

2  
3 **Q. Reference: C. Douglas Bowman Evidence, Page 4, Lines 6-13;**

4  
5 **Mr. Bowman states:**

6  
7 **“I recommend that the Board bring this investigation to a close and direct its**  
8 **attention to high priority items including the reliability and adequacy of**  
9 **supply pre-Muskrat Falls, the regulatory requirements associated with sales**  
10 **and purchases of capacity and energy over the Maritime Link, and the rates**  
11 **and regulatory treatment of costs associated with Muskrat Falls and its**  
12 **associated transmission. The investigation is not necessary to address these**  
13 **high priority issues – they can all be adequately addressed through the**  
14 **normal regulatory process.”**

15  
16 **Please provide an overview of the type of regulatory process Mr. Bowman**  
17 **would propose to the Board to address the issue of reliability on the Island**  
18 **Interconnected System after the interconnection with Muskrat Falls.**

- 19  
20  
21 **A.** Without knowing the type of reliability issue that might arise following the  
22 interconnection with Muskrat Falls, Mr. Doug Bowman is unable to recommend  
23 the specific regulatory process that might be followed. However, he believes that  
24 responsibility for the reliability of the Island Interconnected System lies with  
25 Hydro. He notes that when the outages occurred in January 2014, it was Hydro  
26 rather than the Board that took responsibility, and appropriately so. If reliability is  
27 a concern following completion of the interconnection with Muskrat Falls, Mr.  
28 Doug Bowman would expect Hydro to file an application with the Board for new  
29 facilities or programs to address the reliability concern in a least cost manner.  
30 Recent examples of such applications filed by Hydro with the Board include  
31 Holyrood black start (diesel units), the 120 MW combustion turbine at Holyrood,  
32 and the capacity assistance agreements with Island Industrial Customers.

33  
34  
35