 3:4 **January** [69] 1:6,11 4:11 4:25 9:5 10:14,23,25 13:8 14:20 37:13 39:23 39:23 40:25 41:2,4 46:7 46:22 47:12 50:13 54:1 54:10 59:15 60:21 61:23 63:22 65:17,20 71:13,21 71:21 75:2,23 79:21 81:22 83:20 84:11,23 86:5 95:1,24 96:19 123:5 132:3,7,13,21 133:8,13 134:7,17 135:15,25 136:9 136:9 137:11.21 138:10 138:21 139:11,24 140:9 141:18,23 142:6 143:24 145:22 147:8 148:23 **January's** [1] 55:11

Jennifer [1] 2:5 **jeopardy** [1] 149:8 **Jim** [1] 1:5 **job** [4] 111:11,13 118:22 148:22 **John's** [3] 132:8 159:9 159:12

Johnson [7] 2:18,19 123:24 127:7 129:12,19 155:23

joined [1] 2:4 **joint** [5] 47:4 48:24 49:6 56:21 57:1

jointly [3] 35:6 82:21 140:21

Journal [1] 20:16 **judgment** [3] 21:1 122:20 128:1

July [2] 60:15 82:23 jump [1] 85:22

June [1] 60:5 **Justice** [1] 20:25 **justifiable** [1] 34:17 justification [1] 30:12

justified [1] 34:17

-K-

keen [1] 18:9 **keep** [6] 13:19 108:15 119:5 122:21 139:22 146:12

Keepers [2] 130:7 155:12

keeping [1] 141:25 **Keith** [2] 5:12 17:22 **Kelly** [8] 2:9,11 62:23 130:24 131:4,20,21

146:17

Kennedy [3] 2:23 96:4 98:2

Kerry [1] 111:22 kev [8] 4:12.19 24:5 49:3

49:19 50:4 115:18 139:1 kick [1] 102:5 kicked [1] 46:23

kids [2] 89:13 90:11 kind [5] 110:24 114:14 114:15 122:10 153:17

knew [10] 30:22 69:5 85:14,16,18 92:5 99:10 105:18,20 108:3

knock [2] 28:18 31:20

knocked [7] 27:25 28:23 30:16 31:4,9,11,12

knocking [1] 28:19 **knowing** [6] 69:9 93:19 94:8 101:23 103:24

knowledge [1] 29:10 **known** [5] 6:12 9:6 15:5 77:7 112:5

knows [2] 26:20 34:10

-L-

Labrador [28] 1:13,20 2:4 3:1 4:22,23 6:15,20 8:9 16:25 18:7 19:14 25:8 28:7 35:8 36:23 37:5,9 55:19,21 56:2,2 68:19 82:23 125:1 133:4 159:5,9

Labrador's [1] 9:12 Labradorians [1] 16:20 lack [2] 45:10 63:8 lacked [1] 12:20 **Lake** [1] 87:1

large [9] 26:5 28:20 31:25 32:3,15 45:12 58:3 137:20 143:5

largest [11] 45:14 51:16 51:17 52:23 53:13 73:9 73:12,19 74:4,14 134:6

last [24] 7:20 37:23 38:10 38:11 42:18 46:7 50:4 50:13 54:1 55:10 56:7 59:5 61:23 71:13 75:2 80:23 81:2,22 82:23 86:5 125:7 143:3 147:8 152:17

Lastly [1] 23:1 **late** [6] 1:10 59:22 84:6 107:17 109:20 137:6 **latitude** [1] 157:24

law [3] 20:15,19 25:4 **lawver** [1] 98:10 lead [2] 9:19 148:25 **leader** [3] 8:21 46:20

85:20 leaders [1] 150:3 **leadership** [2] 10:17

16:7 **leading** [4] 10:22,25 65:17,20

leads [1] 73:2 learned [2] 13:11 14:20 **least** [7] 10:6 11:15 13:22 21:16 23:24 123:16 127:9

least-cost [1] 62:2 **leave** [2] 7:18 119:1 **led** [5] 18:24 19:9 117:3 118:16 126:8

left [6] 1:4 9:9 15:13,14 101:20 130:19

legal [3] 2:23 3:5 19:11 legislated [1] 16:3

legislation [1] 19:23 legitimate [1] 151:9

less [12] 15:19 52:23 53:1 53:12 73:9 74:13,18 77:14 98:19 142:6,17 145:2

lesson [1] 13:11 **lessons** [1] 14:20 **letter** [1] 124:6 **level** [44] 14:1,4,4,9,10

14:13,16,24 15:10 31:11 42:15 43:3,6 50:24,25

51:4,9,24 53:8 55:13,13 56:6 65:2,24,25 68:1,24 69:13 70:4 72:9,18,20 73:1,5,5,10,16,21 74:12 75:6 76:7 86:10 87:15

levels [7] 13:23 14:6,23 50:15 72:7 93:24 100:19

liability [1] 23:19 **Liberty** [24] 3:18,21,25 4:21 10:12 11:6 12:20 12:23 16:12 17:8 23:21 32:18 41:6 49:4 63:6.17 114:9 115:15,17 116:10 120:18 124:17 145:6,11

Liberty's [4] 4:4,25 13:17 42:6

life [2] 95:3,6

light [9] 25:7 29:15 75:14 81:11 90:14,24 117:5 124:7 126:21

lights [2] 15:15 72:5 **likely** [1] 12:2 **Likewise** [1] 130:9 limbo [1] 15:13 limit [2] 142:5,16

limited [2] 33:11 39:18

limits [1] 137:18 **line** [9] 86:16 98:10 116:5 116:7 122:7 126:15,16 128:5 157:22

lines [1] 136:21 **lineup** [1] 7:9 **list** [14] 29:8,11 31:12 56:10,13,17,20 69:11,12 69:14 123:22 144:1,6

149:24 **listen** [1] 76:19 **lists** [3] 33:8 56:12,15 **litre** [1] 139:8

live [4] 11:25 12:1 16:20 46:15

load [18] 26:12 28:11,14 28:17,24 41:18 53:19 55:6 59:15 61:19 103:4 103:5,5,6 104:20 105:14 128:7 141:15

local [1] 13:10 **localized** [1] 30:24 **located** [2] 27:19 159:8 **location** [2] 90:9 142:21 long-term [2] 108:20 126:5

longer [2] 126:23 128:22 **longwinded** [1] 129:8 **look** [15] 17:14 28:10 37:20 47:2 52:3,18 58:20 58:25 72:13 88:22 115:22 123:8,10,15 129:11

looked [9] 19:12 33:23 56:9 74:16 75:3 119:15 120:18 122:24 123:3

looking [23] 24:1 52:21 58:6,11,23 59:15 65:7 73:7 74:8 86:13 88:9

91:5 105:22 106:11,13 106:14 107:25 108:2 109:9 116:11 126:20 128:4 129:1

looks [3] 52:16 74:3 119:18

lose [5] 31:14,15,17 54:4 90:1

loss [2] 32:1 149:9 **lost** [11] 12:7,8 26:23 27:1 32:9,10 76:16,17,19 77:21 86:25

lots [2] 150:2,8 **love** [1] 66:6

low [4] 16:17 103:4,5 145:8

lowest [1] 20:7 lunch [1] 105:11

-M-

MacDougall [10] 2:1,3 35:7,19 36:3,18 87:8 96:22 97:6 146:22

machine [2] 77:22 94:6 Madam [1] 156:12

magnitude [4] 55:9 56:5 58:2 60:9

main [1] 126:16 **maintain** [4] 18:16 140:17 141:5 151:1

maintained [6] 24:24 28:24 29:14 30:7 33:14 56.11

maintaining [1] 143:20 **maintenance** [11] 11:10 28:8 33:7 41:22 86:16 127:22 128:7 138:14 148:7,7,9

major [9] 39:11 133:21 134:4,13 136:16 144:11 145:1.21 146:13

majority [2] 20:25 138:6 makes [3] 21:19 31:21 34:13

manage [5] 13:3 38:4 45:23 136:16 139:20

managed [4] 19:7 20:2 22:2,2

management [5] 19:4 21:6 24:20 57:25 138:24

manager [3] 67:11,15 132:8

manages [1] 17:1 **managing** [3] 78:1

140:12 148:4 mandate [2] 9:24 62:7

mandated [2] 10:20 78:17

manner [3] 20:2 42:23 63:14

manual [3] 27:6,9,11 **manually** [1] 137:18 manufacturer's [1] 120:5

map - now Verbatim Court Reporters

map [1] 12:23 **March** [38] 8:3,12 14:22 15:3,22 16:6 61:18 85:13 86:8 87:12,13 91:24 94:13 101:23 102:10,17 102:19,21,24 103:2,18 114:18 117:5,14 125:14 125:17 126:7 127:3 129:14 145:17 152:18 153:8,16,21 154:20 155:3 159:8,13 **margin** [3] 53:12 74:13

margin [3] 53:12 74:13 74:19

margins [3] 54:15 75:8 140:23

market [1] 107:15 marks [1] 16:9 Martin [1] 64:9

mass [1] 45:18 match [1] 141:14

material [1] 29:12

materialized [1] 158:3 materially [1] 143:14

materials [3] 19:17 20:14 76:9

matter [7] 88:1 110:16 114:10 118:2,23 124:19 159:5

matters [2] 114:8 157:25

Maureen [1] 3:5 **maximize** [1] 139:4

maximum [5] 14:6 53:23 74:24 103:24 136:11

may [26] 4:9 7:15 12:5 26:23 31:9 32:5,5 33:19 34:23 38:16 43:12 46:10 48:9 49:22 52:19 54:7 59:23 60:5 67:25 93:6 115:2 118:6 119:24 121:8 128:21 157:17

McDonough [2] 111:22 112:2

McGill [1] 20:15 mean [23] 34:13 65:15 88:3 95:16,21 96:17 114:6 115:1 116:19,25 118:5,20 119:22 120:25 121:4 131:2 151:6,7,8,8 151:12 154:10,15

means [6] 6:12 45:18 54:16 82:6 103:3 159:10

meant [3] 13:19 21:4 55:1

measured [1] 21:25 mechanisms [1] 138:7 media [13] 13:10 45:18 46:11,14,16 47:25 48:3 48:8,13 49:2 90:23 129:3 153:3

medications [1] 149:7 mediums [1] 58:8 meet [12] 24:4,12 39:19 40:1 41:4 75:9 108:20

40:1 41:4 75:9 108:20 110:24 122:9 142:8 149:18 150:14 **meeting** [3] 60:25 62:7 153:11

meetings [1] 57:12 megawatt [3] 65:2 88:17

megawatts [21] 43:6 51:15,16,19 52:24 53:1 53:14 73:11,13,21 74:14 74:18 76:17 77:14,21 87:2 94:3 101:24 103:25 105:19 111:5

member [2] 130:12 156:24

members [4] 6:11 34:22 47:2 157:6

mention [3] 13:18 35:10 40:18

mentioned [10] 17:17 38:2 41:11 56:21 57:25 60:7 65:12 86:4 121:15 142:12

menu [1] 136:19 mere [1] 21:5 merely [1] 21:9 message [2] 48:25 136:11

messages [6] 45:3 47:19 49:17,20 81:23 137:3

messaging [2] 83:3 146:7

met [6] 34:3 80:6 90:20 90:22.23 113:15

metered [1] 147:17 methods [1] 135:23

mic [2] 72:13,13 middle [1] 39:5

midnight [1] 102:20 might [6] 32:19 45:20 50:16 03:18 106:16

might [6] 32:19 45:20 59:16 93:18 106:16 128:15

million [1] 121:9 mind [1] 22:10 minimal [1] 30:15

minimized [1] 143:7

minor [1] 123:25 minute [5] 41:19 90:21 100:24 141:24,24

minutes [13] 8:23 15:1 69:9 87:5 104:5,7,10,12 105:22 131:7 136:8,9 142:10

mis-operations [2] 138:6 142:11

misinformation [1] 46:10

46:10 **miss** [1] 83:12

mitigate [3] 11:15 13:3 13:23

mitigating [1] 44:5 mitigations [2] 43:12 65:8

Mitsubishi [1] 112:12 **mobile** [1] 137:1 **mobilisation** [1] 89:14

modified [1] 42:25 **modifying** [1] 140:14

modifying [1] 140:1 **moments** [1] 43:9

momentum [1] 54:5 **Monday** [2] 157:14,17

money [1] 151:11 **monitor** [2] 43:3 140:3

monitored [1] 4:17 monitoring [6] 17:9 46:16 52:2,7 64:24 128:25

month [1] 98:20 months [7] 15:19,25 60:13 84:21 107:3 109:9

Morgan [6] 5:12 6:14 17:23,24 151:2,3

Morgan's [1] 150:25 morning [33] 1:2 2:2,10 8:25 9:2 15:7,17 17:14 17:25 36:21 46:20 47:14 50:11 52:9 66:11 74:15 76:5 85:14 89:10 93:4 93:23 94:9 98:4 99:20 102:16,18,20 103:14 104:22,23 105:7,17 134:7

most [7] 49:20 64:7 89:11 128:14 132:15 135:7,18

motor [2] 39:15 76:16 **move** [3] 8:17 91:20 103:6

moved [3] 46:24 60:1 115:20

Moving [1] 33:3 **Ms** [48] 2:24 35:23 36:8 36:12 37:2 38:21 40:3 43:8 44:7,10,17,18,20 51:14 72:10,17 75:25 77:1 78:8 80:21 82:19 83:5,13,21 84:3,14 86:1

83:5,13,21 84:3,14 86:1 88:21 89:4,8 93:8 94:12 95:7,25 97:2,14 100:8 116:3,9 120:12 125:25 127:12 130:8,16 131:16 155:13,18 156:13

multi-channelled [1] 48:11

multiple [1] 11:2 **municipal** [3] 143:11,18 150:3

Murphy [2] 159:2,14 Murray [12] 131:24 132:5 135:2,4 144:21 146:18 147:13,23 148:17 149:12 153:13 154:25

Muskrat [5] 3:12,14 4:15 17:18,19

must [5] 22:9 34:6,8 110:20 154:16

Mutual [3] 23:22 24:25 32:18

-N-

Nalcor [14] 63:24 69:7 69:16,20,24 70:19,20

71:7,9 84:24 92:8 95:19 98:22 99:13

name [2] 1:21 36:22 naturally [1] 114:10 nature [4] 11:7 108:13 151:24,25

navigate [1] 15:14 near [1] 134:10

necessarily [1] 150:24 necessary [4] 8:15 12:25 21:9 145:13

necessity [1] 41:12 need [24] 11:17 12:24 14:11 18:20 45:9,18 48:10,12,13,13 49:14 53:6 54:8 58:21 82:6 86:18 91:3 93:6 103:25 121:21 124:12 145:18 150:25 151:12

needed [8] 18:18 24:9 24:13 47:8 49:13 50:7 106:7 126:9

needs [9] 11:23 24:11 33:15,18 34:5 56:24 68:9 108:20 154:1

negligence [3] 23:17 32:1,17

negligent [1] 24:19 **negligently** [1] 24:23 **neither** [1] 10:22

never [7] 84:12 109:2,24 119:17 123:10 148:22 151:17

new [35] 13:13 16:14,14 24:14 45:20 52:4,6 54:1 58:7 59:6,10,20 85:18 86:19 92:23 96:12 102:4 111:5,6,6,14,19 112:11 113:17,23 114:3 120:4 140:21 145:8,9 146:7,9 148:9,21 153:9

Newfoundland [148] 1:13,14,24 2:4,12 4:2,22 4:22,23 5:20,22,24,25 6:5,9,15,16,20 7:3,5,8 8:9 9:12 16:24 18:6,8 19:1,3,4,13,14 21:20,21 24:17 25:7.8 26:13 28:6 29:15 35:8 36:23 37:5,8 40:11 43:22 44:1 45:15 47:5 48:14,21 49:12 55:16,19 56:8,22 58:19 62:20 64:19 65:14,15,20 67:8,8,9 68:18 72:24 75:4 76:18,22 77:8,18 82:22,22 88:19 89:15,18 91:10 92:8 112:5 113:21 124:9,10,13 125:1 130:13 130:20 131:23 132:1,5,9 132:14,19 133:2,4,5,14 133:17,20,25 134:3,12 134:18,22 135:9,16,21 136:7,14,24 137:7,12,13 137:22 138:10,15,21 139:1,17 140:2,7,13,20

141:10,11,15,19,23 142:2

142:4 143:4.16 144:1.7

144:12,22,25 145:5,22

146:3,14 149:25 150:7 153:2,6 154:22 155:25 159:4,9

Newfoundlanders [1]

Newman [1] 1:6 next [11] 17:22 31:13 50:17 57:15,20 63:2 73:4 77:11 123:22 130:20 137:9

night [2] 103:12 125:20 nine [1] 138:2

NL [1] 159:12

nobody [7] 29:16,17 31:14 34:10,23 123:13 158:1

none [1] 94:13 nor [1] 10:22 normal [1] 140:24 normally [2] 104:16 106:8

North [1] 1:17 Northern [3] 55:24 68:20 128:6

note [6] 7:19 26:15 54:22 63:15 87:10 149:22

noted [7] 47:13 55:15 78:21 85:15 90:16 145:11 152:17

nothing [6] 32:14 61:14 80:2 92:19 98:17 108:8

notice [15] 12:4,11 23:3 30:9,10,21 31:2 34:8 47:9,11 76:9 85:22 90:22 142:20,24

notices [2] 5:7 85:23 **notification** [58] 13:14 13:24 14:23,25 15:8,11 15:11,18 31:8 43:7,17 45:19 46:21 50:10,11,16 51:3,10,23 52:20 53:2,8 54:21,23 55:9,12 57:22 58:9,13 73:4,5 75:22 81:16 82:1,4,11 83:11 86:3,10 89:10 90:14,18 90:21 91:2 92:14,14 98:17 125:13,15,22,24

notifications [4] 86:12 91:1 126:24 137:4

146:8 155:8

126:3,21 128:9,16 140:21

notified [10] 76:3 88:24 89:2,7 90:15 92:9,10,17 93:15 140:19

notifies [3] 14:1,5,12 **notify** [6] 66:22 67:22 72:21 78:7 93:12 128:20

notifying [2] 77:25 85:3 **Nova** [2] 23:2,5

November [3] 79:8 84:6 84:13

now [48] 1:24 21:25 27:18 31:1 33:2 34:24 40:4 41:25 42:7,11 43:4 44:7 48:14 52:4,7 57:17 58:3 60:18 61:3 62:20 64:25

65:14,23 71:12 75:1 76:24 78:13 79:24 83:17 90:23 95:16,17,23 104:1 106:19 109:24 121:1 126:21 129:1 135:2 137:2 137:7 138:13 139:14 141:1 144:17 146:6 153:22

nowhere [1] 107:17 **Nu-Quest** [4] 5:12 17:23 18:2,3

number [24] 11:7 25:20 26:15 28:1 30:15,22,23 31:5,19 39:3 42:3 63:5 70:7 71:16 79:17 83:8 93:7 103:23 121:17 122:1 128:3 133:14 145:12 147:25

numbers [1] 31:12 **numerous** [3] 47:24 48:8 48:20

nuts[1] 124:18

-O-

o'clock [2] 8:15 131:11 **objective** [2] 10:13 45:4 **obligated** [1] 31:20 **obligation** [4] 20:19,20 29:2 30:6 obligations [1] 34:2 obtain [1] 12:3 **obvious** [1] 27:24 **obviously** [20] 18:9,14 19:8,12 24:21 25:13 66:5 66:21 67:6,20 85:25 87:2

130:20 148:24 153:6 154:8 157:25 **occasions** [1] 133:9 occur [2] 121:18 144:25 occurred [13] 8:3 18:22 18:24 29:10 30:11 37:13 88:10,12 97:12 133:10

95:22 118:7 119:19

occurrences [1] 144:24 occurring [4] 18:10 28:4 40:10 97:14

134:7 137:11 143:24

occurs [1] 68:5

off [20] 27:25 28:18,19 28:23 30:3,16 31:4,9,11 31:13,20 49:15 55:1 75:2 105:9 127:20,21,22

128:19 151:12 **offering** [1] 146:6 **office** [1] 74:16

Officer [2] 70:20 132:1 **offices** [1] 159:8

official [6] 8:22 9:4,20 10:7 17:12 19:6

officials [4] 48:23 143:18 150:4,19

offline [1] 125:20 often [2] 46:14 55:4

old [4] 20:21 113:23 114:2 119:2

on-call [3] 52:10 68:3,14 once [6] 26:24 46:23 85:2 91:9,11 104:4

oncoming [1] 52:19 one [53] 3:9,23 4:20 5:23 7:23 8:5 13:6 16:21 17:15 18:3 19:11 20:21 24:1 25:16 30:16 32:21 33:8 34:1 35:11 39:14 46:7 47:10 49:3 56:13 57:12 61:18,25 69:4,23 70:25 74:10 85:15 91:9 95:17 96:16 97:5 108:12 110:18 112:16 115:18 116:10 121:7,17 122:18 124:23 125:19 133:25

151:7 152:17 157:3 one-hour [1] 90:22 ones [5] 27:7,24 28:25 29:21,23

142:17 147:6 148:12

ongoing [4] 3:16 17:16 125:1 143:16

online [6] 43:21,24 57:24 65:13,17 120:15

open [6] 11:1 13:11 30:25 44:14 87:20 150:13 **opened** [2] 34:5 114:7

operate [2] 137:15 138:4 **operated** [7] 18:8 20:2 24:24 61:4,8,9 102:8

operates [1] 72:9 **operating** [10] 42:25 43:2 50:21 54:13 68:17 70:20 72:12 106:3 125:4 140:15

operation [9] 11:10 19:19 24:5,20 80:7 81:13 138:13 139:15 146:11

operational [2] 116:23 139:23

operations [27] 9:16 10:16 11:5,12 16:7 35:5 37:8 42:14 43:9 45:1,1,2 50:9 52:10 57:10 67:14 68:2,19 77:4 89:20,21 91:15,16 132:4,7 138:1 138:3

operator [7] 85:2 92:5,7 94:5,7 99:9 106:5

operators [8] 43:22 44:1 50:22 66:22 68:5,6,12 79:16

opinion [1] 117:2 opportunities [2] 134:19 156:22

opportunity [15] 5:3 7:2 9:1 17:13 18:1 32:20 48:17 124:15 132:12 156:16,18,21,24 157:6 157:15

opposed [5] 27:5 33:25 114:3 120:6 148:16

Opposition [6] 8:22 9:5 10:8 17:12 19:6 85:21

Opposition's [1] 46:20 **option** [1] 107:23

options [1] 48:16 orange [3] 14:10 50:18 83:11

order [6] 18:16 31:19 62:19 107:3 122:9 157:9

orders [1] 11:25 **ordinary** [1] 106:25

organization[1] 66:18 organize [2] 19:15 49:2 otherwise [2] 45:19

137:17 ought [2] 9:20 17:2 ours [1] 91:13

ourselves [3] 46:15,25 48:1

outage [28] 4:1 7:25 24:9 38:19 43:18 46:2,3 47:4 49:6 50:3 54:21 55:7 57:1.4.24 58:14.16.23 62:1 76:1 82:2,2,20 126:7 134:11 136:25 137:5 139:21

outages [92] 1:9 4:3,11 9:9,20 10:14,15 11:15 11:18,20 12:14 13:4,21 13:23 14:9.13.16.21 15:3 15:7.17.23 16:6.11.17 25:11 26:7,19 28:3 30:11 32:4 33:24 39:21,22 40:17 46:7,22 47:10,15 47:16,18,20,22,24 48:16 49:7,10 53:25 54:12,17 55:11 62:12 74:25 75:11 75:18 81:11 82:5 86:5,8 125:6 128:13 132:15 133:24 134:1,5 135:25 137:11,20 138:5 141:2,2 141:5,11,14,16,24 142:6 142:8,9,13,17,21 143:5 143:15,23 145:14,16,25 146:13 154:19,21 159:6

outlets [2] 25:25 48:14 outline[1] 49:13 **outlined** [1] 49:19 **outlining** [1] 19:17 **output** [3] 104:6,6,8 **outside** [3] 26:22 70:20 153:17

overall [8] 23:20 27:3 28:14 31:5 34:4 39:11 44:13 45:4

overflow [1] 136:19 **overhauled** [1] 139:6 oversight [4] 30:3 32:25 33:10,18

own [16] 19:11 23:18 24:17 37:20 41:9 49:10 61:24 63:12,13 86:23 94:7 129:4 151:13,17,18 151:20

owned [1] 18:8 **Oxford** [1] 1:5

-P-

p.m [6] 85:18 103:8 120:11 133:1 144:19 158:6

page [6] 5:6 20:23 24:1,6 26:4 107:11

pages [1] 109:6 panel [14] 2:7 35:9,11 64:3,4 87:9,15 94:17 96:16,24 97:2 98:4,21

panelists [1] 72:22 **Paper** [1] 1:17 Papers [1] 8:18 **Paragraph** [1] 22:9 **parameters** [1] 127:24 **pardon** [1] 155:21 parents [1] 15:13 part [17] 3:22 32:6 36:4 42:7,8 49:20 61:3 74:8 76:15,20 87:17 98:15

114:25 117:4 133:10

148:14 151:21 participation [1] 5:8 particular [28] 18:20 19:22,23 22:4,17 23:7 23:21 30:16,20,25 31:9 31:10 33:8 61:15 77:22 78:21 79:18 81:21 82:20 84:22 92:11 117:10 120:7 124:8 143:22 151:20,21 155:4

particularly [5] 9:18 11:4 16:4 97:2 115:9 parties [9] 1:12,22 6:17 7:12 35:11 124:2 130:4 130:21 157:12

partner [1] 17:3 parts [1] 70:12 **pass** [2] 44:7 144:17 **passed** [1] 16:1 **passing** [1] 123:8 **past** [2] 117:14 138:23 **patients** [1] 18:18 **Paul** [4] 2:16 35:4 37:7 77:2

Paulette [2] 159:2,14 payers [3] 10:11 16:10 21:15

peak [14] 31:10 74:17 102:12,16,17,18,18 104:16,21,24 105:11,17 138:18 139:5

peak-load [1] 77:9

peaks [1] 105:3 **pending** [1] 96:3 **Peninsula** [13] 26:11 55:24,24 68:20 93:24,25 100:13 126:17 128:6 138:12 139:10,13 153:24

Penney [1] 157:4 **people** [51] 9:9 12:10 26:22,25 30:15 31:19,20 38:4 44:16 47:17 48:18 50:6 53:24 63:21 67:1 67:19,23 68:4,11,21,22 70:9,10 75:17 80:24 81:5 82:17 85:9 87:14 90:9

92:17 93:12,16 104:22 104:25 105:1 108:22 120:8 126:9,15 128:20 128:25 131:3 148:1,11 148:12,16 152:20 154:6 154:10,18

people's [2] 80:15 152:18

per [3] 70:21 82:14 128:1 percent [14] 27:3,6 47:8 47:10 55:18 58:18 82:3 133:2 134:2,14 137:22 137:23.24 138:17

perform [2] 106:1,8 **performance** [2] 105:23

119:17 **performed** [1] 102:9

performing [1] 80:1 **perhaps** [4] 105:8 117:25 118:3 151:23

period [13] 40:2 48:21 51:25 65:4 77:10,12 104:16 126:23 133:22 136:17 141:8,18 143:25

periods [3] 133:16,19 139:4

permit [2] 134:23 142:4 **permitting** [1] 108:10 **person** [13] 23:13 66:23 67:14,16,17 68:15 69:19 69:25 70:2 85:4 92:11 96:9.9

persons [2] 7:13 12:4 **perspective** [13] 19:11 33:3 44:11 46:23 49:21 52:22 55:14 56:3 73:22 86:2 90:3 93:2 129:2

pharmaceutical [3] 18:5 149:5,6

Phase [12] 3:9,12,16,20 3:23 4:20 7:23 8:5 17:15 17:16 61:25 124:23

phases [1] 3:9 **phone** [8] 90:12 92:20 93:8,11,16 136:2,4,21 **phonetic** [2] 99:3 148:10 **phrase** [1] 13:1 **physical** [1] 90:9

pick [1] 53:11 **picking** [1] 53:19 **pictures** [1] 123:12 **piece** [4] 45:25 90:17

110:2 113:19

pieces [2] 25:21 45:7 **pipes** [2] 23:9,13

place [25] 58:3 71:12,13 71:16 75:24 76:25 81:17 85:24 88:15 89:18 91:3 95:16 97:8.9 106:21 107:19 108:10 109:10 110:4 112:23 122:11 126:2 153:8 154:17 155:5

plan [13] 13:1 24:11 42:7 42:8 49:6 69:21,22 70:7 71:8 78:12,13 102:2

129:10 **planned** [3] 24:9,24 115:19 **planning** [7] 17:6 24:13 37:8 41:19 51:22 87:18 90:10 **plans** [3] 59:11 107:6 128:16 **plant** [14] 39:13 67:12 68:3,4,5,6,7,10,14 78:22 85:8,9 99:10 107:6 **plants** [5] 39:3,4 138:22 139:4 143:12 play [1] 30:20 **plays**[1] 138:19 **pleasure** [1] 36:6 **plug** [1] 14:4 **plus** [3] 51:18 73:12 103:25 **point** [33] 14:10 19:8 30:5 43:10 46:20 47:19 51:25 53:3,14,20 60:23 61:2,3 63:6,8 75:8 76:7 76:18 77:17 79:22 83:25 86:8 92:17,19 93:6 94:21 96:11 97:1,23 99:24 102:10 109:22 115:11 **pointed** [3] 11:7 12:20 85:21 points [2] 51:5 59:6 police [1] 143:18 poor [1] 17:5 **population** [1] 148:14 **portion** [1] 21:17 **portions** [1] 65:21 pose [1] 7:2 **posed** [1] 130:3 position [4] 44:14 63:17 70:21 132:2 possibility [4] 11:17 14:8 54:12 58:11 **possible** [5] 20:7 74:25 112:8 131:13 142:2 Possibly [1] 132:14 **post** [1] 17:18 **potential** [4] 13:15.21 41:15 140:19 potentially [3] 31:13 97:17 151:11 power [218] 1:8,14 2:12 4:3,22,23 5:22,25 6:5,16 7:5,8 9:8,10 11:15,18,22 12:13,19 13:15,24,24,25 13:25 14:5,11,12,15,21 15:7,23 16:6,11 18:13 18:15.21.23 19:1.2.4.14 19:21 20:1,5,5,12 21:2 21:20 22:19,20 23:2,7 23:11 25:6,7 26:1,7,9,14 26:24 29:3,16,22,22,24 31:14,16,17 32:2,4,10 32:11 33:12,13,24 34:12 39:19 40:11,13 43:22

44:1 45:15 46:3 47:5

48:15,22 49:13,25 53:2

53:21,24,25 54:2,10,16

54:20 55:7,16 56:8,23 60:22 61:13 62:2,13,20 64:1,20 65:14,15,21 67:8 69:19 72:7,8,8,24 73:23 73:24 74:20 75:4.10.11 75:17 76:19,22 77:8,19 81:18 82:22 85:2,22 87:7 88:19 89:16.18.23.23 90:2 91:11 94:3 101:24 102:25 112:3,3,11,16 117:8 124:9,10,13 125:6 125:23 130:20 132:1,5,9 132:15.19 133:2.5.14.17 133:18,23,25 134:3,5,12 135:9,17 136:14 137:5,7 137:11 138:2,9,11,21 139:1,21 140:2,7,13,20 141:1,11,16,19,20,24 142:2,5,7,13,16,21,25 143:5,13,16 144:1,22 145:4,16,22,24,25 146:3 146:13,14 147:9 149:9 149:25 150:7,25 152:22 155:25 159:6 Power's [19] 58:19 131:23 132:14 133:20 134:18,22 135:22 136:7 136:24 137:12,14,22 138:15 139:17 141:10 142:5 143:4 144:7.13 **powers** [1] 10:1 **practical** [2] 12:12 33:20 **practice** [2] 11:1 144:16 **practices** [1] 11:9 practitioners [1] 57:2 pre-notification [1] **pre-owned** [1] 107:15 **pre-prepared** [1] 49:19 **precise** [1] 142:20 precisely [2] 122:11 125:3 **precision** [2] 22:15,22 **prefer** [1] 135:20 **preference** [2] 136:6,25 preliminary [1] 4:6 premature [1] 8:12 prematurely [1] 79:24 preparation [1] 43:14 prepare [9] 11:17,20 13:21 14:8 31:17 34:14 54:11 76:9 115:15 prepared [6] 53:6,24 74:5,25 98:5 144:21 preparedness [2] 145:20 146:15 preparing [2] 65:8 122:4 present [8] 3:3 7:13 9:1 17:14 18:1 63:9 124:1 132:20 presentation [22] 6:16 6:23 7:15 19:16 34:25 35:6,16 38:12 63:21 75:21 106:23 109:6 130:2 131:7,23 132:12 133:12 140:25 144:17 146:19 149:4 156:25

presentations [5] 5:9 6:14 7:10 8:20 35:25 **presented** [3] 36:14 59:5 66:8 **presenter** [2] 47:13 131:18 presenters [4] 5:11 6:18 35:10 38:14 preservation [1] 21:11 preserve [2] 29:18 33:21 **preserved** [1] 29:21 **President** [14] 35:2.3.5 36:23 37:3,7 63:19,24 70:18,19 131:25 132:4,6 132:18 press [1] 48:20 **pressure** [1] 90:1 **presume** [1] 88:6 **pretty** [2] 95:21 102:19 **prevent** [6] 11:15 13:22 37:22 43:13 47:18 114:13 **prevented** [1] 39:9 preventing [2] 37:17 47:22 **preview** [1] 126:23 **previous** [5] 71:21 103:17 106:4 125:20 130:4 **previously** [5] 38:14 41:9,11 111:3,15 primarily [4] 5:19,21 6:6 61:10 **primary** [5] 5:25 55:17 141:25 143:4 144:7 **principles** [1] 44:13 **priority** [2] 4:12 56:10 **private** [1] 21:10 probability [1] 65:3 **problem** [7] 28:5 36:19 39:6,15,16 40:18,20 **problems** [5] 15:1 39:5 39:17 40:24 136:1 procedural_[2] 88:5 94:22 procedurally [1] 157:21 procedure [2] 98:15 139:3 **procedures** [1] 146:9 **proceed** [6] 5:14 34:25 114:1 118:4,22 130:14 **proceeding** [4] 8:1 35:12 116:13 156:15 **proceedings** [7] 1:3 2:20 6:1 8:14 19:10 36:2

118:11

process [21] 3:23 8:6

18:22 28:10,19 33:17

34:5.7.11 43:17 49:15

52:6 58:4 83:11 85:1

processes [4] 56:8 57:9

111:20 118:9

product [1] 12:8

88:25 91:8

87:18 92:18 106:20 111:8

production [1] 19:25 **productive** [1] 157:20 products [1] 18:20 ProEnergy [2] 113:11 113:13 program [2] 41:23 82:13 **programs** [1] 57:7 progress [4] 4:18 38:10 42:10 129:9 project [12] 56:22 59:14 59:25 60:9,9,11,17 107:24 121:14,15 122:4 122:4 **projected** [1] 75:9 **projects** [1] 122:12 **proliferation** [1] 46:11 **prolonged** [1] 138:4 **promote** [1] 75:14 **prompt** [4] 50:16 51:20 73:14,22 91:14 **prompts** [6] 50:25 51:3 51:7 53:1 72:20 73:1 **proper** [6] 9:22 42:22 75:22 108:24 123:15 154:23 **properly** [1] 118:1 propose [1] 151:9 **proposed** [1] 113:2 protect [1] 144:4 **protocol** [49] 13:14,16 13:19 14:24 15:18.20 43:8 50:10,12,17,21 66:13 71:22 72:7 75:4 75:24 76:2 77:25 81:17 82:2 86:20 90:18,21.24 93:20 95:6 97:7,13,18 97:19 99:19 100:18 125:13 126:3 140:22.22 140:25 153:17,20 154:1 154:5,16,23 155:4

prompted [3] 50:13 86:7 54:13 57:1 64:16,25 66:9 protocols [8] 23:19 33:9 54:19 77:4 95:15 106:15 146:9 153:9 128:9 135:9 136:22 139:8 **provides** [3] 10:21

provide [25] 9:13 10:13 16:2 32:23 38:25 41:13 45:5 51:23,25 55:22 58:13 78:17 80:24 81:10 82:10 94:17 117:7 124:3 140:8 142:18 145:23 provided [18] 5:3 19:17 19:20 23:23 30:10,12

34:20 37:24 38:15 44:25 57:5 60:13 94:15 109:17 140:13 142:2 155:8 156:18

133:11 140:5 providing [6] 4:5 25:25 61:20 103:2 116:12 128:23

province [25] 9:9,25 10:6,11 11:24 12:5 13:10

20:1,3,6 21:22 22:24 26:3 37:16 47:6 55:17 55:22 62:3 63:22 76:21 80:24 112:21 120:9 127:9 147:22

province-wide [2] 80:13 153:25

provincial [1] 143:17 **prudence** [2] 117:4 125:3

prudency [6] 114:7,21 114:25 115:8,23 121:4

prudent [3] 105:24 116:22 127:3

PUB [11] 9:5.22 10:4.8.9 10:12,20 21:25 33:6 80:11 86:25

public [100] 6:11 7:21 8:19 9:1,15,20 10:2,3,25 11:13 12:22 13:5.13.19 14:1,3,5,7 16:24,25 17:2 17:9 21:6,12,16 23:20 30:3 31:1,1,3 32:2,25 33:10,18 34:15,23 36:7 37:25 40:15 44:16,23 45:4,12,16 47:2 48:6 49:5 53:2 58:13 60:2 72:2 75:22 77:20,25 78:5 78:7,15 86:20 87:6 88:13 88:24 89:25 90:14,15,19 94:25 98:16 107:10 109:8 109:24 111:1 112:21 113:18,20 114:11 117:17 117:17 119:13 121:1 127:9 129:2,7 143:6 144:2,15 148:23 150:6 150:18.19 151:22 152:1 153:7,11 156:16,19,20 156:24,25 157:7 159:4

public's [2] 9:19 52:21 **publicly** [2] 13:9 124:15 **published** [3] 5:6 86:24 88:12

Pulp[1] 1:16 **purchase** [2] 115:12 118:17

purchasing [1] 121:24 **purpose** [1] 141:4 **purposes** [2] 21:10 33:20

push [1] 48:25 **put** [33] 2:8 7:15 21:18

25:3 31:4 59:5 61:18 64:3,3,6,8 71:22 81:5,17 97:8 102:14 104:4 106:6 106:10 107:19,23,24 108:14.17 109:10 110:19 112:11 124:5 127:24 129:6 151:13,17 157:7

putting [4] 74:20 106:9 106:21 107:5

PW [4] 112:3,3,11,15

-Q-

Q.C [5] 2:9 130:24 131:4 131:21 146:17 **quality** [2] 108:19,25 questioning [6] 7:9,11

62:19 98:11 116:5,8 **questions** [49] 5:3 7:2,4
7:14 18:3 35:25 36:9
38:16,24 46:17 62:17,21
62:24 63:5 87:21 88:11
96:25 97:25 98:14 100:25
101:8 114:14 115:3,21
118:6,24 119:6,20 121:1
121:3 123:17,23 130:1,3
130:5,9 131:8 146:21,23
146:25 147:3,4 155:10
155:14,24 156:4,10,21
157:7

quickly [6] 46:13,13 47:1 49:1 97:11 108:24

quite [13] 44:19 46:8,12 46:13,24 49:9 71:17 101:7 112:9 119:1,12 147:19 153:23

quotations [1] 107:13 **quoted** [1] 20:23

-R-

R-5s [1] 38:4
radio [3] 48:3,12 135:21
rainfall [1] 22:13
raise [4] 30:5 107:18
109:23 122:22
raised [2] 6:18 97:1
ran [5] 48:3,4 102:15,17
102:19
random [1] 34:9

random [1] 34:9 **range** [5] 24:10 65:2 70:11 105:8 116:19

rapidly [1] 46:25 **rate** [7] 10:10 16:10 21:15 22:12 28:17 125:2 148:3

rates [1] 33:22 ratio [1] 147:24

re-raise [1] 87:23 reach [10] 45:10,15 48:9 48:18 50:7 57:8 66:24

48:18 50:7 57:8 66:24 67:18,19,21 reaches [1] 31:10

react [1] 68:22 reacting [1] 44:5

reaction [3] 67:2 85:6 154:12

read [1] 21:18

readiness [5] 4:14 41:20 41:20 80:13,25

ready [9] 41:24 62:15 65:10 78:24 80:17 81:9 89:13 103:5 104:23

real [8] 43:21 55:25 71:20 78:19 95:3,6,13 129:5

realize [1] 148:13 really [12] 39:1 44:13 52:2 55:10 64:22 73:2 82:6 93:4 95:14 123:10 148:21 153:15

reason [5] 32:5 64:9 103:13 125:24 154:10

reasonable [4] 9:13 16:3 116:16 131:12

reasonably [4] 22:14,16 25:10 30:7

reasons [1] 122:18 reassurance [1] 113:25 receive [2] 26:9 136:25 received [7] 4:20 5:8 8:8

25:22 41:6 89:9 157:3 **receiving** [1] 99:15 **recent** [2] 87:14 127:4

recently [2] 97:1 125:16 RECESS [1] 101:15

recognize [1] 151:23 recognized [1] 41:12

recommendation [3] 13:16 63:6,16

recommendations [13] 4:6 17:8 38:8 41:7 42:5 49:4,5 61:25 81:7 115:14 115:18 124:11,19

recommended [1] 91:10 reconnected [1] 29:23 record [16] 1:2 6:25 8:2 79:6 87:11 94:15 96:23 97:20 99:6 114:11 119:17 121:1 124:4 125:9 146:25 157:2

recorded [1] 88:13 records [1] 6:1

recreate [1] 95:3 red [4] 14:16 50:19 72:5

83:11 **reduce** [5] 4:3 28:14

31:18 135:1 136:21 reduced [1] 126:13

reduces [2] 31:5 135:23

redundancy [1] 136:23 **Refining** [1] 1:17

reflect [1] 12:9

refused [1] 12:18

regard [5] 19:20 25:20 30:8 60:20 149:17

regarding [4] 18:22 59:6 129:13 140:6

regardless [2] 135:11 154:6

regards [2] 124:16 125:12

Region [1] 132:8 **regional** [1] 56:12

regions [2] 68:17,17

regular [2] 60:14 127:21 regularly [3] 27:1 78:18 129:1

regulated [1] 18:25 regulation [3] 9:24 18:19,23

regulations [1] 10:4 Regulatory [1] 52:11 reiterates [1] 14:11 related [5] 7:24 15:4 56:24 114:8 122:2

relates [1] 3:13

relating [7] 4:7,21 19:4 20:16 34:7 88:5 119:6

relation [11] 4:18 5:4 8:10 18:23 19:19 21:1 22:1 25:23 30:10 33:17 125:4

Relations [3] 35:3 37:4 52:12

relationship [2] 21:19 45:13

relative [1] 30:9 released [1] 4:5 reliability [14] 3:10,14 4:7 17:17 33:21 115:13 115:21,21 117:1 118:16 133:7 136:15 139:7 145:18

reliable [14] 9:13 10:1 10:21,22 13:7 16:3 18:15 18:21 20:8,11 62:2,10 80:7 108:18

rely [2] 45:17 151:14 **relying** [3] 24:23 45:14 128:2

remaining [2] 55:20 142:15

remains [2] 16:17 145:15 remarks [3] 38:24 55:16 156:15

reminded [1] 120:25 reminders [1] 156:15 remiss [1] 149:1

remote [3] 12:2 55:25 89:14

remotely [1] 137:15 reoccurrence [1] 37:18

repair [2] 39:24 125:21 **repairs** [1] 127:21

repeat [2] 99:6 117:13

replaced [1] 79:20 **reply** [1] 157:16

report [32] 3:21 4:4,9,20 7:23 8:5,8 13:17 16:12 17:8 23:22 25:1 26:4 32:19 33:2 41:6,10 42:6 42:9 52:13 60:16 78:15 78:20,23,25 80:11 85:16 86:24 114:9 116:12 143:2

reporting [1] 41:13 **reports** [10] 3:20 4:24 4:25 5:4,5 38:1,3,9 114:16 124:21

representative [1] 66:20

145:6

representatives [1] 7:3 representing [2] 3:1 149:6

request [1] 82:9 requested [1] 33:1 requests [1] 5:8 require [2] 12:5 54:8 required [29] 4:18 28:15 30:14 53:4 54:20 59:25 60:25 61:16 65:1 67:3 68:10 70:5 73:25 90:13 102:25 103:7 106:1,4 108:19 121:25 133:17 137:17 138:1,22 139:20 141:11,16,20 142:24

requirement [5] 20:9 20:11 61:11 67:21 113:16

requirements [3] 61:1 80:7 153:11

requires [4] 14:3 17:9 43:4 139:18

requiring [1] 145:4 research [8] 50:3 56:22 57:4 81:3 82:3,17,20 95:4

reserve [19] 30:1 50:14 52:20 54:15 61:11,14,17 61:20 73:6 74:13,19 75:8 77:15 93:20 99:18 100:4 100:11 103:3 140:23

reserves [33] 16:16 43:2 43:3,5 50:15 51:8 52:4 52:22,25 60:24 61:1,4 64:24 73:1,8,9,17,17 86:7,9,17 90:25 92:25 97:9 100:17 102:15 126:4 126:6 129:2 140:12,15 140:18 145:8

residents [8] 11:19 12:1 12:11 13:15,21 15:6 21:17 62:3

resolve [1] 158:2 resources [5] 1:18 21:22

24:4,11 70:8

respect [20] 6:3,21 7:9
19:7 20:18 24:8 29:6

19:7 20:18 24:8 29:6 38:11,19 41:15 44:23 93:20 94:21 95:11 96:5 96:23 97:17 100:12,19 116:22

respectfully [2] 97:21 115:6

respective [1] 97:25 **respond** [7] 49:9 63:14 64:8 128:23 129:6 137:20 157:10

responding [2] 46:16 59:4

responds [1] 87:9 response [22] 14:19 26:14 30:13 38:2,7 52:5 61:24 63:16,22 64:4 69:21,22 70:4,6 71:8 86:5 96:1 98:10 109:2 134:18,24 141:21

responses [1] 4:24 responsibilities [1] 49:14

responsibility [3] 5:20 5:22 6:8

responsible [3] 63:18 68:15 147:19

responsive [2] 135:11 143:21 rest [2] 80:2 129:13 restore [6] 41:2 45:25 46:5 62:13 138:9 139:21 restoring [2] 143:13 145:24

restricted [2] 69:14 71:4 result [17] 10:16 20:3,5 23:12 39:20 63:16 79:20 80:10,11 82:16 102:7 111:20 115:14 133:18 135:25 144:1 149:8

resulted [5] 23:19 39:18 40:23 134:5 136:19

RESUME [1] 101:16 **return** [1] 99:10 **returned** [1] 79:23 **revealed** [1] 134:19

revenue [1] 12:8 **review** [10] 24:13 40:17 78:2 114:8 21 115:1 8

78:2 114:8,21 115:1,8 115:23 117:4 120:19 reviewed [1] 97:17

revised [1] 139:3 revisit [1] 153:19 RFI [1] 112:14

right [21] 1:5,24 32:1,16 32:16 35:22 40:4 50:23 51:13 53:17 58:3 60:1 60:18 61:3 72:11 73:8 84:8,15 95:17 113:8 117:24

rightful [1] 76:5 rise [1] 94:9 rising [1] 101:25

risk [5] 4:3 16:17 128:18 128:25 145:14

River [3] 1:19,21 39:12 Riverkeeper [2] 3:1 7:7 road [2] 12:23 159:9

Rob [2] 35:1 36:22 **Roberta** [1] 2:25

role [1] 138:19 **roles** [4] 49:14 143:7 144:9,11

rolling [2] 153:5,7 Ron [1] 157:4

room [5] 57:19 67:7 79:16 92:5 95:19

rotate [3] 133:17 138:2 141:20

rotated [4] 70:23 133:23 141:12,24

rotating [36] 14:13 25:10 33:17 34:7 39:22 43:18 47:9,15,16,18,20,22 53:25 54:12,17 74:25 75:11 82:5 133:24 134:1 137:19 141:1,2,5,10,14 141:16 142:5,7,9,13,16 142:21 145:25 154:19,21

rotation [3] 56:20 71:10 145:4

rotations [1] 26:7 round [1] 125:14

route [1] 150:21 routed [1] 136:18 **routine** [4] 139:22,25 144:24 145:2 run [5] 61:10 79:17 105:5 105:7 138:22 runs [1] 79:8 rural [2] 12:1 55:21 -S**safe** [6] 10:1,21,22 62:10 81:12 150:12 **safely** [1] 60:19 **safety** [11] 14:14 15:12 54:19 70:10 75:14 108:25 143:6,8 144:4,10 149:14 **sake** [2] 5:23 8:2 **salubrity** [1] 21:12 **Sam** [1] 3:6 same-day [1] 82:4 **satisfied** [2] 152:25 153:9 **Saturday** [1] 134:7 **saw** [3] 74:12,17 83:8 says [2] 22:9 24:2 scale [3] 137:20 143:5 149:20 **scenarios** [1] 78:4 **schedule** [10] 94:4 107:1 107:24 108:2.6.7.15 109:17,19 121:16 scheduled [2] 8:14 99:10 scheme [2] 125:23 126:1 schemes [1] 72:4 **school** [5] 15:9 89:13 104:24 143:19 154:7 **scope** [1] 94:17 **Scotia** [2] 23:2,5 screens [1] 50:20 **season** [2] 109:14 138:15 seasons [2] 16:18 145:16 sec [1] 67:25 second [5] 24:6 30:5 52:6 134:21 139:5 **secondary** [1] 40:19 seconds [1] 123:9 **Secretary** [3] 3:4 6:13 7:17 **Section** [2] 9:14 19:22 see [20] 5:11 7:18 43:23 50:22 52:17,22,25 54:5 54:22 65:3,16,24 66:6 72:4,25 95:13 105:25 150:14 153:20 154:15 **seeing** [3] 55:4 83:10 91:5 **selected** [1] 29:14 **selection** [2] 25:24 33:7 **selections** [1] 33:16 self-identified [1] 56:16 send [1] 45:3

senior [2] 69:15 143:19

senior-most [1] 63:17 **seniors** [1] 143:10 **sense** [5] 21:14 30:18 31:21,22 34:13 sensitive [1] 56:19 sent [1] 137:3 separate [4] 7:25 61:10 63:12 120:19 **sequence** [1] 133:12 **series** [2] 9:7,15 **serious** [1] 132:17 **seriously** [1] 81:3 served [2] 10:5 13:1 server [1] 136:12 serves [2] 143:9 150:18 **service** [41] 9:14 10:1,21 10:22 11:3 12:21,23 16:3 16:19 17:5,6 20:8 35:4 37:4 41:15 55:14,23 56:3 79:2 107:16 109:19 110:9 110:20 112:22 120:1 121:9,10 127:6,20 128:6 132:25 133:21 134:4,15 136:20 137:2 143:6,21 147:14,17 150:6 services [7] 3:25 143:17 143:18 150:5,5,10,21 **serving** [1] 151:25 set [6] 4:10 7:13.19 8:14 109:19 157:8 **sets** [1] 24:2 **setting** [2] 5:9 60:11 **seven** [7] 47:23 48:20 52:2.3 60:13 106:4 154:15 seven-day [4] 52:13,16 65:4 126:5 seven-year [2] 113:22 114:1 seven-year-old [2] 118:17 119:21 several [5] 56:4 80:14 102:9 106:10 133:9 severe [2] 24:12 144:23 **severity** [1] 67:3 **shape** [1] 104:20 **shared** [1] 140:10 Shareholder [1] 52:11 **sharing** [2] 40:11 57:9 **shedding** [3] 26:12 28:11 55:6 **short** [5] 8:15 11:8 41:17 122:7 131:17 **shortage** [2] 13:15 141:17 **shortages** [3] 133:18 145:3,20 **shorter** [1] 108:3 **shortfall** [5] 54:14 75:7 76:4 140:20 141:22 **shortfalls** [1] 55:12 **shortly** [1] 99:21

showed [1] 58:17 **showering** [1] 104:23 **showing** [1] 78:15 **shows** [4] 6:2 48:4 50:17 133:14 **shut** [2] 27:8 103:12 **shutdowns** [1] 27:11 **sic** [1] 23:22 **side** [2] 50:24 89:20 **sign** [1] 49:15 signal [1] 136:20 signed [1] 119:24 significant [11] 6:3 16:11 35:12 37:14 38:10 40:8,24 62:14 70:1 79:8 117:4 **similar** [3] 42:23 49:23 56:4 **simple** [1] 96:7 simplicity [1] 5:23 simply [2] 96:7,8 simultaneously [1] 11:16 site [4] 58:23 60:6 108:8 122:5 **situate** [1] 35:9 situation [34] 22:8 23:6 27:22 28:13 33:19 34:16 43:16,19 46:16 54:21 58:10 66:9 67:10 69:4 71:23 76:5,24 84:17 90:4 90:25 91:4,23 93:5,17 93:19.20.22 97:11 98:18 99:22.24 117:11 118:5 154:9 **situations** [5] 45:23 78:4 135:8 153:21 154:2 **six** [4] 47:23 54:6 66:6 133:8 **size** [1] 149:20 **skipped** [1] 155:21 **slide** [3] 50:17 54:23 133:11 **small** [6] 18:4 28:13,21 28:25 30:23 58:1 **smaller** [2] 32:7 56:5 **Smith** [11] 131:24,25 132:3,9,10 144:20 146:18 149:21 150:16 151:16 152:5 **snap** [1] 11:3 **snuggle** [1] 44:21 **social** [5] 46:14 48:8,13 129:3 153:3 **sole** [1] 29:18 **solely** [4] 5:19,21 6:8

29:15

solicitor [1] 157:24

solution [1] 12:13

someone [3] 128:2

somewhat [1] 128:21

somewhere [1] 148:11

147:19 151:17

start-up [4] 92:18 103:21 103:24 104:2 **started** [10] 32:13 39:20 46:24 76:9 84:5,10,12 93:11 105:24 106:16 **starting** [5] 60:17 84:22 100:1 102:15 106:17

soon [2] 49:3 156:6 sorry [7] 44:19 72:12 113:15 114:23 152:4,8 155:21 sort [2] 44:3 100:20 sound [1] 159:11 **sounds** [1] 51:13 soup [1] 124:18 sources [4] 14:15 19:24 75:15 81:14 south [1] 56:1 **Southside** [1] 144:6 **spare** [1] 76:20 speak [14] 6:11 8:23 38:21,22,23 41:19 42:11 53:10 88:25 120:14 135:2 139:14 141:1 156:17 **speaking** [5] 64:6 104:21 105:6 115:12 126:8 **speaks** [1] 20:17 **specific** [11] 5:9 6:18 38:13 40:17 93:23 121:16 134:20 142:19 146:23 147:4,6 specifically [14] 21:18 24:18 26:6 28:20 33:11 50:12 75:2 97:3,7,10,12 107:12 109:11 143:2 **specify** [3] 110:7,8,11 **speculate** [1] 13:6 **spinning** [4] 61:11,14 61:20 103:3 **spoke** [3] 50:10 57:11 64:15 spreadsheet [1] 150:1 **St** [3] 132:8 159:9,12 **staff** [3] 3:3 43:10 137:17 **stage** [5] 22:3 43:18 66:15 125:8 152:2 stakeholder [1] 57:11 stakeholders [4] 41:14 45:6 62:5.6 stand [1] 75:21 **standard** [1] 21:23 **standby** [1] 76:22 **Star** [1] 87:1 start [22] 37:11 38:18 43:14 44:12 51:22 62:19 67:1 74:7,20 85:19 90:10 90:12 93:4 99:20 103:14 104:7,8 105:21,22 106:14 106:22 117:8

43:24 52:8,13 65:16 83:18,19 87:3 **statutory** [2] 20:11 21:4 stayed [1] 108:22 staying [1] 39:10 stays [2] 30:2,2 **steered** [1] 123:7 **step** [3] 57:12,15 122:14 Stephenville [1] 87:1 steps [2] 81:20 88:24 still [12] 79:3 84:23 87:16 96:2,3,5 98:9 100:17 108:7 127:2,17 148:4 **stone** (1) 119:1 **stopping** [1] 47:21 storage [3] 139:4,9 151:21 storm [2] 11:3 49:6 story [3] 117:22,22 118:3 stoves [1] 81:15 **strategy** [3] 12:21,23 135:22 **streamline** [2] 91:8,23 streamlined [1] 57:9 **street** [1] 72:5 stresses [1] 14:14 **stressful** [1] 132:13 **strong** [2] 41:21 108:16 **structure** [2] 63:9,13 **subject** [3] 7:25 87:25 120:19 **submission** [3] 10:18 63:15 111:1 submissions [5] 7:11 7:21 124:23 157:10,13 **submit** [11] 21:24 29:1 29:24 32:17 109:23 112:4 113:19 114:20 115:6 122:17 157:1 **submitted** [1] 111:17 subsequent [2] 82:2 subsequently [1] 153:6 **substance** [1] 22:10 **substantial** [3] 38:6 81:8 124:8 **substation** [2] 138:3,14 **successful** [3] 23:15 32:19 110:8 successfully [3] 12:25 103:19 106:3 **succinct** [1] 82:7 **such** [17] 11:21 12:6,25 16:11 17:1 34:8 37:18 37:22 99:15 106:9 107:1

Index Page 13

122:3 140:2 143:11

sufficient [2] 39:25 41:3

suggest [2] 25:4 27:22

144:23 150:13.20

sudden [1] 34:11

sue [1] 32:1

sued [1] 23:14

starts [2] 50:24 61:8

state [2] 80:25 142:22

stations [2] 48:3 144:3

status [9] 21:8 41:16

Station [1] 134:9

show [2] 133:16,19

suggestion [1] 31:18 **summary** [3] 23:22 24:1 24:7

summer [3] 57:14 105:13 128:7

Sunnyside [2] 40:22 134:9

supper [1] 105:1 **supplied** [2] 20:14 22:5 **supplier** [1] 108:15 **suppliers** [2] 107:14 111:10

supplies [2] 11:20 12:3 **supply** [40] 1:8 3:10,14 4:7 13:20 18:13,15,21 20:4 21:4,9 22:6,13,19 22:20 41:1 49:12 53:23 55:2 56:6 61:19 62:2 66:16 70:10 74:23 81:14 86:5 125:5 133:7,9,18 137:10 138:2,19 141:6 141:17 144:5 145:20 151:22 159:6

supporting [1] 110:3 **supports** [1] 12:6 **supposed** [2] 36:1 96:12 **Supreme** [1] 20:22

surprised [1] 112:1

support [2] 70:9,13

surrounding [1] 15:22 **survey** [4] 47:5,7 58:17 82:21

surveying [1] 47:3 **surveys** [1] 135:17 **sustained** [2] 141:21

sustained [2] 141:21 143:24 swearing [1] 36:16 sworn [2] 35:18 36:13

symbolized [2] 14:4,9 **synchronized** [1] 60:21

synchronized [1] 60:21 system [167] 1:10 3:11 4:8 5:16 6:4 8:7 19:5,20 22:1.6.13 24:5.18.20.22 28:8 30:16 31:21 33:4 34:4 35:5 37:7 38:5 39:19 40:6,13,21 42:14 42:25 43:4,23 45:1 50:14 50:15.22 52:2.7.9.10.15 52:17,19 53:5,18 54:21 55:4,9,13 56:2 57:10,18 57:19 58:5 60:21,23 61:1 61:8,11,13,15 62:8 64:24 65:22 66:1,19,22,23,23 67:6,14 68:24,25 69:3 69:18,19,25 70:1 73:1 73:20 74:1 77:3 79:10 81:2,6 85:2,3 86:3,7,9 86:13,14,16 87:3,7 89:21 90:25 91:1,12,14,15,16 92:25 93:2.19 95:22 96:13,14,16 97:8 99:18 100:2,11,17 102:14 103:2 103:6 104:5,14 106:5

126:4,6,11,21 127:10

129:1,5 132:24 133:13

133:22 134:5,10,13,16

134:23 135:8,14,24

136:17 137:10,13,14,16 137:20,23,24 138:18 139:20 140:4,5,6,10,12 140:15 141:4,9,22 142:1 142:23 144:12 145:2,14 145:19,23 146:6,8,12 159:7

system's [1] 14:2 **system-reserve** [1] 55:13

system-wide [2] 51:15 73:7

systemic [1] 28:16 **systems** [9] 50:8 53:10 57:12 89:19 112:3,3,11 112:16 152:25

-T-

T-001 [1] 43:1 T001 [6] 50:21,23 54:13 72:12,18 73:16 table [1] 36:24 takes [1] 54:14 taking [2] 97:17 153:8 tank [1] 139:8 targets [3] 90:18,19,20

team [13] 41:21 44:24 50:9 52:11 89:11,15,16 89:19,20,21,22 91:15,17

teams [1] 49:8 **technical** [4] 40:5 88:4

88:9 98:18

technologies [5] 45:20 57:25 58:7 59:1 135:16

technology [3] 58:2 137:3,6

Teck [1] 1:17 telecommunications [1] 20:17

telephone [3] 135:24 136:18 146:6

telling [3] 73:24 74:24 151:13

temperature [1] 18:19 temperatures [3] 76:23 132:16 143:25

templates [1] 49:20

ten [2] 8:23 18:7 tendency [2] 58:15 75:17 tender [11] 59:20 60:2

110:5,11,19,23 111:8,20 112:12,17 113:11

tends [1] 105:9

tens [2] 15:6 109:6 **term** [2] 41:17 108:18

terminal [1] 144:5 **terminology** [1] 79:1

terms [6] 8:13 92:14 106:15 121:18 149:19

terrible [2] 154:8,9 **tested** [2] 95:15 137:6 **text** [2] 137:3 146:7 **texting** [3] 45:21 48:15 58:7

thank [37] 3:3 8:25 17:13 17:19,22,25 34:18,22 42:14 62:9,16,24 63:4 75:20 92:2 101:7,14,20 106:19 109:2 123:19 129:16,25 131:5,22 132:11 135:5 144:21 146:16,18 155:10,15 156:10,14 157:17,19 158:4

themselves [2] 1:23 36:25

theory [1] 95:4 **therefore** [4] 32:23 99:24 109:23 120:2

thereof [1] 63:8 thermal [1] 139:9 they've [1] 124:21 third [2] 16:10 134:24

thorough [2] 41:13 124:18

thoroughly [1] 115:25 thought [1] 44:11 thoughts [1] 19:15 thousands [1] 15:6

three[13] 6:21 13:23 15:1 15:4,19 20:23 56:11 64:7 105:4 125:19 127:23 134:20 139:1

through [15] 13:10 22:13 37:25 39:10 41:1 52:13 53:20 79:7,8 85:10 111:7 131:11 140:4 150:1 152:22

throughout [12] 4:16 18:6 26:2 40:9 41:11 60:14 62:14 65:25 69:24 80:8 104:20 139:25

tight [4] 51:8 81:25 82:7 122:10

tighter [1] 74:11 **timeframe** [5] 11:8 48:2 93:15 107:7 108:4

timeframes [1] 82:1 **timeline** [5] 60:8,12

timeline [5] 60:8,12 88:11 106:25 122:10 **timelines** [2] 49:18 91:3

timely [8] 41:13 42:22 45:5 48:18 62:4 135:11 140:5,8

times [8] 17:4 70:24 76:6 102:9 105:2 136:21 138:18 144:11

timetable [1] 110:24 timing [2] 8:13 142:20 today [22] 2:5 5:11,16 9:3 10:18 16:4 18:10 19:16 45:9 47:3 52:25 63:20 64:3,6 73:18 98:5 106:24 132:13,19 137:23 154:11 156:23

today's [5] 3:22 5:7 7:15 8:13 156:15

together [6] 17:3 59:6

64:3,4 107:23,24

Tom [1] 2:19 tomorrow [4] 52:25 73:18 74:3 130:23

too [6] 23:8,10 87:20 98:7 142:20 148:10

took [**s**] 38:9 56:12 57:12 57:15 88:15

top [1] 50:23

Torbay [1] 159:9 **total** [4] 134:2,12,15 138:17

totally [2] 79:20 80:5 **touch** [1] 72:2

tour[1] 78:22

traction [1] 54:8 tradesworkers [1] 68:13

traditional [2] 46:14 48:3

traffic [1] 15:15 transcribed [1] 159:10 transcript [1] 159:3 transfer [1] 42:20 transformer [3] 40:22

transformers [1] 122:8 **transmission** [15] 5:17 5:19 19:25 24:5 40:20 40:24 43:25 65:25 68:18 122:7 126:15,16 139:16

40:23 134:8

140:4 145:14

transmissions [1] 6:7 transparent [2] 13:12 45:5

travel [1] 12:3 treat [2] 25:9 30:6 treated [2] 25:19 34:4 treating [2] 44:16,22 treatment [2] 18:18 143:12

tribunal [1] 10:5 **tried** [3] 19:12 42:21 85:18

trigger [1] 91:1 **triggered** [2] 92:20 134:10

triggers [2] 43:6 86:6 **trouble** [2] 84:11 142:19 **troubling** [1] 16:4 **true** [4] 111:4,4 134:16

trustee [2] 21:14,21 **try** [5] 45:22 47:18 48:18 48:25 146:24

159:3

trying [8] 19:15 44:14 53:16 91:7 95:3 101:5 127:24 129:5

turbine [34] 16:14 38:23 39:7 59:7,8,10,11,12,21 59:22 79:11 92:21,23,24 93:3 99:23 102:4,11,14 106:21 107:16 108:5

113:23 114:2,23,24,25 119:15,22 120:15 121:8 122:6 139:6 145:9

turbines [1] 59:18 **turn** [6] 59:1 71:9 77:2 102:4 106:19 154:23

turned [1] 86:17 **TV** [1] 48:13

tweeting [1] 15:1 twenty [1] 131:7

twice [1] 102:16 **Twitter** [1] 48:9

two [32] 1:18 3:8,13,16 3:20 5:8 6:10,13 11:19 12:3,11 15:2 17:17 24:2 39:13 42:15,21 43:2 44:4 47:14 65:5 66:12,21 85:23 99:19 105:2 111:13 111:14 112:6 125:11 139:19 154:7

type [6] 22:4 28:16 98:6 107:6 126:25 152:1

types [6] 68:12 78:4 121:22 146:16 150:8 154:1

typically [4] 60:10 105:12 108:4 144:25

-U-

ultimately [1] 31:7 unavailable [1] 136:8 uncertain [1] 142:22 uncommon [2] 46:9 145:3

uncontrolled [1] 9:8 under [6] 35:15 55:5 96:2 97:16 117:14,15

underestimate [1] 158:1

undergoing [1] 87:17 understand [23] 5:12 35:1 37:14,21 38:4 43:11 45:8 48:10 56:23 58:21 59:17 65:7 72:4,25 90:4 93:17,18 95:11 126:8 128:11,14 153:22,23

understood [7] 40:8 45:7 47:7 50:5 81:1,25 94:21

undertaken [2] 3:8 4:13 undertaking [1] 106:24 undertook [1] 38:6

unit [61] 39:9,15,16 51:16 51:17 52:23 53:13 60:20 61:3,9 73:10,12,20,20 74:4,14 76:17 77:6 78:24 79:7,18,18,19,19,23,25 80:3,5 84:20 85:14,19 86:15 87:1 88:18,20 92:4 92:6,18 95:17 99:10 103:22 105:21,24 106:3 106:6,16 107:19 109:10 110:7,8 111:3 117:7,10 119:25 120:8 121:18,24 122:19 126:13 127:5,11

units [17] 11:2 15:2 39:14 69:5 99:19 111:14,15,19 112:12 113:17,24 120:4 125:19 127:19,22 128:19 147:10 Unless [1] 8:10 unlike [1] 35:10

unlike [1] 35:10 Unlimited [1] 159:15 unplanned [2] 25:11 128:13

unprecedented [1] 145:5

Unreliable [1] 17:5 unsatisfied [1] 98:9 unturned [1] 119:2 unused [2] 107:15 111:14 unusual [2] 80:2 122:2 up [28] 3:11 9:19 10:23 10:25 20:13 23:9 34:5 43:15 53:11 19 56:1 18

10:25 20:13 23:9 34:5 43:15 53:11,19 56:1,18 61:2 65:9,17,20 74:15 99:20 102:10 103:6 104:22 105:24 106:14 114:7 115:20 125:12 130:20 133:24

updates [5] 48:8,19 50:1 60:14 78:17

updating [1] 58:5 **upheld** [1] 23:15 **ups** [1] 79:18

urgent [2] 66:5,9

used [10] 24:14 28:11,12 28:14 50:22 61:6 90:5 103:16 111:2,3

user [2] 23:7,7 users [3] 22:17 28:17

37:16 **uses** [1] 21:10

utilities [50] 4:18,24 8:7
9:2,15,25 10:2,3 17:10
19:19 32:3,23 42:12,16
44:5 49:5,8,16 51:1,20
51:21 56:25 64:14 65:5
66:12,15 72:19,21,23
73:15 78:15 88:13 91:9
98:16 107:11 109:8 111:1
113:18 134:25 139:19,23
140:1 152:24 154:13
156:17,19 157:8,9,15
159:4

utility [20] 7:2 12:22 13:13 16:24 20:20 23:18 23:20 30:1 33:12,21 38:1 54:3 57:2,14 58:3,16 118:4,10,16 144:15

utility's [1] 58:20 utilize [1] 15:17 utilizing [1] 75:15 utter [1] 12:18

-V-

valid [1] 122:18 validated [1] 50:2 valued [1] 17:2 valve [2] 39:8,16 Vardy [1] 157:4 various [6] 20:13 26:1 68:12 70:23 81:7 89:17 vendor [1] 21:5

vernacular [1] 125:8 versus [3] 126:22 128:1 153:25

Verte [1] 55:24 **vibration** [3] 79:3,10 85:15

Vice [11] 35:2,2,4 36:22 37:3,7 70:18,19 132:4,6 156:7

Vice-Chairman [1] 1:4 **visit** [1] 123:6

visits [2] 136:2,4 voice [1] 9:21

void [1] 13:5 voltage [2] 93:24 100:13 voluminous [2] 124:4

125:9 **vulnerabilities** [5] 52:17 86:15,21,23 126:11 **vulnerable** [1] 11:4

-W-

wait [1] 136:21 walk [1] 157:22 wants [1] 49:24 warning [16] 13:24 14:5 14:7 47:16,19 53:21,22 54:11,19 72:8 74:21,22 81:18 89:24 128:12 144:3 warranty [2] 120:5,6

watch [9] 13:24,25 53:2 54:2 72:7 73:23,24 81:18 125:23

watching [2] 53:5 74:1 water [12] 11:21 21:1,3 21:7,14 22:6,8,16 23:9 138:24 139:4 143:12

ways [1] 11:14

weather [5] 16:22 24:12 138:7,12 144:23

web [2] 5:6 91:18 **website** [12] 48:19 58:13 135:21 136:2,4,6,7,10

136:12,14 146:5 157:5 **websites** [1] 58:20

week [3] 59:5 68:7 110:13 weekly [1] 83:18

weeks [1] 80:14 welfare [2] 143:8 144:10

Wells [1] 1:3 Wesleyville [1] 139:5 West [1] 22:6

Whalen [1] 1:4 **whatsoever** [1] 94:11 **wherever** [1] 83:10

whole [6] 21:7 64:22 65:25 69:24 70:11 114:18

wholesaler [1] 18:5 widely [1] 9:6 widespread [3] 9:8 13:3 40:24

willing [1] 96:17 window [4] 52:3 73:18 91:6 126:6

winter [26] 4:4,13 11:3 16:18 17:6 41:20,20,25 42:18,24 52:7 57:13,15 62:16 70:24 80:8,18,25 81:2,9 84:4,21 109:14 125:7 138:15 145:15

winter's [2] 104:17 105:17

winters [1] 152:21 wish [5] 5:1 6:11,25 30:5 34:23

wished [1] 156:22 wishes [1] 8:23 within [21] 17:1 22:24 24:16 43:6 47:9,14 60:18 65:4 68:5,23 69:9 70:8 71:9 77:3,11 90:17 93:10 96:25 97:12,25 130:22

without [14] 9:10 12:19 85:12 102:3 130:22 132:17 133:15,21 134:3 134:15 139:12 142:25 147:9 152:22

witness [1] 2:7 woke [1] 74:15

wonder [3] 30:19 64:16 117:25

wondered [1] 79:22 wondering [2] 117:21 152:24

word [4] 12:19 45:10 142:19 146:24

worked [8] 50:8 62:12 95:16 108:15 112:9 140:1 153:2 154:5

works [4] 21:14 72:11 108:9 153:15

world [2] 16:21 57:3 worried [1] 31:15 writing [3] 7:16 157:1,7 written [5] 7:11,20 94:15 157:3.12

wrong [1] 120:7

-Y-

year [20] 3:22 16:10 37:23 38:10,11 50:4 56:7 69:24 71:13 78:3 80:23 82:23 86:6 102:10 104:21 105:11 133:11 137:25 145:1 147:8

Year's [1] 54:1 years [6] 71:16,18 112:6 123:13 132:16 145:12 yellow [2] 72:6 133:15 yet [3] 8:8 128:24 129:7

Young [1] 2:6

yourself [4] 6:12 79:16 118:14 153:1

-Z-

zero [1] 104:6