

July 13, 2016

The Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities
Prince Charles Building
120 Torbay Road, P.O. Box 21040
St. John's, NL A1A 5B2

Attention: Ms. Cheryl Blundon
Director Corporate Services & Board Secretary

Dear Ms. Blundon:

**Re: Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro - the Board's Investigation and Hearing into
Supply Issues and Power Outages on the Island Interconnected System –
Nostradamus Upgrades Monthly Report**

In accordance with item 2.1 of the Liberty Report Recommendations dated December 17, 2014, wherein Hydro is required to "provide the Board with monthly updates on the status of Nostradamus upgrades until the production model is fully in-service and shaken down", please find enclosed the original plus 12 copies of Hydro's report entitled *Accuracy of Nostradamus Load Forecasting at Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Monthly Report: June 2016*.

We trust the foregoing is satisfactory. If you have any questions or comments, please contact the undersigned.

Yours truly,

NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR HYDRO



Kyle B. Tucker, M. Eng., P. Eng.
Manager, Regulatory Engineering

KT/bs

cc: Gerard Hayes – Newfoundland Power
Paul Coxworthy – Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales
Sheryl Nisenbaum – Praxair Canada Inc.
ecc: Roberta Frampton Benefiel – Grand Riverkeeper Labrador

Thomas Johnson – Consumer Advocate
Thomas O' Reilly – Cox & Palmer
Danny Dumaresque

**Accuracy of Nostradamus Load Forecasting at
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro
Monthly Report: June 2016**

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro

July 13, 2016



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1 **1 NOSTRADAMUS LOAD FORECASTING**

2 **1.1 Nostradamus**

3 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (Hydro) uses software called Nostradamus, by
4 Ventyx, for short-term load forecasting with a time frame of seven days. “The
5 Nostradamus Neural Network Forecasting system is a flexible neural network based
6 forecasting tool developed specifically for utility demand forecasting. Unlike
7 conventional computing processes, which are programmed, neural networks use
8 sophisticated mathematical techniques to train a network of inputs and outputs. Neural
9 networks recognize and learn the joint relationships (linear or non-linear) between the
10 ranges of variables considered. Once the network learns these intricate relationships,
11 this knowledge can then easily be extended to produce accurate forecasts.”
12 (Nostradamus User Guide, Release 8.2, Ventyx, an ABB Company, May 2014).

13 The Nostradamus model is trained using a sequence of continuous historic periods of
14 hourly weather and demand data, then forecasts system demand using predictions of
15 those same weather parameters for the next seven days.

16

17 **1.2 Short-Term Load Forecasting**

18 Hydro uses its short-term load forecast to manage the power system and ensure
19 adequate generating resources are available to meet customer demand.

20

21 **1.2.1 Utility Load**

22 Hydro contracts Amec Foster Wheeler (Amec) to provide the weather parameters in the
23 form of twice daily hourly weather forecasts for a seven-day period. At the same time
24 as the weather forecast data are provided, Amec also provides recent observed data at
25 the same locations. The forecast and actual data are automatically retrieved from Amec
26 and input to the Nostradamus database.

27

28 Nostradamus can use a variety of weather parameters for forecasting as long as a
29 historical record is available for training. Hydro currently uses: air temperature, wind

1 speed, and cloud cover. Nostradamus can use each variable more than once, for
2 example both the current and forecast air temperatures are used in forecasting load.
3 Wind chill is not used explicitly as the neural network function of Nostradamus will form
4 its own relationships between load, wind and temperature, which should be superior to
5 the one formula used by Environment Canada to derive wind chill.

6
7 Weather data for four locations are used in Nostradamus: St. John's, Gander, Deer Lake,
8 and Port aux Basques. Data from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015 are being used
9 for training and verification purposes. The training and verification periods are selected
10 to provide a sufficiently long period to ensure that a range of weather parameters are
11 included, e.g., high and low temperatures, but short enough that the historic load is still
12 representative of loads that can be expected in the future.

13
14 In addition to the weather and demand data, a parameter that indicates daylight hours
15 each day is input to Nostradamus.

16
17 Demand data for the Avalon Peninsula alone and for the Island Interconnected System
18 as a whole are input to Nostradamus automatically each hour. Only total utility load
19 (conforming), Newfoundland Power's and Hydro's, is input in the Nostradamus model.
20 Industrial load (non-conforming), which is not a function of weather, is forecast outside
21 the Nostradamus program and added to the forecasts from Nostradamus to derive the
22 total load forecast.

23
24 During the process of training the Nostradamus model, it creates separate submodels
25 for weekdays, weekends and holidays to account for the variation in customer use of
26 electricity. Nostradamus has separate holiday groups for statutory holidays and also for
27 days that are known to have unusual loads, for instance the days between Christmas
28 and New Year's and the school Easter break.

1 **1.2.2 Industrial Load**

2 Industrial load tends to be almost constant, as industrial processes are independent of
3 weather. Under the current procedure, the power-on-order for each Industrial
4 Customer, plus the expected owned generation from Corner Brook Pulp and Paper
5 (CBPP), is used as the industrial load forecasts unless System Operations engineers
6 modify the forecast based on some knowledge of customer loads, for instance a
7 decrease due to reduced production at CBPP or a ramp up in the load expected at Vale.
8 Engineers can change the expected load in one or more cells of a seven by twenty-four
9 hour grid, or can change the default value to be used indefinitely.

10

11 **1.2.3 Supply and Demand Status Reporting**

12 The forecast peak reported to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (the Board)
13 on the daily Supply and Demand Status Report is the forecast peak as of 7:20 am. The
14 weather forecast for the next seven days and the observed weather data for the
15 previous day are input at approximately 5:00 am. Nostradamus is then run every hour
16 of the day and the most recent forecast is available for reference by System Operations
17 engineers and the Energy Control Centre operators for monitoring and managing
18 available spinning reserves. The within day forecast updates are used by operators to
19 decide if additional spinning reserve is required in advance of forecast system peaks.

20

21 **1.3 Potential Sources of Variance**

22 As with any forecasting there will be discrepancies between the forecast and the actual
23 values. Typical sources of variance in the load forecasting are as follows:

- 24 • Differences in the industrial load forecast due to unexpected changes in
25 customer loads;
- 26 • Inaccuracies in the weather forecast, particularly temperature, wind speed or
27 cloud cover; and
- 28 • Non-uniform customer behaviour which results in unpredictability.

1 **2 JUNE 2016 FORECAST ACCURACY**

2 **2.1 Description**

3 Table 1 presents the daily forecast peak, the observed peak, and the available system
4 capacity, as included in Hydro's daily Supply and Demand Status Reports submitted to
5 the Board for each day in June 2016. The data are also presented in Figure 1. The actual
6 peaks, as reported to the Board, varied from 738 MW on June 26 to 1072 MW on
7 June 2.

8
9 The available capacity during the month was between 1245 MW on June 22 and
10 1475 MW on June 5. Reserves were sufficient throughout the period.

11
12 Table 2 presents error statistics for the peak forecasts during the month of June 2016.
13 Figure 2 is a plot of the forecast and actual peaks, as shown in Figure 1, but with the
14 addition of a bar chart showing the difference between the two data series. In both the
15 tables and the figures, a positive error is an overestimate; a negative error is an
16 underestimate.

17
18 In the month of June the forecast peak was in a range between 7.7% below the actual
19 peak and 6.2% above the actual peak. On the best day the forecast peak was essentially
20 the same as the actual peak; on the worst day it was 79 MW too low. On average, the
21 forecast peak was 17 MW different than the actual peak, or 1.9%.

22
23 This report will further examine the forecast for June 13 when the forecast
24 underestimated the peak by 79 MW or 7.7%, and June 15 when the forecast
25 overestimated the peak by 50 MW, or by 6.2%.

Table 1 Jun 2016 Load Forecasting Data

| Date | Forecast Peak, MW | Actual Peak, MW | Available | |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| | | | Island Supply, MW | Forecast Reserve, MW |
| 1-Jun-16 | 980 | 1007 | 1325 | 345 |
| 2-Jun-16 | 1040 | 1072 | 1345 | 305 |
| 3-Jun-16 | 950 | 953 | 1335 | 385 |
| 4-Jun-16 | 870 | 903 | 1470 | 600 |
| 5-Jun-16 | 900 | 919 | 1475 | 575 |
| 6-Jun-16 | 930 | 950 | 1320 | 390 |
| 7-Jun-16 | 880 | 854 | 1305 | 425 |
| 8-Jun-16 | 955 | 977 | 1315 | 360 |
| 9-Jun-16 | 1000 | 992 | 1300 | 300 |
| 10-Jun-16 | 940 | 955 | 1310 | 370 |
| 11-Jun-16 | 905 | 891 | 1300 | 395 |
| 12-Jun-16 | 800 | 797 | 1310 | 510 |
| 13-Jun-16 | 945 | 1024 | 1450 | 505 |
| 14-Jun-16 | 890 | 881 | 1425 | 535 |
| 15-Jun-16 | 855 | 805 | 1415 | 560 |
| 16-Jun-16 | 870 | 854 | 1440 | 570 |
| 17-Jun-16 | 915 | 903 | 1300 | 385 |
| 18-Jun-16 | 950 | 966 | 1310 | 360 |
| 19-Jun-16 | 790 | 816 | 1320 | 530 |
| 20-Jun-16 | 785 | 778 | 1320 | 535 |
| 21-Jun-16 | 780 | 783 | 1320 | 540 |
| 22-Jun-16 | 785 | 799 | 1245 | 460 |
| 23-Jun-16 | 785 | 777 | 1335 | 550 |
| 24-Jun-16 | 790 | 797 | 1325 | 535 |
| 25-Jun-16 | 745 | 754 | 1305 | 560 |
| 26-Jun-16 | 740 | 738 | 1325 | 585 |
| 27-Jun-16 | 790 | 789 | 1335 | 545 |
| 28-Jun-16 | 750 | 759 | 1365 | 615 |
| 29-Jun-16 | 790 | 793 | 1335 | 545 |
| 30-Jun-16 | 780 | 771 | 1415 | 635 |
| Minimum | 740 | 738 | 1245 | 300 |
| Average | 787 | 869 | 1347 | 484 |
| Maximum | 1040 | 1072 | 1475 | 635 |

Notes:

Forecast peak, available capacity and forecast reserve are rounded to the nearest 5 MW.

Forecast peak and available capacity presented is as reported to the Board. The forecast is updated hourly throughout the day for use in maintaining adequate generation reserves.

Forecast Reserve = Available Island Supply - (Forecast Peak - CBPP Interruptible Load (when applicable) - the impact of voltage





Table 2 Jun 2016 Analysis of Forecast Error

| Date | Actual Peak, MW | Forecast Peak, MW | Error, MW | Absolute Error, MW | Percent Error | Absolute Percent Error | Actual/Forecast |
|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1-Jun-16 | 1007 | 980 | -27 | 27 | -2.7% | 2.7% | -2.8% |
| 2-Jun-16 | 1072 | 1040 | -32 | 32 | -3.0% | 3.0% | -3.1% |
| 3-Jun-16 | 953 | 950 | -3 | 3 | -0.3% | 0.3% | -0.3% |
| 4-Jun-16 | 903 | 870 | -33 | 33 | -3.7% | 3.7% | -3.8% |
| 5-Jun-16 | 919 | 900 | -19 | 19 | -2.1% | 2.1% | -2.1% |
| 6-Jun-16 | 950 | 930 | -20 | 20 | -2.1% | 2.1% | -2.2% |
| 7-Jun-16 | 854 | 880 | 26 | 26 | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% |
| 8-Jun-16 | 977 | 955 | -22 | 22 | -2.3% | 2.3% | -2.3% |
| 9-Jun-16 | 992 | 1000 | 8 | 8 | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.8% |
| 10-Jun-16 | 955 | 940 | -15 | 15 | -1.6% | 1.6% | -1.6% |
| 11-Jun-16 | 891 | 905 | 14 | 14 | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.5% |
| 12-Jun-16 | 797 | 800 | 3 | 3 | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| 13-Jun-16 | 1024 | 945 | -79 | 79 | -7.7% | 7.7% | -8.4% |
| 14-Jun-16 | 881 | 890 | 9 | 9 | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| 15-Jun-16 | 805 | 855 | 50 | 50 | 6.2% | 6.2% | 5.8% |
| 16-Jun-16 | 854 | 870 | 16 | 16 | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.8% |
| 17-Jun-16 | 903 | 915 | 12 | 12 | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
| 18-Jun-16 | 966 | 950 | -16 | 16 | -1.7% | 1.7% | -1.7% |
| 19-Jun-16 | 816 | 790 | -26 | 26 | -3.2% | 3.2% | -3.3% |
| 20-Jun-16 | 778 | 785 | 7 | 7 | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| 21-Jun-16 | 783 | 780 | -3 | 3 | -0.4% | 0.4% | -0.4% |
| 22-Jun-16 | 799 | 785 | -14 | 14 | -1.8% | 1.8% | -1.8% |
| 23-Jun-16 | 777 | 785 | 8 | 8 | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| 24-Jun-16 | 797 | 790 | -7 | 7 | -0.9% | 0.9% | -0.9% |
| 25-Jun-16 | 754 | 745 | -9 | 9 | -1.2% | 1.2% | -1.2% |
| 26-Jun-16 | 738 | 740 | 2 | 2 | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% |
| 27-Jun-16 | 789 | 790 | 1 | 1 | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| 28-Jun-16 | 759 | 750 | -9 | 9 | -1.2% | 1.2% | -1.2% |
| 29-Jun-16 | 793 | 790 | -3 | 3 | -0.4% | 0.4% | -0.4% |
| 30-Jun-16 | 771 | 780 | 9 | 9 | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2% |
| Minimum | 738 | 740 | -79 | 1 | -7.7% | 0.1% | -8.4% |
| Average | 869 | 787 | -6 | 17 | -0.5% | 1.9% | -0.6% |
| Maximum | 1072 | 1040 | 50 | 79 | 6.2% | 7.7% | 5.8% |

Notes:

Forecast peak is rounded to the nearest 5 MW

Forecast peak presented is as reported to the Board. The forecast is updated hourly throughout the day for use in maintaining adequate generation reserves.



1

2 2.2 Nostradamus Database Problem

3 On the morning of Saturday, June 25 a software issue prevented Nostradamus from
 4 producing updated forecasts. Energy Control Centre operators successfully managed
 5 generation and reserves through the long weekend without the updated forecasts.
 6 When Hydro's Energy Systems staff investigated the problem on Tuesday, June 28
 7 (following the holiday), they found that a password for the database where the load and
 8 climate information is stored had expired. Without access to the database,
 9 Nostradamus was unable to produce forecasts. When the database was first set up, the
 10 programming should have been configured to prevent the password from expiring.
 11 When the programming was corrected and the password was reset, Nostradamus
 12 resumed operation. All observation data from the period when the model was out of
 13 service was automatically downloaded when the program restarted and was available
 14 for use.

1 Nostradamus has the ability to produce forecasts as if it were an earlier time, however it
2 would use actual rather than forecast climate data, since forecast meteorologic data
3 are not stored, but are replaced with each new forecast and then with observed data.
4 Nostradamus therefore could not be made to produce exactly the forecasts that would
5 have been available on June 25 through 28, had the model been working properly.

6

7 **2.3 June 13, 2015**

8 On June 13, the forecast peak at 7:20 am, as reported to the Board, was 945 MW; the
9 actual reported peak was 1024 MW. The absolute difference was 79 MW, 7.7% of the
10 actual. Figure 3 includes an hourly plot of the load forecast for June 13 as well as
11 several charts which examine components of the load forecast to assist in determining
12 the sources of the differences between actual and forecast loads.

13

14 Figure 3(a) shows the hourly distribution of the load forecast compared to the actual
15 load. The forecast overestimated the load for the full 24-hour period. The forecast
16 predicted a 6:00 pm peak of 943 MW; the peak was at 6:00 pm, but was 1022 MW.

17

18 Figure 3(b) shows the hourly distribution of the utility load forecast only, i.e., the load
19 forecast with the industrial component removed. The utility forecast was worse than
20 the total forecast for most of the day, so error in the industrial portion of the forecast
21 reduced the total forecast error.

22

23 Figure 3(c) shows the actual temperature in St. John's compared to the forecast. With
24 the exception of two or three hours in the afternoon, the actual temperate was
25 consistently below the temperature forecast by up to four degrees. Since temperature
26 has such a significant effect on the heating loads in the province, the error in the
27 temperature likely explains much of the error in the load forecast.


1 Figure 3(d) shows the actual wind speed in St. John's compared to the forecast. For
2 most of the day the wind forecast was quite accurate. The actual wind dropped below
3 forecast in the evening after the peak, but during the peak the wind forecast was close
4 to actual. The error in the wind speed forecast did not contribute significantly to the
5 over forecast of the peak.

6

7 Figure 3(e) shows the actual cloud cover in St. John's compared to the forecast. The
8 cloud cover was accurate – both the forecast and the actual cloud cover was 100% for
9 most of the day.

10

11 The discrepancy between actual and forecast load for June 13 was likely primarily as a
12 result of inaccuracies in the temperature forecast. The hourly within-day updates are
13 used by Energy Control Centre operators to manage spinning reserve. By 1:30 pm the
14 forecast peak was within 2% of the actual.



1 **2.4 June 15, 2015**

2 On June 15, the forecast peak at 7:20 am, as reported to the Board, was 855 MW; the
3 actual reported peak was 805 MW. The absolute difference was 50 MW, 6.2% of the
4 actual.

5

6 Figure 4(a) shows the hourly distribution of the load forecast compared to the actual
7 load. The forecast overestimated the load for most of the day, with the error seeming
8 to increase as the day progressed. The forecast was for an 11:00 pm peak of 859 MW,
9 the actual peak occurred at 11:00 am and was 796 MW.

10

11 Figure 4(b) shows the hourly distribution of the utility load forecast only, i.e., the load
12 forecast with the industrial component removed. The utility forecast was significantly
13 more accurate than the total forecast, indicating that it was error in the industrial
14 forecast that caused the error in the total load forecast. The CBPP load averaged only
15 65 MW on June 15, compared to a forecast of 107 MW. At the time of the forecast and
16 actual peaks, the CBPP load was less than 50 MW.

17

18 The discrepancy between actual and forecast load for June 15 was a result of the lower
19 than forecast load from CBPP. The Energy Control Centre operators have a real time
20 indication of the CBPP load so were well aware of the requirement for less generation
21 than forecast.

