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Page 1 Page 3 1 (10:00 a.m.) return matters both to the company and to its customers and during the course of his 2 CHAIRMAN: 2 explanation, he commented on the fact that we Q. Okay. So if there are no -3 4 MS. GLYNN: have a generally supportive regulatory 4 environment here in Newfoundland and he Q. There are no preliminary matters, Mr. Chair. 5 6 CHAIRMAN: pointed out some differences with other 6 Q. Sir, I think we are with you. jurisdictions such as the automatic flow 7 through of storm damage that's over \$100,000 8 KELLY, Q.C.: 8 in Alberta, but we don't have that here. And Q. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 10 Commissioners, Newfoundland Power has filed a 10 that led to an interesting question from you, comprehensive written brief which effectively Mr. Chairman, in which you asked Mr. Ludlow 11 11 addresses all of the issues in this "what else do you think we could do to make 12 12 the regulatory environment more than generally 13 proceeding. That includes both the settled 13 supportive?" Now that was an excellent issues reflected in the settlement agreement 14 14 and the issues which were dealt with in the question and one that I think helps focus the 15 15 16 hearing itself, primarily cost of capital and 16 discussion I'd like to have this morning. depreciation. So I thought what might be Broadly speaking, from a financial 17 17 helpful as we start this morning was to try to perspective, two things are required in order 18 18 to have least cost reliable power over the put this proceeding, and specifically the cost 19 19 of capital discussion, into a bit of a broader long term. One is appropriate capital 20 20 long-term context, and in considering that expenditures and two is reasonable annual 21 21 revenues, including the fair return, and you 22 historical context, I wanted to look back at 22 got to have both. Now with that comment, 23 where we've come from, but then more 23 importantly, to discuss where we're going in let's look back a bit and see how this has 24 24 the future because this GRA comes at an worked. 25 25 Page 4 Page 2 important time in terms of the future of the You heard Mr. Ludlow describe the cuts to 1 1 2 development of the Province's electrical 2 both operating and capital expenditures 3 3

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important time in terms of the future of the development of the Province's electrical system. We've just come through a major public policy debate about the future of energy supply here in Newfoundland and Labrador. The decision has been made to proceed with Muskrat Falls and the Labrador Infeed with power supply now projected for 2017 or shortly thereafter.

Deciding to build Muskrat Falls and bring power to the island is one thing, but much still needs to be done over the next few years to ensure that this new source of supply is properly integrated into the island grid. We must ensure that there is an uninterrupted and seamless energy supply for Newfoundland Power customers. And getting that right is important for our customers, but it's also important for the Province and the provincial economy.

economy.

Now Mr. Chairman, the principal issue in this proceeding is cost of capital and specifically the fair return on equity for Newfoundland Power. Mr. Ludlow, in his evidence, explained to you why having a fair

You heard Mr. Ludlow describe the cuts to both operating and capital expenditures following the cod moratorium in 1992. Those cuts were unfortunate but necessary. We had 50,000 people leave the province and over time, those cuts affected the reliability of the electrical system. It's 1992.

Then we come up to 1997. We had first oil in the province from Hibernia. It was time to get ready for the future. And I've been at this now about 15 years and I remember being here listening to the then president, Mr. Hughes, talking about the need to get our electrical system ready for the changing economy. And I was here with Mr. John Evans, who was then the vice-president of operation and engineering, and we brought down examples of rusted out pole transformers, corroded conductor and defective insulators so the Board could actually see hands on what the actual state of some of these assets were. And the Board's own consultant confirmed what we were saying. And the Board responded by then approving increased capital expenditures to improve and maintain system reliability.

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That was the time when Newfoundland Power started to introduce the stainless steel transformer tanks that you heard about in this hearing in the last several weeks. And the Board has continued to support Newfoundland Power's capital program and today on our system we have good reliability, bearing in mind that we're on a rock in the North Atlantic.

But in addition to capital expenditures.

But in addition to capital expenditures, you also need reasonable annual revenues, including a fair return on equity. And we brought Dr. Moran here in the late 1990s who explained to the Board that the least cost or the optimum cost is achieved when the return on equity and the capital structure results in an A bond rating. That gives you the least cost power over the long term. So, return and capital structure are both important components of getting least cost power.

In the 1998/99 GRA, the Board cut Newfoundland Power's return to what was then the very low rate of nine and a quarter percent. That was the lowest then allowed for any investor-owned utility in North America. course, one of the points out of that is management has an obligation then to both investors and to our customers to actually earn those returns. Earning the comparable return is what satisfies investors, satisfies the credit rating agencies and ensures least cost power. That's the point that Mr. Ludlow was trying to make in this opening comments.

So Mr. Chairman, if you then fast forward through the decade from about 1998 to 2008, we have a couple of things. During that period, the Board adopted a formula to adjust the ROE during a time when there was a long-term sustained decline in long Canada bond yields. Newfoundland Power actually proposed using the formula and the Board adopted that formula at that time over the objections of the then Consumer Advocate, who advocated regular cost of capital hearings. And the formula worked reasonably well until 2008.

The other thing that the Board did during that ten-year period was they expanded the range of rate of return. The rate is set at the midpoint of the range, but the Board expanded the allowed range. And that was done

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And one of the credit rating agencies then reduced Newfoundland Power's credit rating. So we had this anomaly that just as capital expenditures were increasing, Newfoundland Power's credit rating was eroded. And as you know, money which is borrowed to fund capital expenditures has to be repaid over a 30-year period.

So in 2003, the Board changed course and increased Newfoundland Power's return to 9.75 percent. So the return on equity is a key component of least cost power for customers and of course, it goes without saying that the return matters to equity investors. They expect a return on equity which is equal to the return on other comparable risk investments or to put it slightly differently, returns which are comparable to those earned by other average risk utilities. And we know that capital flows to higher returns. That's the reason, for example, why FERC down in the United States is now giving higher returns for new transmission assets to encourage investment in those previously underfunded

as an incentive for management to find productivity improvements between GRAs. That was in 2003. So the utility could increase its earned return in the short run, but of course, those savings flow back to customers for their benefit at the next GRA. So just like FERC in the United States, this Board concluded that an ROE incentive was a good thing, not just for the shareholders, but for our customers.

And then we come all the way up to 2008 and the world changed. The financial markets crashed. Long Canada bond yields collapsed. Credit spreads on utility bonds became astronomical. The formulas weren't working and many regulators at that stage, including the NEB and the British Columbia Utilities Commission, later followed by Alberta, suspended or discontinued use of their formula mechanisms. By the time we got to Newfoundland Power's 2009 GRA, things had settled down a bit, but there was still a huge degree of uncertainty in financial markets and where things were headed. You'll remember that the long Canada bond yields for 2010 were

assets, the real problem in the US. And of

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Page 9 forecast to be in the four and a quarter to four and a half percent range, but at the time of the hearing in 2009, they were still below that range. Newfoundland Power and its expert, Ms. McShane, pointed out the high degree of uncertainty in the financial markets and

proposed discontinuing the use of the formula and simply setting a rate of return until markets returned to more normal conditions. But Dr. Booth, however, was confidently predicting that the worst was behind us; the recovery was well under way and long Canada bond yields would be five, five and a half, six percent within a few years. That's the discussion we had in 2009. In 2009, one thing we can say is the general consensus was that bond yields were going to be higher, not lower. And so that put this Board in a rather

at nine percent and two, you decided to keep the formula. Now those two things are not separate and

two things. One is you set the rate of return

difficult choice and in 2009 you decided to do

difficult position. You had to make a

been over ten percent in 2011.

So the starting ROE and the formula mechanism, these two things are very interrelated and at that point in time, in 2009, everyone, including ourselves, were thinking ROEs -- sorry, long Canada bond yields would increase. And so that started us off in 2010 with a sub par ROE, below the Canadian average.

10 (10:15 a.m.)

Then just come through each of the years. We get into 2010 and the first thing that happens is we have the March ice storm and Hurricane Igor and with careful and prudent management and by deferring other expenditures, the company managed to absorb 1.8 million in costs without having to come back to the Board to ask for a cost deferral order. That's not a bad thing. That's a good thing. That's what you want your utility to do, if possible. And Mr. Ludlow did caution that that may not always be possible, especially if you get it happening late in the year and a cost deferral is necessary. Even Dr. Booth was complimentary about the

Page 10

achievement and you may remember Mr. Ludlow rather proudly pointing out that our trucks headed home with the power back on passing the Canadian Armed Forces coming in to help, on their way in.

With good management in 2010, the company still managed to earn a return of 9.21 percent for 2010, which was close to the average of Canadian utilities. So that was 2010.

Then we come up to 2011 and the world did not unfold as we all thought it would. Long Canada bond yields fell dramatically. The formula cut Newfoundland Power's allowed ROE to 8.38 percent, the lowest for any investorowned utility in North America in 2011. Credit rating agencies didn't reduce the company's bond rating, but they did flag up that the reduced credit metrics, as a result of the ROE reduction, and warned of a possible downgrade if they perceived a meaningful reduction in the level of regulatory support, combined with weaker liquidity and a sustained deterioration in Newfoundland Power's financial metrics. And clearly, the rating

agencies were looking to see if this trend was

distinct. They are highly interrelated. At nine percent, the ROE for 2010 was approximately 30 basis points below the average of other Canadian allowed utilities, so 30 basis points lower than the average. But we recognized you can't just look at nine percent in isolation and we assumed the Board didn't do that either. If you're going to keep a formula, then you need to have some sense of well, what happens if I look out over the next couple of years with that formula mechanism. And at the time, of course, the Board was using a long Canada bond yield of four and a half percent for 2010 and if you took Dr. Booth's point where he was confidently predicting we could be at, say five and a half percent, then if you -- you had to set the rate of return at a fairly low rate to start off with, because look what happens if you didn't. If you were at nine percent and long Canada bond yields went up one percent, then Newfoundland Power's ROE in

2011 would have been 9.8 percent. And if you

9.3, and it went up one percent, we would have

started at the average of Canadian utilities,

| | Page 13 | | Page 15 |
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| 1 | going to continue and how it would play out. | 1 | everyone loses, shareholders and customers, |
| 2 | As Ms. Perry explained, in 2011 the | 2 | because the allowed return is merely the |
| 3 | company chose to try to manage that problem, | 3 | starting point. The lower the allowed return, |
| 4 | especially since there was a great deal of | 4 | the harder it is to earn a fair return, one |
| 5 | uncertainty because of the Bell pole Bell | 5 | that's comparable to the returns earned by |
| 6 | Aliant pole transaction and the related | 6 | other average risk utilities. And as Mr. |
| 7 | financial effects of that, including the rate | 7 | Ludlow pointed out, you may be able to defer |
| 8 | base impacts that it had. So a great deal of | 8 | some expenditures in the short term, but you |
| 9 | executive time and effort went into managing | 9 | can't do that without adverse consequences |
| 10 | the financial affairs of the company in 2011, | 10 | over the long term. That's particularly true |
| 11 | including managing the return. The company | 11 | in this jurisdiction when we already ask our |
| 12 | did achieve nine percent, which was not a bad | 12 | utility to manage unexpected events such as |
| 13 | result in the circumstances, but as 2011 went | 13 | storm damage, if possible, rather than |
| 14 | on, the financial crisis in Europe became full | 14 | providing an automatic storm recovery |
| 15 | blown, the US economy struggled, US and France | 15 | mechanism. |
| 16 | got downgraded and long Canada bond yields | 16 | And that point is particularly important |
| 17 | collapsed, just went through the floor. Even | 17 | as we go forward because as I said at the |
| 18 | Dr. Booth admitted he didn't see it coming. | 18 | beginning of my comments, the next several |
| 19 | Then if the formula would have applied in | 19 | years are critical. Senior management needs |
| 20 | 2012, it would have reduced Newfoundland | 20 | to be focused on managing the electrical |
| 21 | Power's return to 7.85 percent, far below any | 21 | system, managing the transition from where we |
| 22 | other allowed return. That led to another | 22 | are today to where we must be in 2017-2018 and |
| 23 | huge expenditure of time and effort to manage | 23 | getting there requires a lot of work. |
| 24 | the return. There was a cost of capital | 24 | Ultimately that new power generation source |
| 25 | application filed with the Board. Experts | 25 | and those new transmission assets have got to |
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PUB-CA-015.

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Page 17 and it's above where Dr. Booth expects them to be over the next several years. So there's no imperative for a formula. The Board can, it has the ability and so it can and should simply determine a fair and reasonable ROE which will be included in the test year costs until further order of the Board. That's essentially how the ROE was set and applied from the time the Public Utilities Act came into effect in the early 1950s all the way up to 1998 in this province.

In setting the return, the Board should be mindful that Newfoundland Power's allowed ROE's since the last GRA have been below par. That was especially true in 2011, but it was also true in 2010 and 2012. So the allowed returns for those years are not the appropriate benchmarks for the return that you should set today.

Now my friend, Mr. Johnson, the Consumer Advocate, will say that the cost of equity has come down and I'm sure he will say to you Ms. McShane said so. But it hasn't come down from nine percent. It's come down from what the real cost of capital was in 2010. If you look

on the one hand and a utility's cost of equity on the other. That's why regulators such as the British Columbia Utilities Commission, the Ontario Energy Board, the Alberta Utilities Commission, have moved away from sole or predominant reliance on the CAP-M methodology. They increasingly rely on other methodologies, in particular, the discounted cash flow or DCF methodology. The lack of any clear and predictable relationship between long Canada bond yields and a utility's cost of equity, for example, has forced Dr. Booth to make several judgmental adjustments to his CAP-M analysis as he tried to come up with a reasonable result and Mr. MacDonald acknowledged in his report that his CAP-M analysis on a stand-alone basis would result in a return which would not be a fair ROE for the company.

So the days of sole reliance on CAP-M are over. Dr. Vander Weide went so far as to say that its application is so distorted in current financial market conditions that he placed no weight on it. The use of multiple methodologies, each of which has its own

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at allowed utility returns in Canada, the average was 9.29 percent in 2010. It was 9.08 percent in 2012 and you'll find that information in the response to the PUB staff question PUB-CA-023 and find it in Ms. McShane's Schedule 3, page two of two. And the evidence of the cost of capital witnesses was that the financial market conditions in 2013, 2014 will be no different than in 2012. You'll find Dr. Booth's answer saying that at

But looking at allowed utility returns is admittedly circular, though it is a good reasonableness check. So what other things should you look at? Well, obviously the cost of capital evidence itself. Mr. Chairman, that evidence tells us that there have been two important shifts in regulatory thinking since we were here in 2009. The first is with respect to the use of the CAP-M methodology.

With the collapse of long Canada bond yields, which are driven by government monetary policy instead of market forces, there's no longer any clear and predictable relationship between long Canada bond yields

Page 20 strengths and weaknesses, is to be preferred. That was the approach of each of the other

cost of capital witnesses, except Dr. Booth.
 That's how Ms. McShane approached it, Dr.

Vander Weide approached it, Mr. MacDonald approached it. But even Dr. Booth did a DCF analysis. His DCF analysis yielded 8.73

percent which when combined with 50 basis points for floatation costs, would have given a DCF result of 9.23 percent and Dr. Booth

himself acknowledged that he's now looking more closely at DCF results and previously what he used to do was apply 50 percent weightings to DCF and his CAP-M results.

Now the second change, because I told you I think there are two changes in regulatory thinking, the second change is with respect to US comparisons in determining the fair return. That's driven in part by increased reliance on the DCF methodology because it's not possible to construct a proxy group of Canadian utilities to apply the DCF model. There are only two publicly traded Canadian companies that you could use. It is possible, however,

to construct a sample of US utilities, having

Page 17 - Page 20

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Page 21 comparable overall investment risk to Newfoundland Power. Each cost of capital witness did that, including Dr. Booth himself. 4 (10:30 a.m.) Ms. McShane, you'll remember, explained in detail how she narrowed her criteria for the sample to satisfy the concerns that his Board expressed in its last order and Dr. Vander Weide and Mr. MacDonald each constructed their own samples of US proxy samples. And Dr. Booth's US sample included six utilities, all but one of which were in Ms. McShane's sample. So the testimony of all

Newfoundland Power.

In 2009, the National Energy Board expressly recognized that the integration of Canadian and US financial markets make US comparisons informative for determining a fair return and if you look at what British Columbia, Ontario and the Alberta Commissions have done in their last decisions, they now

of the witnesses provides a strong evidentiary

methodology to a proxy group of US utilities

having overall comparable risk to that of

basis for the application of the DCF

for the time being, simply setting a reasonable rate of return for Newfoundland Power is the best approach and then either Newfoundland Power or the Board can initiate a cost of capital review if market conditions change. That approach gets us out of the constant review of cost of capital that has occurred since the financial crisis in 2008 and which has occupied so much time and effort.

formula for all time. The Board can

reconsider the issue in the future. Over

time, a regulatory consensus will emerge, but

No witnesses come here, Mr. Chairman, to suggest that a formula is actually necessary. Dr. Booth testified that he only proposed a formula because he was asked to. And Mr. MacDonald agreed that one of the alternatives that the Board should consider is simply setting the rate of return with either party can come back and apply to change it, if needed. The two formulas proposed by Dr. Booth and Mr. MacDonald demonstrate the lack of any consensus as to how a formula should operate.

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all consider US-based DCF results in informing their views of appropriate returns for their utilities.

In Newfoundland Power's written memorandum, we have provided a useful table which summarize the ROE results of the various tests employed by each of the cost of capital witnesses and we did that as a useful assistance for the Board as a summary of all the evidence.

So with that, I'd like to turn to talk a little bit about the automatic adjustment formula and I've already said most of what needs to be said about that point. At this point in time, we believe the best approach is to discontinue the use of the formula until such time as we know what this new economic world order is going to look like. It is clear that for at least the next three years, we are going to be in a continuing period of low long Canada bond yields as a result of government monetary policy.

I do want to say that by proposing

discontinuance of the formula, Newfoundland

Power is not saying the Board should abandon a

The two formulas can have diametrically opposite effects, depending upon the financial circumstances. With a floor under long Canada bond yields in Dr. Booth's formula, you could actually reduce Newfoundland Power's return if long Canada bond yields rise but utility spreads contract, because unless you get over his floor, even though long Canada bond yields go up, Newfoundland Power's return could go down because of the contraction of the credit spread. Mr. MacDonald's formula in those circumstances would yield the exact opposite result. And as Ms. Perry demonstrated, Mr. MacDonald's formula is unbalanced. A six basis point reduction in long Canada bond yields would reduce Newfoundland Power's ROE by a quarter of a percent, 25 basis points. While a 75 basis point increase in long Canada bond yields would result in no increase to Newfoundland Power's return. The proposed formula has a 23 basis point built-in downward bias because of how it's constructed.

The lack of a consensus over automatic adjustment formulas arises because there's no longer any clear and predictable relationship

| | n 0, 2010 | | D 07 |
|----|--|----|--|
| 1 | Page 25 | , | Page 27 |
| 1 | between long Canada bond yields and a | 1 | time. |
| 2 | utility's cost of equity. The attempts in | 2 | Let me next say a few words about capital |
| 3 | this hearing to create a formula proxy for a | 3 | structure. Newfoundland Power's 45 percent |
| 4 | utility's cost of equity have resulted in | 4 | equity component in its capital structure has |
| 5 | proposals which are complicated and uncertain. | 5 | repeatedly been affirmed by this Board. It is |
| 6 | The proposed formulas not only incorporate | 6 | an important component of Newfoundland Power's |
| 7 | utility bond credit spreads, but they've also | 7 | overall average risk profile, bearing in mind |
| 8 | added floors and deadbands and automatic | 8 | the company's small size, hostile environment |
| 9 | triggers. There's no principal basis for us | 9 | and relatively weak customer and employee |
| 10 | to conclude that such mechanisms will | 10 | demographics. Two additional considerations |
| 11 | correctly establish the cost of equity for | 11 | have emerged since 2008 supporting the need |
| 12 | Newfoundland Power. | 12 | for the 45 percent equity in Newfoundland |
| 13 | And it's interesting that the proposed | 13 | Power's capital structure. |
| 14 | formulas are each variations of or have | 14 | The first is the fallout from the |
| 15 | similarities with the Ontario Energy Board's | 15 | financial crisis. Other regulators, such as |
| 16 | 2009 formula. Now the OEB needs a formula | 16 | the British Columbia Utilities Commission and |
| 17 | mechanism because of the very large number of | 17 | the Alberta Utilities Commission, have moved |
| 18 | small utilities that they regulate that it | 18 | to strengthen their utilities' capital |
| 19 | regulates. But that's not true in | 19 | structures over the past several years. |
| 20 | Newfoundland and Labrador. And it's | 20 | They've actually increased their equity |
| 21 | interesting, proponents of formulas now | 21 | ratios. And that, of course, was in line with |
| 22 | suggest that the Ontario Energy Board formula | 22 | the move to strengthen capital structures of |
| 23 | is yielding reasonable results, but they | 23 | financial institutions in the wake of the |
| 24 | ignore the fact that today's Ontario Energy | 24 | financial crisis because today, no country or |
| 25 | Board formula results stem from the fact that | 25 | business is immune from scrutiny by the credit |
| | Page 26 | | Page 28 |
| 1 | the Ontario Board set the starting return at | 1 | rating agencies, more from a potential of a |
| 2 | nine and three-quarters percent for 2010, one | 2 | credit downgrade. We've seen that with the |
| 3 | of the higher allowed ROEs in the country at | 3 | United States, France and most recently, |
| 4 | that time. If you start high enough, yeah, | 4 | Canadian banks. Mr. MacDonald specifically |
| 5 | it'll give you nice results now, but nobody | 5 | referred to the factor of the continuing |
| 6 | was here at Newfoundland Power's last GRA, not | 6 | fallout from the financial crisis in support |
| 7 | the Consumer Advocate, recommending that this | 7 | of his recommendation to maintain Newfoundland |
| 8 | Board adopt an Ontario type formula starting | 8 | Power's existing capital structure. That was |
| 9 | at nine and three-quarters percent. | 9 | in his testimony on January the 18th at pages |
| 10 | Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, at this | 10 | 245 to 247. |
| 11 | point in time, it's important that | 11 | The second factor was referred to by Mr. |
| 12 | Newfoundland Power's senior management team | 12 | Ludlow in his evidence and interestingly, |
| 13 | focus their time and energy on the Province's | 13 | explicitly referred to by Moody's in their |
| 14 | utility system. The certainty of a known | 14 | most recent credit report. Moody's expressed |
| 15 | return which is fair and reasonable is | 15 | a cautionary note related to their concern |
| 16 | preferable to the uncertainty of what a | 16 | that Newfoundland Power's future ability to |
| 17 | formula may or may not do in a world of | 17 | fully recover costs and earn returns may be |
| 18 | uncertain financial markets which are driven | 18 | compromised as the Province of Newfoundland |
| 19 | by government monetary policy rather than | 19 | and Labrador undertakes development of the |
| 20 | normal market forces. | 20 | Muskrat Falls hydro-electric project on the |
| 21 | So Newfoundland Power, as I said earlier, | 21 | Lower Churchill River and the related |
| 22 | asks the Board to do two things: set a fair | 22 | transmission infrastructure. That's the |
| 23 | and reasonable return; and then, two, | 23 | concern expressed by Moody's. And how credit |
| 24 | discontinue the use of the formula until it | 24 | rating agencies view Newfoundland Power's risk |
| | can be reconsidered at some future point in | 25 | is obviously critical to maintaining |

Page 29 Page 31 Newfoundland Power's credit rating and the transcript on January 15th, 2013, page 70, 1 ensuring least cost supply of power to 2 2 line 17. customers. So Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, those are 3 3 And as I noted at the beginning of my my comments on cost of capital. I intend to 4 4 comments, changes in credit ratings affect say a few words on depreciation. 5 5 6 borrowing costs and the cost of power over the 6 (10:45 a.m.) 7 long term. Over the next several years, it's It's demonstrably true that the Board particularly important that credit ratings not made the correct decision in 1983 when it 8 8 be jeopardized. So at this critical juncture, directed Newfoundland Power to use the equal 10 it is important that the Board demonstrate its 10 life group or ELG depreciation procedure. commitment to continued regulatory support. That is clear beyond a doubt. ELG is a 11 11 An ill-conceived precipitous move to reduce recognized sound public utility practice in 12 12 the equity component of Newfoundland Power's Canada. It best matches the expense with the 13 13 capital structure, as proposed by Dr. Booth, life of the utility assets. It also ensures 14 14 could well have serious adverse effects for the fulfilment of the power policy requirement 15 15 16 the company, its customers and the Province. 16 of least cost power consistent with reliability over the long term. Customer The Board staff asked an interesting 17 17 rates today are 3.7 million dollars less question of Dr. Booth in PUB-CA-015. They 18 18 pointed out that Dr. Booth had not recommended annually because of the Board's decision to 19 19 a change in capital structure in his May adopt ELG. That's because Newfoundland 20 2012 20 report and they asked if there had been any Power's rate base is 70 million dollars less 21 21 change in capital market conditions since that than if we had stayed on the ALG, average life 22 22 time. And Dr. Booth confirmed that there had group, procedure. If we were to revert to ALG 23 23 not been any such changes since his May 2012 after a relatively short time period customer 24 24 rates would again be higher because of the capital structure recommendation, which was to 25 25

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leave it at 45 percent.

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In addition, there are real and practical difficulties with the suggestion that common equity be replaced by preference shares, and I'm not going to go through them all. I simply note that as Ms. Perry explained, the only realistic way to reduce the equity component to 40 percent would be to borrow42 million dollars in additional debt. That would put significant downward pressure on Newfoundland Power's credit metrics at a time when Moody's is looking for those credit metrics to be stabilized. That's the word they use.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on capital structure, a note of caution when you're reading the Consumer Advocate's brief. In his brief, the Consumer Advocate stated that Fortis had issued preferred shares in November 2012 at 3.8 percent. That rate is not correct. The correct yield was 4.75 percent. I think it's just a mistake. The Consumer Advocate put the correct yield to Ms. Perry in cross-examination and she confirmed 4. 75 percent. You'll find that, if necessary, in

growth in the rate base. So that proposal is not in accordance with the power policy contained in the Electrical Power Control Act. Frankly, it is tantamount to saying let us take a benefit today that our parents paid for and let us pass the cost on to our children and our grandchildren.

The company's depreciation expense is reasonable and prudent. Of the seven mast property categories considered by Mr. Pous, Gannet Fleming had proposed increased in service lives for all of them. Their recommendation is supported by years of experience with Newfoundland Power's system, with site visits and with discussion with Newfoundland Power's engineering staff. Similarly, Gannet Fleming's recommendation with respect to net salvage estimate for overhead services is reasonable. There is simply no basis to conclude that any of the Gannet Fleming recommendations with respect to depreciation are either unreasonable or imprudent and that's the test that you would have to meet.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, next I want

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Page 33 to address three points that the Consumer Advocate raised in his brief with respect to operating costs. Those are drug costs, retiring allowances and short term incentive pay. I'll be relatively brief on each of them and just ensuring that you have the appropriate references if you need to in the record.

The Consumer Advocate didn't call any evidence on these matters. The evidence in the record does not support his assertions and conclusions. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that each of these forecast costs is based upon the best information available. Grant Thornton conducted a comprehensive review of Newfoundland Power's operating costs, including these items, and found nothing unreasonable. There is no basis for the Board to conclude that any of these particular estimates of test year costs are unreasonable or imprudent.

First, on drug costs. The Consumer Advocate asserts that OPEB expense should be reduced because he speculates that drug costs will be less than forecast. There's no basis conclude that the forecast expense is unreasonable and imprudent.

With respect to retiring allowances, the Consumer Advocate asserts that retiring allowances for new non-unionized employees should be disallowed. The point was addressed by Mr. Smith in cross-examination on January 25th, page 32, line 8 through page 48, line 6. Mr. Smith pointed out that retiring allowances had been part of Newfoundland Power's compensation package for many years, both for unionized and non-unionized employees. Newfoundland Power is currently addressing an important demographic transition in its workforce. He testified the company wants to hire better than average employees and to do so, must pay competitive compensation.

The Consumer Advocate's brief refers to proposed changes in New Brunswick and the Federal civil services. These developments were not introduced in evidence or explored during the hearing and they certainly do not represent any evidence, let alone any clear evidence, of changes in retiring allowances in Newfoundland and Labrador. But keep in mind,

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in the evidence for that conclusion. The point was addressed by Ms. Perry in cross-examination. You'll find the evidence January 15th, page 133, line 3 and it carries through to page 141, line 13, and also on January 16 beginning at page 9, line 2, going through to page 17, line 23.

And succinctly summarized, Ms. Perry made the following observations: Newfoundland Power followed the usual process of forecasting drug costs based upon the health care trend numbers provided by Mercers. Mercers said the effect of the new drug regulation was impractical to quantify at this point in time. Overall drug costs depend not only on price but also drug usage. Further, Newfoundland Power already has pricing agreements with pharmacies through Blue Cross which provide better prices than current on drugs. And the forecast drug costs are based upon the best information currently available.

The Consumer Advocate's assertion that a six percent cost reduction will occur is unfounded speculation without any evidentiary basis. It is no basis for this Board to

retiring allowances are one part of a total compensation package. Changing any one component necessarily requires adjustment to other components to ensure that the total compensation package remains competitive and you must be competitive, especially in today's environment. So there is simply no basis to conclude that the test year estimate of costs for labour overall is unreasonable or imprudent.

And the third point is the STI or short term incentive plan. If I follow the brief correctly, the Consumer Advocate's primary focus appears to be with respect to the earnings related component of the short term incentive plan. His basis argument seems to be that earnings benefit shareholders not customers and I say in response, put simply, that's nonsense. As I discussed earlier, management has an obligation both to its shareholders and to its customers to work hard to earn comparable returns. Unless the utility actually earns a fair return, credit metrics deteriorate, bond ratings are jeopardized, borrowing costs potentially

Page 33 - Page 36

Page 37 Page 39 increase and customers suffer. The Electrical returns. Earnings are important for both 1 1 2 Power Control Act makes it clear that 2 investors and customers. maintaining a sound credit rating is an Finally, Mr. Chairman, the last point I 3 3 important objective. should touch on very briefly is the 4 4 The Consumer Advocate called no evidence conservation plan. You'll note that the plan 5 5 6 with respect to executive compensation. itself provides mechanisms for ongoing 6 7 Executive compensation was fully explored in evaluation and consultation with industry and 7 the last GRA and the Board accepted the expert market participants, no new or additional 8 8 testimony of Mr. Karl Aboud. In this hearing, process is required. Progress is being made 9 9 10 the importance of earnings for customers was 10 with respect to conservation. This is an fully set out in the response to CA-NP-452. evolving program. The new program has an 11 11 Mr. Ludlow dealt with it in his direct expanded portfolio of options for customers. 12 12 13 testimony and in his cross-examination. In But I want to make it clear, nothing limits 13 his brief, the Consumer Advocate conveniently the number of customers who may want to take 14 14 advantage of the insulation option. That 15 left out Mr. Ludlow's answer referring to the 15 16 need for a balance between investors and 16 option remains open for existing homeowners, customers. And Ms. Perry dealt with the but the expanded portfolio gives customers 17 17 additional opportunities to achieve savings on testimony -- dealt with the issue in her 18 18 testimony on January 15th, which you'll find their electricity costs. 19 19 at page 1, lines 18 through to page 6, line Mr. Chairman, Mr. Adams gave an 20 20 16. And finally, in CA-NP-612, you'll see interesting presentation with respect to mini-21 21 22 that STI earning incentives have been included 22 split heat pumps. Newfoundland Power in Newfoundland Power's cost of service since personnel have spoken with Mr. Adams and will 23 23 be following up with him further. Those heat at least 1977. 24 24 pumps will be evaluated by the utilities. Mr. 25 The Consumer Advocate refers to decisions 25 Page 40 Page 38 from Alberta and the Northwest Territories. 1 Adams did note himself, he made a reference to 1 2 These weren't referred to or examined during 2 Newfoundland Hydro doing an evaluation during 3 the evidence, but you will note in CA-NP-612 his testimony. However, heat pumps have 3 that financial performance is a factor in 4 significant capital cost, as well as ongoing 4 5 executive compensation in British Columbia, 5 expense. So the cost benefit analysis must be Alberta, Prince Edward Island and of course, 6 considered over the long term and evaluated in 6 7 Newfoundland and Labrador. 7 light of energy supply costs and potential 8 But before I leave this, there's an 8 system savings. With a decision to proceed 9 interesting observation that Dr. Booth made with Muskrat Falls, a hydro-electric project, 9 and I'd like to take you to this. It's on a proper cost benefit analysis necessarily 10 10 11 January 18th, page 19, lines 8 to 19. And 11 requires information on energy supply costs here's what Dr. Booth had to say about good 12 and the quantification of potential savings 12 management and earning the return. The 13 13 which is not currently available because question I put to him "but in order to earn 14 14 potential savings will be different when the the return, amongst the factors you mentioned 15 Holyrood thermal plant is effectively replaced 15 is also good management?" and his answer by hydro power. However, Newfoundland Power 16 16 "that's absolutely correct. If you look at 17 17 and Newfoundland Hydro will be assessing this this and you have hopelessly incompetent 18 18 technology and its potential costs and system 19 management that keeps making mistakes, then benefits as part of its continuing evaluation 19 you would get unstable earnings and then of conservation opportunities. 20 20 21 you're in a paradox to then give the equity 21 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, those are my holders a higher rate of return because they 22 22 submissions and comments, unless you have any

obviously sees the paradox that results if

management does not actually earn appropriate

hired incompetent managers."

Dr. Booth

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24 CHAIRMAN:

questions.

Q. So I guess we'll break for 15 minutes?

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| February 8, 2013 | Multi-Pa | ige TM | NL Power Inc. 2013 GRA |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|---|
| | Page 41 | | Page 43 |
| 1 MS. GLYNN: | 1 | 8.80 | percent is not far off the nine percent |
| 2 Q. 15 minutes, please, Mr. Chair. | 2 | | er for 2010. And here we now have Canadian |
| 3 CHAIRMAN: | 3 | utili | ities, including members of the Fortis |
| 4 Q. 15. | 4 | fam | ily, now borrowing 40 and sometimes 50 year |
| 5 (BREAK - 10:59 a.m.) | 5 | deb | t at incredibly low interest rates. And as |
| 6 (RESUME - 11:18 a.m.) | 6 | for | the dividend yield, when Ms. McShane wrote |
| 7 CHAIRMAN: | 7 | her | expert report in 2009, it stood at 4.2 |
| 8 Q. So I think, Mr. Johnson, we'r | re over to you, 8 | perc | cent. Now it's down to about three |
| 9 sir. | 9 | perc | cent, evidencing a declining trend in the |
| 10 MR. JOHNSON: | 10 | cost | t of equity. |
| 11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, C | Commissioners. I 11 | F | As for the TSX price index, well, in |
| recently reread the final argur | ment that Mr. 12 | | rch of 2009, just before Ms. McShane wrote |
| 13 Kelly made on behalf of Nev | wfoundland Power 13 | her | report, it was 7500 at its lowest, 8600 by |
| back in 2009 and at that time, | he put certain 14 | the | end of March. By October of 2009, when we |
| propositions to the Board. He | e said that the | wer | e in hearings, the TSX price index stood at |
| propositions would be of | considerable 16 | arou | and 10,900. By July 2012, it was 11,600. |
| assistance to the Board in its | deliberations 17 | By. | January 2013, it was 12,600. |
| on the cost of capital. The pr | roposition at 18 | N | Now the Board will recall in this case |
| 19 the time was that the cost of e | quity was going 19 | that | Ms. McShane said that she prepared her |
| to be higher in 2010. He said i | it would be up, | 200 | 9 report, and these are her words, "around |
| 21 not down, and he said the po | osition that | the | time of the worst part of the crisis." |
| 22 proposition was really incontr | rovertible and he 22 | But | she testified as well that things had |
| 23 referred at the time to how the | e spread over 23 | char | nged considerably over the course of that |
| the long Canada had risen to 2 | 275 basis points 24 | year | r. She testified that by the time the |
| in the spring of 2009 at the | time of the 25 | hear | ring took place, there had been |
| | Page 42 | | Page 44 |
| 1 company's last bond issue and | • | con | siderable improvement in market conditions. |
| 2 that though the bond spreads ha | • | | she admitted that these improvements were |
| 3 time of the hearing, it was clea | - | | reflected in her recommended ROE because |
| 4 investors required increased ret | | her | cost of equity tests were not sensitive to |
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to long Canada bond yields and he noted that with the cost of fully secured debt having increased, it was simply not logical to believe that the cost of the unsecured equity investment had fallen. He said that the share prices had dropped as a result of the economic turmoil and as the share prices fell, the dividend yield rose in relation to the share The equity markets were thus signalling, he said, a rising cost of equity, just as the bond market was signalling a rising cost of debt. The proposition, according to Mr. Kelly, was inescapable that the cost of equity in 2010 was going up.

Now given that this was such a key proposition last time, I would have expected Newfoundland Power to be now giving you, as its first inescapable proposition, the fact that the cost of equity is going to be lower in 2013 than what it is presently set at in

rates in 2012. Because after all, the present

the changing conditions. That's the reason why there was no change in her recommendation.

Now in this case, Ms. McShane states that relative to late 2009, the cost of equity, according to the application of her various tests is 50 basis points lower. But you have to keep in mind that she is using pretty much the same tests in this GRA as she used the last time, albeit this time, we note that somehow she has managed to double the floatation allowance.

Now Mr. Kelly, in 2009, also provided the Board with a second proposition and the second proposition was that the maintenance of credit worthiness for Newfoundland Power required a return of between nine and a half and nine and three-quarters percent. Now they were seeking 11 percent, but between nine and a half and nine and three-quarters, he put that, that was the floor below which the company would not maintain credit worthiness and it would not be

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ensured that the company would be able to issue further debt to maintain service to its customers as required.

Now with all due respect, the evidence in this case clearly establishes that Newfoundland Power overstated the return on equity that it required to maintain credit worthiness and to ensure that the company was able to issue further debt to maintain service to its customers. They've had financial integrity ever since the last GRA and they didn't require nine and a half or nine and three-quarters to get that. Both Mr. Ludlow and Ms. Perry confirmed that the company has had financial integrity since the last general rate application. Keep in mind as well that the Board's financial consultant's report shows that even if Newfoundland Power received no rate relief in either 2013 and 2014, they would still be meeting their credit metrics.

Now this Board has heard from four witnesses on the cost of capital related issues and with due respect to each of the witnesses who testified, we submit that the witness who provided this Board with the most

withdraw some of that monetary policy stimulus; that we have a financial system that's firing on all cylinders. That's the Governor's words and Dr. Booth refers to Governor Carney's statement that there are relatively few places in the advanced world that investors can put their money with a degree of certainty that something catastrophic is not going to happen. Canada is one of those countries.

Dr. Booth's report goes on to forecast the long Canada bond yield and he discusses the US situation and the fact that the United States has yet to take its fiscal medicine, as he puts it. He goes on to address the state of the corporate bond market and the state of capital markets generally. He refers specifically to the Federal Reserve of Kansas City and the financial stress index and he discusses how the researchers at the Bank of Canada who were actually the pioneers in developing a financial condition stress index, their index is reflecting relatively easy stress free capital market conditions.

He discusses the state of equity markets

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in-depth analysis and explanation of capital market conditions was Dr. Booth.

Dr. Booth addresses the financial and economic outlook in his report as a first and foremost issue. He starts his discussion by considering the capital market conditions. He discusses the outlook for inflation. He looks at the recent history of the long Canada bond yield. He describes a situation with the Eurozone and the sovereign debt issues of the US. He addresses the wrangling in Congress about the debt ceiling and the heavy lifting that Congress left to the Fed and details the massive intervention of the Fed through the Operation Twist. He discusses how policy makers in most other major economies are looking for ways to stimulate their economies further amid the European debt crisis and he noted Governor Carney's recent comments that Canada is in a very different place. Dr. Booth quotes Governor Carney as stating that our economy is almost back at full capacity, that the labour market has been growing, that we're growing above trend and the extent to

which we continue to grow above trend, we may

Page 48 during and after the financial crisis and how the state of the economy affects profits in the capital market. He discusses how profitability data has implications for the

fair ROE. Dr. Booth concludes that the overall Canadian economy is in good shape and the financial system is firing at all

cylinders. The stock market is valuing utilities favourably. Credit is easy.

Utilities are issuing 40 and 50 year debt at very low rates. The only problem, as Dr. Booth puts it, is that as one of the very few

AAA rated issuers left in the world, the

Government of Canada is borrowing at extremely

low interest rates, significantly lower than the US government. However this does not, according to Dr. Booth, indicate any

heightened risk aversion in the credit markets.

Dr. Booth in full spends about 35 pages of his report bringing this Board through the state of the capital markets, and I will put it to you that it is Dr. Booth who can speak of these matters with the most authority in this proceeding. You can search high and you

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can search low in Dr. Vander Weide's report for discussion of capital market conditions, but you won't find it. Ms. McShane discusses capital market

conditions, but the thing with Ms. McShane is that she is so tied to her various tests that at the end of the day, her recommended ROE as we saw in 2009 is not really significantly influenced by the state of the capital market conditions. Ms. McShane tells us in her report called "Trends in Economic and Capital Market Conditions" that she is going to address trends and cost of capital since the oral portion of the 2010 GRA, but it is very clear that there is nothing that directly ties in with her estimates. Where, for example, do we see any discussion of how the collapse in the volatility or what she calls the fear index has caused her to reduce her market risk premium estimate? In fact, there is none, as she increases her market risk premium estimate, even as Canadian utilities access funds at incredibly low rates for incredibly long maturities.

Page 49 Page 51

- rate that is determined by ordinary investors, 1 2 rather it's an interest rate that has been
- determined by the actions of the global policy 3 maker. Just prior to Operation Twist, Dr. 4
- Booth testified that the Bank of Canada's June 5
- 2011 forecast for the long Canada bond yield 6
 - was back to the four and a half to five
- 7 percent range and he indicated that it would 8
- not be appropriate for Newfoundland Power to 10 have a fair ROE determined by the actions of
- the Fed. 11

12 (11:30 a.m.)

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Dr. Booth estimated the impact of Operation Twist by studying the yields on the TSX preferred share index which he regards as a distinctly Canadian investment because of its tax treatment and noted that the yields on the preferred share market did not come down to the same degree as on government and corporate bond yields following Operation Twist.

His credit spread adjustment, on the other hand, takes into account recent research at the Bank of Canada which looked at the causes of the change in spreads between

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Power indicating that the Board should give greater weight to recommendations arrived at by the use of these multiple tests or multiple methodologies and we'll come to these methodologies shortly and how they've been applied, but we submit that it has not been established that the recommendation emanating from these tests are deserving of greater weight than Dr. Booth's recommendation. And to the contrary, it has been established, in our submission, that these other tests are not substantiated and we will get to that. But first to Dr. Booth's approach.

Now once again, we have Newfoundland

Dr. Booth says that the fair ROE is in the range of seven to eight percent with a midpoint of 7.5 percent on 40 percent common equity, which includes an 80 basis point adjustment for Operation Twist and a 40 basis point adjustment for credit spreads, for which he sets out the rationale in his testimony.

As Dr. Booth testified, the US Feds Operation Twist was intended to literally twist the yield curve and it worked. To the point that Dr. Booth does not regard the long term Canadian bond yield as representing a corporate and government bond yields.

Now next we turn to the market risk premium. The Board is very familiar with the market risk premium. The Board in its 2009 GRA decision stated that "the equity risk premium test is for the most part based on Canadian data and while it is necessary to forecast for the future in assessing both the market risk premium and the beta, this is the sort of exercise that the Board is accustomed to in the context of prospective regulation." So this gets us into the whole question of what is the expected market risk premium for the market as a whole? We look at that before we look at the relative risk of a utility as compared to the market.

Dr. Booth's analysis and judgment is that the market risk premium is between five to six percent and his estimate in that regard is extremely well grounded. He considers Canadian capital market history going back to 1924 which points to a market risk premium under five percent, but he also gives weight to US data. He observes that the Canadian market risk premium has been about one percent

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| | Page 53 | | Page 55 |
| 1 | lower than the United States, which has run | 1 | point out that regulators such as the National |
| 2 | about six percent. Dr. Booth also considers | 2 | Energy Board in its TQM decision in 2009 did |
| 3 | the results of an extensive survey by | 3 | not accept the premise that these utility |
| 4 | Professor Fernandez of some 7200 survey | 4 | betas revert to one as the Blume adjustment is |
| 5 | responses from financial analysts, companies | 5 | premised upon. Dr. Vander Weide is off the |
| 6 | and professors of finance, and this survey, | 6 | charts altogether at .73 to .92 for his beta |
| 7 | which was published in June of 2012 shows that | 7 | estimate. As we say in our brief, Ms. |
| 8 | 2200 US respondents, they said that the | 8 | McShane's estimate is vastly in excess of any |
| 9 | average market risk premium estimate was about | 9 | beta range actually experienced by Canadian |
| 10 | five and a half percent and for the 94 | 10 | utilities in the past 20 years. Dr. Booth's |
| 11 | Canadian respondents, the average was about | 11 | evidence is that the Financial Post, Royal |
| 12 | 5.4, right in line with Dr. Booth's estimate | 12 | Bank of Canada, Google, Yahoo Finance, they |
| 13 | of the market risk premium. | 13 | don't adjust their beta estimates in the way |
| 14 | By contrast, Ms. McShane has the market | 14 | assumed by these other witnesses. The |
| 15 | risk premium up at eight percent. Dr. Booth's | 15 | Consumer Advocate recommends that the Board |
| 16 | estimate, we would submit is not only | 16 | put most weight on the actual experience of |
| 17 | consistent with survey results, it is | 17 | Canadian utilities over the last 20 to 30 |
| 18 | consistent with independent financial | 18 | years because the fact is neither of the |
| 19 | institutions, such as TD Economics, whose | 19 | witnesses put forward by Newfoundland Power |
| 20 | October 2012 report Dr. Booth refers to. Dr. | 20 | nor Mr. MacDonald have shown utility betas |
| 21 | Booth is also consistent with Mr. MacDonald | 21 | following the Blume adjustment process. |
| 22 | who indicates that the market risk premium is | 22 | Now I'd like to say something about Dr. |
| 23 | in the range of five to six percent and whose | 23 | Booth's use of discounted cash flow method. |
| 24 | report states that there was no evidence to | 24 | He used to use that method regularly and he, |
| 25 | support a risk premium outside that range and | 25 | today, regards it as one of the two |
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| | Page 54 | | Page 56 |
| 1 | Page 54 he too cites Professor Fernandez' survey. | 1 | Page 56 fundamental methods for determining the ROE. |
| 1 2 | he too cites Professor Fernandez' survey. | 1 2 | Page 56 fundamental methods for determining the ROE. However, he said applying it to Canadian |
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| 2 3 4 | he too cites Professor Fernandez' survey. The other thing quite telling from the Fernandez study or survey is the direction of the market risk premium for the United States. | 2 3 4 | fundamental methods for determining the ROE. However, he said applying it to Canadian utilities is extremely problematic these days as there are not many Canadian utilities |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 | he too cites Professor Fernandez' survey. The other thing quite telling from the Fernandez study or survey is the direction of the market risk premium for the United States. The survey shows that estimates have it coming down over 2009, 2010, 2011 into 2012, descending from 6.4 percent in 2009 to five | 2 3 4 5 6 | fundamental methods for determining the ROE. However, he said applying it to Canadian utilities is extremely problematic these days as there are not many Canadian utilities around and some of those who are around have large levels of unregulated operations. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | he too cites Professor Fernandez' survey. The other thing quite telling from the Fernandez study or survey is the direction of the market risk premium for the United States. The survey shows that estimates have it coming down over 2009, 2010, 2011 into 2012, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | fundamental methods for determining the ROE. However, he said applying it to Canadian utilities is extremely problematic these days as there are not many Canadian utilities around and some of those who are around have large levels of unregulated operations. Neither Dr. Vander Weide nor Mr. MacDonald use |
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Page 57 whole to be 9.3 percent and the fair return on the US market to be between nine and a half to ten and a half percent, so higher in the United States than in Canada. He's also anchored in this regard by reports such as the TD Economics report.

Newfoundland Power meless the point in

Newfoundland Power makes the point in their brief that the use of long run geometric estimations of returns is not advocated by any expert in this proceeding. Well, first of all, it's important to point out that Dr. Booth referred to long run geometric returns, but also said an adjustment was needed and he said this repeatedly to make them arithmetic rather than compound returns. Newfoundland Power may not like it, but TD Economics puts the long run compound return for equities at seven percent, which when you convert to an arithmetic basis, is around nine percent.

Now I want to talk about the multiple test or multiple methodologies. First let me make this observation about Ms. McShane. Even if you accept her risk adjusted equity market premium test, which is derived from an outsized eight percent market risk premium and

premium would have dropped -- result would have dropped from 9.9 percent to 7.69 percent and Mr. MacDonald's ERP would have dropped from ten and a quarter to eight. Mr. MacDonald, for his part, did not consider doing it in the returns for returns way, despite the fact that his report even had a reference to it being a returns from returns method. That line appeared in his report.

Now we have to keep in mind that the historic utility approach is supposed to be estimating what the go-forward utility equity risk premium is. As Ms. McShane's report says, it is supposed to be an indicator of what investors expect for the future based on the premise that over the long term investors expectations and their experience converge. Using the approach of Ms. McShane, Dr. Vander Weide and Mr. MacDonald, they are arriving at risk premiums of around 6.7 to 6.7 (sic) percent for a utility and using their approach, you have to arrive at the conclusion that utilities which have long been regarded as being safer than the average company would have warranted an addition 5.4 percent risk

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Page 60 premium over the entire TSX over the period 1956 to 2011.

Now as came out during the hearing, this

an outsized Blume adjustment beta, she still gets to 8.9 percent, and secondly, we find it rather interesting that she has actually doubled her financing floatation allowance from 50 basis points to a full one percent allowance. Ms. Perry had no knowledge of floatation costs doubling. We can only make the assumption that it's getting increasingly difficult for utility expert witnesses to attempt to justify the ROE recommendations that they are putting forward, which brings us to the historic utility analysis. This is what Dr. Vander Weide refers to as the exposte risk premium and Mr. MacDonald calls the ERP.

historic utility approach was advocated by Ms. McShane before the Alberta Utilities Commission in the relatively recent 2011 generic cost of capital proceeding and the Alberta Board agreed with the intervenors in that case that part of the reason for higher historical returns for the utilities over that period may be that allowed returns have been higher than the actual ROE that investors expected and required for investments of comparable risk. Therefore, the Alberta Commission found that the evidence on historic returns was inconclusive with respect to the return investors expect on comparable investments. Similarly, we submit that there is no reasonable basis for the Board to conclude that this method puts forward reliable evidence with respect to the return investors expect on a utility like Newfoundland Power.

Let me turn to a discussion of the

discounted cash flow test. Putting aside for

For many years, as this Board heard, Ms. McShane admitted, indeed up to 2007, she would deduct the returns earned on bonds from the returns earned on stocks and that's how she would arrive at the historic utility risk premium. If she had used that approach, her historic utility cost of equity would have dropped from ten and a quarter percent to around 7.97 percent, and by the same procedure, Dr. Vander Weide's ex poste risk

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Page 61 the moment the question whether the company 1 2 has chosen to populate the samples of the witnesses are similar to Newfoundland Power. 3 we have a more basic problem. It is clear 4 from the estimation methods used by Ms. 5 6 McShane, for instance, that the DCF estimate 7 falls from simply using analyst's long growth estimates in the constant growth model to 8 tapering them down to the long run growth in 9 10 the economy at stage three and tapering them down again when you use the actual forecast 11 ROE and financial parameters of the company 12 that generates the future growth, which is the 13 sustainable method. 14 15 This is a clear indication that not only

are the short run analyst's growth estimates unreasonable methods for long run growth, but that using the long run GDP growth rate also overestimates a reasonable long run growth rate. So we ask a very simple question here. What evidence has been put forward by Newfoundland Power's witnesses or by Mr. MacDonald to substantiate that the companies they include in their samples of these very mature utilities have historically been able

21 22 23

24 these growth rates and we do not see evidence 25

Page 62

to achieve dividend growth rates anywhere near what their forecast growth models are premised on. The answer, of course as we know, is that there is no evidence on the record to substantiate that either the Canadian or the US utilities were in fact able to achieve the GDP growth rate historically.

Now in Dr. Vander Weide's case, he doesn't use a multi-stage DCF model at all anyway, but the fact is that the multi-stage model produces lower ROE estimates than the constant growth model, precisely because analyst's forecasts used in the constant growth models, exceed forecast GDP growth. We asked Dr. Vander Weide specifically in the RFI process for data to substantiate whether his firms were able to achieve growth rates as put forward in the proceeding and he told us he didn't examine historical dividend growth data and he told me during the hearing to get the data and analyze it. They're publicly available.

Now this Board will recall, however, that we did find out from cross-examination of Ms. McShane that her sample of US companies from in this case that investors believe optimistic forecasts. Similarly, the Alberta Board didn't believe there was investor -- that there was evidence that investors believe optimistic forecast.

As we stated in our brief, accordingly, in our submission, inadequate substantiation has been put forward by Newfoundland Power's cost of capital witnesses and by Mr. MacDonald to ground the Board's reliance upon DCF test results in this proceeding. Basing the fair return for Newfoundland Power on an analysis so lacking in substantiation is not reasonable.

This brings us to the companies themselves that were part of these witnesses' samples. As we said in our opening statement to the Board. Newfoundland Power has essentially doubled down on the American evidence in this case and it's just as deficient as it was in 2009. As this Board stated quite clearly in P.U. 43, in this type of analysis, it's not enough that the chosen comparables are the best available. If the data is to be relied on it must be shown to be

the recent 2011 Alberta generic cost of 1 capital proceeding were not able to achieve 2 anything close to compound US GDP growth over 3 the 20-year period from 1990 to 2010. Her US 4 firms, which include several companies 5 utilized by her in this proceeding, achieved 6 only 2.7 percent average growth in dividends 7 per share compared to the compound growth of 8

GDP of 4.7 percent over that long period.

And this is where Dr. Booth's concern

10 (11:45 a.m.)

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comes in as he expressed it at the hearing. While conceptually DCF and risk premium models are equally valid, it's very important that any estimates of future growth for utilities reflect reasonable constraints because of the fact that these are slow growing mature companies. As he testified, that's one criticism that he has against some of the other evidence before this Board, "that none of the standard checks have been done." That's a professor of finance at one of the most well known universities in the country. We submit that there is optimism built in to

| | Page 65 | | Page 67 |
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| 1 | a reasonable proxy of that reasonable | 1 | samples, nor do several of the companies in |
| 2 | adjustments can be made to account for the | 2 | the samples have the full extension of weather |
| 3 | differences. In this case, as in 2009, the | 3 | normalization protection that Newfoundland |
| 4 | evidence is again overwhelming of a lack of | 4 | Power has. Newfoundland Power operates in a |
| 5 | balance as it is clear that on almost every | 5 | forward test year regime which is viewed as |
| 6 | measure, Newfoundland Power would have to be | 6 | being the least risky. Dr. Vander Weide's |
| 7 | considered less risky than the US comparables. | 7 | July 2012 testimony in Missouri, which he |
| 8 | That essential fact has not changed, despite | 8 | tabled in response to an undertaking, said |
| 9 | the manner in which Ms. McShane has repackaged | 9 | that the risk of regulatory lag can be |
| 10 | the evidence. Dr. Vander Weide's samples are | 10 | addressed by regulators through, amongst other |
| 11 | even worse. The majority of Ms. McShane's | 11 | things, the establishment of forward looking |
| 12 | samples are from the 2009 case anyway. Of the | 12 | test years. Quite a number of companies in |
| 13 | six companies she dropped for not meeting her | 13 | these samples do not operate in forward test |
| 14 | criteria, four of them are now in Dr. Vander | 14 | year jurisdictions. Regulatory lag is an |
| 15 | Weide's sample, amongst others that are | 15 | issue in the United States, but it's not an |
| 16 | actually ranked by Standard and Poor's as | 16 | issue at all for Newfoundland Power, according |
| 17 | among the very weakest rated utility companies | 17 | to Ms. Perry. |
| 18 | in the whole of the United States. | 18 | Finally, Newfoundland Power has very |
| 19 | Despite what Ms. McShane and Dr. Vander | 19 | little earnings volatility. Ms. McShane |
| 20 | Weide say, Canada's business, as well as its | 20 | admitted that if you have lower year-to-year |
| 21 | regulatory environment, has consistently been | 21 | return volatility, it may indicate that you've |
| 22 | seen as supportive relative to the United | 22 | got lower short term risk. Dr. Booth's |
| 23 | States. Newfoundland Power is a relatively | 23 | evidence clearly indicated that the 14 US |
| 24 | low risk utility segment, being a transmission | 24 | integrated electric utilities that he looked |
| 25 | and distribution company. The only firm in | 25 | at had significantly more earnings volatility |
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| | Page 66 | | Page 68 |
| 1 | Page 66 the samples of either Ms. McShane or Mr. | 1 | Page 68 than Newfoundland Power. Newfoundland Power |
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| 2 3 | the samples of either Ms. McShane or Mr. MacDonald's sample that is truly a T&D company is Consolidated Edison. Newfoundland Power is | 1 2 3 | than Newfoundland Power. Newfoundland Power was by far the lowest with a standard deviation in its ROE of just .64 percent, whereas for the United States utilities, it ranged from 1.3 percent up to nearly eight |
| 2 3 4 | the samples of either Ms. McShane or Mr. MacDonald's sample that is truly a T&D company is Consolidated Edison. Newfoundland Power is a completely regulated company, no unregulated | 1 2 3 4 | than Newfoundland Power. Newfoundland Power was by far the lowest with a standard deviation in its ROE of just .64 percent, whereas for the United States utilities, it |
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rate regulated companies are comparable.

We believe the evidence is very clear that you must make adjustments. As Dr. Booth notes, undeniably, long term bond yields are higher in the United States, at least 50 basis points higher than in Canada. He then says you look at the market risk premiums, historic evidence of the market risk premiums are of being higher in the United States, and you look at the Canadian utilities versus the US utilities. You can look at US evidence, but you have to make adjustments. Mr. MacDonald said the same thing.

Ms. McShane and Dr. Vander Weide are the only ones who don't believe you have to make adjustments, and in the case of Dr. Vander Weide, he essentially believes that American regulators have been getting it right and Canadian regulators have been getting it wrong for decades. As Dr. Booth puts it, everybody in Canada has somehow been having these very in-depth four or five day hearings in the cost of capital and somehow in Canada we've been getting it wrong for the last 15-20 years? Dr. Booth doesn't think that's credible for it

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means that every regulator in Canada has been deficient in evaluating the evidence before them. We would ask the Board to reject that notion.

We are advocating, Dr. Booth is recommending, that the Board, for rate making purposes, reduce the common equity component in Newfoundland Power's capital structure to 40 percent and replace for rate making purposes the five percent common equity with preferred shares. This does not require intrusion into the company's actual decisions regarding the utilities capitalization as this Board clearly stated in P.U. 19 in 2003.

Newfoundland Power's capital structure with 45 percent common equity is higher than any other Fortis utility in the country and higher than Fortis Inc. itself. All the rest of the Fortis utilities are down around 40 percent and the parent company is down to something slightly less than 35 percent common equity. Dr. Booth's report addresses the fact that preferred shares, unlike bonds, are similar to equity and are paid out of after tax income and therefore support the credit

rating, as they do not add fixed interest costs.

As we point out in our brief, the reduction of the revenue requirement would have very, very modest impacts on interest coverage and cash flow to debt, a point we make at page 29. Newfoundland Power, in all due respect, is grasping at straws on this issue and they are setting up straw men arguments that they can knock down. We are not, and I want to make this perfectly clear, we're not suggesting that Fortis Inc. issue the preference shares and mirror them down to Newfoundland Power, nor is Dr. Booth suggesting, contrary to what Newfoundland Power's brief states, that they issue retractable preference shares either. They keep saying that issuing retractable preference shares as indicated by Dr. Booth would be effectively the same as issuing additional debt. But as we have pointed out at our brief on page 30, and as Newfoundland Power well knows, DBRS will typically treat preferred shares and hybrids as debt when the ratio of preferred equity and hybrids to

Page 72 common equity exceeds 20 percent, but with Dr.

Booth's recommendation, the ratio will not be 20 percent. It will only be 15 percent because we are adding five percent new preference shares on top of the one percent existing preference shares and the ratio of six percent to 40 percent common equity is only 15 percent, not 20. So that's a red herring.

Furthermore, Dr. Booth testified that it was ridiculous, as he put it, that preferred shares could not be placed through a private placement. He said it's the investment banker's job to go out and sell these securities and you give them a commission and these securities will be placed somewhere. So the request that we've made in our brief is for the Board to direct Newfoundland Power to go out, get two quotes from investment dealers as to the cost of such an issue for approval by the Board or alternatively, and in the interim, recommend for rate making purposes that Newfoundland Power be deemed to have issued five percent preferred dividend shares at the same cost as the recent November 2012

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Page 73 issue by Fortis. 1 2 We regard this step as replacing five percent common equity with preference shares 3 as a very moderated approach. As Dr. Booth 4 put it, a halfway house between going to the 5 6 same ratios as other Fortis utilities which 7 have up to 60 percent debt in their capital structure. We are not requesting that the 8 Board replace five percent equity with debt. 10 It would result in savings to customers and it would not impair Newfoundland Power's 11 financial integrity. We believe it is a very 12 reasoned and balanced approach to take, as it 13 would not be adding fixed interest and 14 therefore would be supportive of the credit 15 16 rating and it would bring Newfoundland Power closer to being at par with its sister 17 utilities. 18 19 Mr. MacDonald suggested that the capital structure is something that we should be 20 21 constantly looking at and he expressed a concern about the sovereign debt crisis, 22

appropriate to maintain that at 45 percent 25
Page 74

until we had clarity or some clarity on those issues. We would submit that Dr. Booth's evidence is to be preferred on this point. The macro economic conditions are not such as to continue to justify Newfoundland Power having 45 percent common equity when its sister utilities have 40 percent and they are subject to the same macro economic issues as Newfoundland Power. And keep in mind as well that Dr. Booth's proposal still gives Newfoundland Power pretty much the best capital structure across Canada, in terms of utilities.

particularly in the United States and he was

looking at that in his determining that it was

Further, as we set out in our brief from the standpoint of business risk and financial risk, we submit that at the very most, Newfoundland Power has average business risk compared to other utilities. It certainly does not have above average risk compared to other utilities, that's for sure, in our submission. Although that was a point that Ms. Perry did not want to concede.

Over the past few years, Newfoundland

Power's business risk, certainly in terms of

its earnings volatility, has only improved

because of accounts like the OPEBs treatment and the OPEVA protections and it seems very clear, based upon definitions of financial risk that this Board has used in the past, as outlined in our brief, that Newfoundland Power has lower financial risk because of the 45 percent equity component than most other utilities in the country.

So, as Dr. Booth puts it in a passage that we have outlined in our brief at page 33, it's a logical conclusion that if Newfoundland Power is an average business risk utility and has lower financial risk, then it should have a lower allowed ROE than a benchmark Canadian utility or its common equity should be reduced. Dr. Booth indicated that he refrained from making a capital structure recommendation previously due to the state of capital markets. However, as he pointed out, as time passes and the markets heal, the need for such a high equity ratio passes. Newfoundland Power, in their brief, attempts to make hay from the fact that Dr. Booth didn't recommend a change in the capital structure in May of 2012. I would just point

Page 76 out that it's very well known that 2012 was an

interim arrangement for 2012 and there would
be a full contested GRA, which is precisely
the process that we're sitting in now.
Newfoundland Power, once again, wants to
make light of the extensive cross-examination

make light of the extensive cross-examination on risk differences between Canadian utilities, including differences between BC utilities and Newfoundland Power. And you'll recall that Newfoundland Power was similarly dismissive about cross-examination in its last GRA about the US utilities that Ms. McShane was referring to. But the key thing with this BC evidence is that this is Ms. McShane's own evidence that she spoke to only a month before she testified here and it's quite useful for putting the discussion around the risk that Newfoundland Power faces into a perspective for the Board. Ms. McShane's evidence in British Columbia was that generically, the lowest risk is electricity transmission, and of course, Newfoundland Power does have some transmission. Next would be electricity distribution, that would apply to Newfoundland Power. Higher in terms of risk would be

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| | E |
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| 2 | be vertically integrated utilities. |
| 3 | (12:00) |
| 4 | Now in FEI in British Columbia, that's a |
| 5 | natural gas distribution company. It's larger |
| 6 | than Newfoundland Power. It's a heating load |
| 7 | gas utility which has more exposure to |
| 8 | declining throughput due to factors such as |
| 9 | smaller and more energy efficient houses than |
| 10 | electricity distributors. Unlike Newfoundland |
| 11 | Power, which has a capture rate of around 90 |
| 12 | percent in new residential units, FEI's |
| 13 | capture rate in new multi-unit dwellings |
| 14 | continues to be materially lower than in |
| 15 | single family housing, only 30 percent in |
| 16 | multi-unit where the trend is going in that |
| 17 | market versus 70 percent in the single family |
| 18 | housing units. Ms. McShane's evidence was |
| 19 | that usage rates of new residential customers |
| 20 | of FEI was 50 percent lower than that of |
| 21 | existing customers. Natural gases share of |
| 22 | the BC market is just under 50 percent, well |
| 23 | lower than the share that natural gas enjoys |
| 24 | in Ontario and in Alberta. Alberta, I |
| 25 | believe, is up to 80 percent according to her |
| | Page |

natural gas distribution and the highest would

argument that Newfoundland Power's size erases all of the advantages that Newfoundland Power enjoys by way of these other business risk indicia, whether it is belonging in a low risk T & D sector, to its being market dominant, to its having little competition. There is no objective evidence that Newfoundland Power is required to have 45 percent common equity to be an average risk Canadian utility. We were very struck in this hearing when our learned friend, Ms. Greene, Q.C. asked Ms. McShane to name a Canadian utility with a lower risk than Newfoundland Power. You will recall that there was an extended silence. The only one that she could come up with as Altalink, which she said would have a lower business risk, and that's been reflected in a lower common equity ratio by the Alberta Utilities Commission, but even then she qualified it by saying, I'm not sure when you look at it on an overall basis it's necessarily that much lower risk. It's pretty telling when the company's main capital witness couldn't think of a utility in Canada with lower risk than Newfoundland Power. Now finally, I would like to address something

evidence. Her evidence clearly displays that FEI is facing competitive pressures. They're facing provincial energy policies which are discouraging of the use of fossil fuels, and promoting the development and use of clean energy technologies and renewable resources. FEI is subject to a carbon tax on its natural gas. According to Ms. McShane in her own evidence, FEI's operating risk includes outages, gas leaks, severe weather, natural disasters, it operates in a remote and rugged terrain subject to damage from a variety of natural events, including avalanches, landslides, fires. So Newfoundland Power is not alone when it comes to challenging operating environments, and all the while Ms. McShane says that FEI's regulatory risk is increasing and it's increasingly involving regulatory lag and uncertainty that stems from the changing energy environment. McShane, however, would only concede that FEI

is of "somewhat higher fundamental business

risk than Newfoundland Power". She says she

would consider them relatively similar if you

consider the size issue. We do not accept the

Page 80 that I never addressed in my brief, but it was a contention of Ms. McShane that her recommendation for the fair ROE would increase by about 50 basis points if the common equity component was lowered by 5 percent. We would urge great caution here. In our respectful submission, the Board would only adjust the ROE if the Board found that Newfoundland Power is an average risk utility and their capital structure is more aggressive than the average. That is to say that if the average common equity for a firm like Newfoundland Power was 40 percent, and the Board gave Newfoundland Power 35 percent like Fortis uses, then you would adjust the ROE. However, in this case, we are simply moving an average risk utility to the average common equity ratio and recommending an average ROE. I would urge caution as well in Mr. Kelly's reference to Schedule 3 to Ms. McShane's Report of allowed ROEs. Those allowed ROEs include ROEs from companies that are like PNG and Nova Scotia Power, which Ms. McShane puts at being the highest risk in the country. We end this capital structure discussion by stating to you

| | Page 81 | - | Page 83 |
|----------------|---|----------------|---|
| 1 | that there's no objective evidence that | 1 | forward risk premium for Canadian utility. |
| 2 | Newfoundland Power requires 45 percent common | 2 | Recall as well that the DCF tests are not |
| 3 | equity to be an average risk Canadian utility. | 3 | backed up by substantiation. Consider whose |
| 4 | Dr. Booth's preference share proposal | 4 | recommendations for the fair ROE is actually |
| 5 | represents a balanced and reasonable approach | 5 | tethered to the real world. Consider the |
| 6 | to lowering Newfoundland Power's common equity | 6 | indications from TD Economics, Royal Bank of |
| 7 | ratio for rate making purposes. As regards | 7 | Canada. These institutions are independent. |
| 8 | the weight of expert cost of capital evidence, | 8 | We would urge you to reflect on whether it |
| 9 | we submit that the evidence of Dr. Booth is | 9 | truly constitutes good judgment to come before |
| 10 | entitled to the greatest weight before the | 10 | the Board, as the utility witnesses have done, |
| 11 | Board. His evidence is clearly more tied to | 11 | and tell you that what is at worst an average |
| 12 | the circumstances of the capital markets. | 12 | risk Canadian utility like Newfoundland Power |
| 13 | Neither Dr. Vander Weide or Mr. MacDonald | 13 | should be awarded 10.5 percent on its common |
| 14 | discussed in any substantive fashion the | 14 | equity. Consider what that would mean in the |
| 15 | capital markets. With Ms. McShane, there is | 15 | context of people who are saving for their own |
| 16 | nothing that directly ties in with her | 16 | retirements, or the returns that are being |
| 17 | estimates. To a great extent, her estimates | 17 | achieved in pension plans. Does that |
| 18 | are detached from the general capital market | 18 | constitute judgment constrained by facts? |
| 19 | discussion. Were she to more accurately | 19 | Seemingly, these witnesses wish for us to |
| 20 | incorporate her discussion of capital market | 20 | forget the outside world when we enter this |
| 21 | conditions into her testimony, it would lead | 21 | room, and park commonsense out by the door. |
| 22 | inevitably to a lowering of her fair ROE | 22 | And least it should be considered that Dr. |
| 23 | recommendation. Dr. Booth, in contrast, is | 23 | Booth, who would put the return between 7 and |
| 24 | the only witness that has substantively looked | 24 | 8 percent at 7.5 is a low ball estimator, |
| 25 | at the development of capital market | 25 | consider Dr. Booth's evidence that every |
| | Page 82 | 2 | Page 84 |
| 1 | conditions since 2008, both in terms of the | 1 | utility in Canada has got a market to book |
| 2 | credit risk adjustment he used, and his | 2 | ratio of about 1.4 to 1.8 percent, as he |
| 3 | recognition of the impact of the US operation | 3 | stated. It means, as he put it, that |
| 4 | "Twist". In assessing the weight to be given | 4 | investors are very, very happy with allowed |
| 5 | to the witnesses, we would urge that the Board | 5 | ROEs in Canada. We submit that Dr. Booth's |
| 6 | look at the actual details by which they | 6 | evidence is clearly the most deserving of the |
| 7 | arrive at their recommendations, not just the | 7 | weight to be given by the Board. In relation |
| 8 | recommendations alone. The DCF based equity | 8 | to the automatic adjustment formula, both the |
| 9 | risk premium test carried out by Ms. McShane | 9 | Board's staff witness, Mr. MacDonald, and Dr. |
| 10 | and Dr. Vander Weide, as we outlined in our | 10 | Booth, recommended a formula. The consumer |
| 11 | brief at page 26, showed dramatic decreases in | 11 | advocate supports the recommendation of Dr. |
| 12 | the DCF cost of equity from 2009 to 2012. In | 12 | Booth's automatic adjustment formula. Dr. |
| 13 | Ms. McShane's case, 180 basis point drop. Dr. | 13 | Booth's addition of a 50 percent adjustment |
| 14 | Vander Weide's case, 190 basis point drop | 14 | for credit spreads has been accepted by the |
| 15 | since this Board heard the evidence in the | 15 | Regie and the OEB. In this, he and Mr. |
| 16 | last Newfoundland Power GRA, and 320 basis | 16 | MacDonald are in agreement, as was Ms. McShane |
| 17 | points down from March, 2009, relative to | 17 | previously before the NEB, and the Regie. So |
| 18 | where they stood in June, 2012. We ask the | 18 | there is consensus on that point. This Board |
| 19 | Board not to permit new and inventive ways of | 19 | has a long history of using the formula and we |
| 1 | r | 1 | |
| 20 | carrying out the historic utility premium test | 20 | regard Dr. Booth's recommendation as regards |
| 20 21 | - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | 20 21 | regard Dr. Booth's recommendation as regards adjustment to changes in long Canada bond |
| 1 | carrying out the historic utility premium test | | |
| 21 | carrying out the historic utility premium test or inventiveness in relation to the financing | 21 | adjustment to changes in long Canada bond |
| 21 22 | carrying out the historic utility premium test or inventiveness in relation to the financing flow station costs to distract you from this | 21 22 | adjustment to changes in long Canada bond yields as reasonable, and in line with the |
| 21 22 23 | carrying out the historic utility premium test or inventiveness in relation to the financing flow station costs to distract you from this fact. Keep in mind as well that the historic | 21 22 23 | adjustment to changes in long Canada bond yields as reasonable, and in line with the Board's historical adjustment mechanism. Dr. |

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| 1 | McShane in the Regie case violated basic | 1 | of the legislation would be zero. We have |
| 2 | economic assumptions and was rejected by the | 2 | attempted and it's only an attempt, to make a |
| 3 | Regie, who adopted Dr. Booth's 75 percent | 3 | better forecast than assuming, as the company |
| 4 | change. Dr. Booth testified that the | 4 | did, that there would be absolutely no impact. |
| 5 | adjustment factor would provide consistency | 5 | We base that off the admitted fact that about |
| 6 | with prior decisions of the Board as interest | 6 | 60 percent of the plan is geared toward |
| 7 | rates revert to normal. The consumer advocate | 7 | generic drugs, and the evidence from Ms. Perry |
| 8 | recommends Dr. Booth's approach to deal with | 8 | indicated that Blue Cross provided that the |
| 9 | the current situation of exceptionally low | 9 | impact on at least certain drugs could be as |
| 10 | interest rates. Dr. Booth recommends a floor | 10 | high as 20 percent. So we put forward as a |
| 11 | for the long Canada bond yield forecast to be | 11 | more reasonable assumption, an assumption of a |
| 12 | set at 3.8 percent. This ensures that unless | 12 | 6 percent reduction in OPEB's expense rather |
| 13 | the long Canada bond yield substantially | 13 | than a zero percent impact, and the 6 percent |
| 14 | increases and moves back to normal range, | 14 | figure is arrived at by assuming « of the as |
| 15 | there is no change in the allowed ROE. As | 15 | high as 20 percent impact, so 10 percent, and |
| 16 | regards operating cost, the impact of new | 16 | assuming - and applying that savings to 60 |
| 17 | provincial regulations regarding generic | 17 | percent of the total expense, which is the |
| 18 | drugs, we deal with this, of course, in our | 18 | portion that relates that generic drugs. It's |
| 19 | brief at page 38 and 39. We submit that the | 19 | imperfect, perhaps imprecise, but better than |
| 20 | revenue requirement of Newfoundland Power | 20 | assuming no cost reduction, and obviously, as |
| 21 | should reflect some cost savings arising from | 21 | we point out, these regulations were designed |
| 22 | the passage of this legislation. Section 5 of | 22 | to benefit everyone who must pay for the |
| 23 | the legislation mandates that the price for a | 23 | generic drugs, and, therefore, the only way to |
| 24 | product listed in the formulary shall not | 24 | pass the benefit on through the rate payers in |
| 25 | exceed 40 percent of the brand price, and this | 25 | a timely manner is to adjust the OPEB's |
| | Page 86 | | Page |
| 1 | applies for the period from October 1st, 2012, | 1 | expense as included in rates for 2013 and |

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applies for the period from October 1st, 2012, to March 31st, 2013, but from April 1st, 2013 onward, the product shall not exceed percent of the brand price. The bottom line is that the savings or potential savings from the regulation are not reflected in the and 2014 test year, OPEB's expense. The company's actuary simply uses historical data to extrapolate forward for the purposes of accounting. So obviously an extrapolation of historical data could not reflect the downward impact of the legislated reduction in generic drug costs, and while the Mercer approach is standard for financial reporting purposes, it's not meant to be a forecast that would meet accepted standards for determining forecast for a test year that should be recovered in the customer's rates. So our proposition is that the forecast of costs that are included in the rates should reflect all known cost drivers that will result in higher, or in this case, what we believe to be lower rates than are derived by simply extrapolating past costs. We believe that that will be a fairer way to go than assuming that the impact

88 expense as included in rates for 2013 and 2014, and to the extent that it's a misestimate, the OPEBDA will ensure the actual cost will be ultimately passed on to customers. I turn now to the retirement allowances. Customers of Newfoundland Power have a right to expect that the management and operation of the company is carried out at the lowest possible cost consistent with the provision of safe, reliable service. Newfoundland Power, as a matter of course, offers costly retirement allowance benefits to new hires. In the case of a new unionized employee, that's a matter of a collective agreement that's presently in force. So that remains an extant obligation. However, there is no extant obligation to continue to offer retirement allowances to new hires who join the non-unionized ranks of Newfoundland Power. There's absolutely no doubt that Newfoundland Power is a well regarded, well sought after employer, as was clear through the crossexamination of Mr. Smith. Newfoundland Power receives multitudes of qualified applications from prospective employees whenever it issues

| Febru | nary 8, 2013 Mu | lti-Page ^T | NL Power Inc. 2013 GRA |
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| | Page 8 | | Page 91 |
| 1 | a public advertisement for a position at the | 1 | OPEBs expense. This is precisely what we want |
| 2 | company, but the fact is with the coming | 2 | to see in relation to these retirement |
| 3 | demographic changes in the workforce at | 3 | allowances. At this time, the consumer |
| 4 | Newfoundland Power, customers should not have | 4 | advocate submits that the revenue requirement |
| 5 | to bear the cost of retirement allowances for | 5 | for 2013 and 2014 should not include any |
| 6 | these new hires. This retirement allowance | 6 | recognition of future retirement benefit costs |
| 7 | entitles the new employee hired today to | 7 | in the form of retirement allowances for non- |
| 8 | receive approximately a half a year's salary | 8 | unionized employees who commence employment |
| 9 | when he or she retires in the future in the | 9 | with Newfoundland Power during the test years |
| 10 | normal course. That is an avoidable and | 10 | 2013 and 2014 or beyond. As regards executive |
| 11 | unnecessary expense, and I don't think that my | 11 | compensation and the short term incentive |
| 12 | learned friend would dispute the fact that | 12 | aspect of it, in a nutshell, what we're |
| 13 | there has been movement in that regard by the | 13 | submitting is that the revenue requirement for |
| 14 | Federal Government, the RCMP, and those | 14 | 2013 and 2014 should not include the portion |
| 15 | institutions. So what we say is that this is | 15 | of the short term incentive pay for executives |
| 16 | a avoidable and unnecessary expense, and this | 16 | or managers resulting from the achievement of |
| 17 | is the time to bring reform to the issue. As | 17 | targets relating to earnings. Achievement of |
| 18 | the evidence discloses, by 2017, employees | 18 | the 34 million or 35 million or 40 million |
| 19 | with less than 10 years of service will be | 19 | dollars in earnings which will get paid out to |
| 20 | making up approximately 45 percent of the | 20 | dividends to the shareholders of Newfoundland |
| 21 | workforce, and as we point out and provide | 21 | Power is clearly for the primary benefit of |
| 22 | specific examples of, there's a growing trend | 22 | shareholders, and not for the primary benefit |
| 23 | away from the payment of retirement | 23 | of rate payers, and we address this issue in |
| 24 | allowances. As you will note from the | 24 | detail in our brief. In our submission, short |
| 25 | materials filed, we talk about New Brunswick, | 25 | term incentive targets for things like |
| | Page 9 | 00 | Page 92 |
| 1 | we talk about the Federal Government. | 1 | reliability, customer satisfaction, injury |
| 2 (12 | 2:15 P.M.) | 2 | frequency rates, controllable operating costs |
| 3 | Now you may recall in the last GRA that there | 3 | for customers, these fall into a separate |
| 4 | was to'ing and fro'ing that we had to do with | 4 | category, as these are performance measures |
| 5 | Newfoundland Power over the fact that they | 5 | which, if achieved, provide direct benefits to |
| 6 | were providing free health care benefits to | 6 | the rate payers. We submit that the same does |
| 7 | retirees, something that Hydro and other | 7 | not hold true for an earnings target. We have |
| 8 | institutions were not doing. Newfoundland | 8 | provided in our brief references to the |
| 9 | Power did not want to introduce reforms, but | 9 | approach on this matter by other Canadian |
| 10 | eventually they did and the reforms were | 10 | regulatory boards. The Northwest Territory |
| 11 | rather modest because they made no changes to | 11 | Board, for instance, held in a 2007 decision |
| 12 | the plan for any existing retirees, and they | 12 | that the portion of the utilities at risk |
| 13 | made no changes for employees who retire or | 13 | compensation program that was based on net |
| 14 | who are eligible to retire before December | 14 | income targets should be borne by |
| 15 | 31st, 2012, but what they did do is bring in a | 15 | shareholders, not rate payers. We reference |
| 16 | 50 percent member pay cost sharing arrangement | 16 | as well the Ontario Distribution Rate Book |
| 17 | for retirees over the age of 65, not including | 17 | from 2006, which indicated and stated that |
| 18 | those groups I just mentioned who were | 18 | incentive payments related to benefits to |
| 19 | exempted. The company reports, and it's on | 19 | shareholders would not be recoverable in the |
| 20 | the record in CANP-504, that the cost savings | 20 | 2006 revenue requirement, and we provided as |
| 21 | of these amendments to Newfoundland Power's | 21 | well a decision concerning the EUP and it was |

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well a decision concerning the EUB and it was

then known in Alberta, which denied ATCO

variable pay plan which was focused on

financial returns. The Board held in the

Electric's inclusion of a portion of its

of these amendments to Newfoundland Power's

OPEBs plan are reflected in the decrease in

dollars, and they state that the decrease in

the accrued OPEB's obligation of 15.2 million

the OPEBs obligation serves to decrease future

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| | Page 93 | | Page 95 |
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| 1 | Alberta case that it was not appropriate to | 1 | resulted in the highest amount of energy |
| 2 | fund the portion of the variable pay plan that | 2 | savings of all the programs, is not being |
| 3 | had been set up for 15 senior employees | 3 | further intensified, now particularly that the |
| 4 | through rates where the benefit of the | 4 | new housing stock is being taken care of |
| 5 | variable pay plan primarily provided an | 5 | without the need for incentives because of the |
| 6 | increased return to the utility. We do not | 6 | building code requirements, and frankly, I |
| 7 | regard the present case involving Newfoundland | 7 | view this as problematic when we have 96 |
| 8 | Power's compensation targets being tied to | 8 | percent when we might as well say 100 percent |
| 9 | earnings, as truly being distinguishable from | 9 | of electricity customers indicating that their |
| 10 | the regulatory precedents that we put before | 10 | primary motivation for trying to cut back on |
| 11 | you. Accordingly, we would urge the Board to | 11 | electricity use is to save money, and the |
| 12 | not permit this portion of the STI for | 12 | significantly increased level of spending on |
| 13 | Newfoundland Power's executives or managers to | 13 | the small technologies portfolio, such as the |
| 14 | be included in revenue requirement for the | 14 | CFLs, the LED lighting, and the Energy Star |
| 15 | test years. In relation to the conservation | 15 | appliances will not do as much to benefit a |
| 16 | plan, we discussed the conservation plan at | 16 | heating customer in terms of a bill impact |
| 17 | pages 48 to 51 in our brief. We recognize | 17 | such as the insulation of a basement or an |
| 18 | that the new five year plan jointly prepared | 18 | attic would. So frankly, I'm submitting that |
| 19 | by Newfoundland Power and Hydro is a very | 19 | it will be necessary to examine how well the |
| 20 | recent document tabled only in this GRA | 20 | program portfolio is aligning with the view of |
| 21 | proceedings. Pursuant to those initiatives | 21 | those electricity customers who want to save |
| 22 | described in the plan, Newfoundland Power is | 22 | money by lowering their bills. So I question |
| 23 | forecasting increasing spending in the area | 23 | the insulation for that matter, the windows |
| 24 | over 2013 and 2014 over spending levels | 24 | piece for the existing housing stock, and I |
| 25 | previously. Our overall recommendation at | 25 | think the review should look at the benefits |
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| | Page 94 | | Page 96 |
| 1 | this stage is, I believe, a fairly practical | 1 | and costs that would arise from more |
| 1 2 | this stage is, I believe, a fairly practical one in the sense that we cannot really have a | | and costs that would arise from more aggressive targeting of that segment. In that |
| 1 | this stage is, I believe, a fairly practical one in the sense that we cannot really have a complete discussion about the merits and | 1 | and costs that would arise from more aggressive targeting of that segment. In that regard, I would submit that not only |
| 2 3 4 | this stage is, I believe, a fairly practical one in the sense that we cannot really have a complete discussion about the merits and shortfalls and criticisms, and areas of | 1 2 3 4 | and costs that would arise from more aggressive targeting of that segment. In that regard, I would submit that not only Newfoundland Power, but Newfoundland Hydro, |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | this stage is, I believe, a fairly practical one in the sense that we cannot really have a complete discussion about the merits and shortfalls and criticisms, and areas of improvement that may arise from this plan in the absence of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, where this is, after all, a joint plan. At this stage, I'm not prepared to be condemnatory, nor completely congratulatory because I think, frankly, it would be premature because I believe that the plan needs to be considered in a proper framework which allows for proper examination. I will state, however, that greater emphasis is being placed on energy conservation, and I acknowledge that the utilities report growing participation in the programs, and certainly, as I think we all know, the publicity around the Take Charge Program has been pretty widespread. On the downside, I am concerned that the programs which have been shown to be providing a very good bang for the buck in | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | and costs that would arise from more aggressive targeting of that segment. In that regard, I would submit that not only Newfoundland Power, but Newfoundland Hydro, should have actual targets in place in terms of the number of customers they're trying to reach with the respective offerings. At the present time there are no targets established at Newfoundland Power to reach any particular number of customers in relation to the programs that they offer. We submit that this should be part of the review of the recent five year plan. I would subscribe to the adage that "if you measure it, you will manage it". I refer as well to Mr. Adams testimony before the Board, in which he provided a detailed presentation and brought forward a series of recommendations. His conclusions included that the program is inappropriately funded and that the measures had no meaningful impact for electricity customers. He concluded that the plan does little to reduce |

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| | Page 9 | 7 | Page 99 |
| 1 | air sealing homes and through the use of | 1 | a precise or even close to precise pattern |
| 2 | ductless heat pumps was quite detailed. The | 2 | that would retain the appropriate relationship |
| 3 | technology which he described has been | 3 | developed for ELG annual vintage rates on an |
| 4 | available, according to Mr. Adams, for about | 4 | annual basis. So we submit that Mr. Wiedmayer |
| 5 | eight years in this province, and according to | 5 | has not effectively refuted that criticism |
| 6 | Mr. Adams has shown quite a level of success | 6 | that Mr. Pous has put forward as regards to |
| 7 | in studies in certain jurisdictions in the | 7 | time sensitivity issue. No one disputes that |
| 8 | United States, and he also, of course, | 8 | the reason we pay less in depreciation expense |
| 9 | described a pilot study which he was involved | 9 | today is because depreciation expense for |
| 10 | in in this jurisdiction, and though it was | 10 | Newfoundland Power has historically been |
| 11 | informal, it was still persuasive. It says to | 11 | higher since 1978 under ELG depreciation than |
| 12 | me that the potential for this technology to | 12 | it would be had ALG rates been used. |
| 13 | be incented on a cost effective basis should | 13 | Precisely because customers paid more in the |
| 14 | definitely be formally and professionally | 14 | past, we pay less today. Newfoundland Power |
| 15 | assessed. Therefore, what we are recommending | 15 | says 3.7 million dollars less in 2014, but, of |
| 16 | to the Board is that the Board initiate a | 16 | course, that's based on a 10.4 percent return |
| 17 | process, in consultation with both utilities | 17 | on common equity for 2014, but logically if |
| 18 | and the consumer advocate, that would allow an | 18 | you pay faster or you pay higher amounts in |
| 19 | appropriate review of the plan involving | 19 | earlier years, you're going to pay lower |
| 20 | interested parties and to allow an opportunity | 20 | amounts in later years. Mr. Wiedmayer himself |
| 21 | for input. Turning to depreciation, in our | 21 | acknowledged that under the ELG procedure, |
| 22 | brief we outlined that the precision of | 22 | depreciation accruals may be higher in earlier |
| 23 | estimates required with the ELG, and we point | 23 | periods and lower in later periods. Mr. Pous, |
| 24 | out the inability to predict the future in | 24 | for his part, states it's not a "may" |
| 25 | terms of retirements and it produces a greater | 25 | proposition, it's a "will be" higher in |
| | Page 9 | 8 | Page 100 |
| 1 | degree of error for ELG over ALG. Mr. Pous | 1 | earlier period situation. Mr. Wiedmayer |
| 2 | states that, "When the variance between future | 2 | referred to Mr. Pous' proposal to use ALG |
| 3 | estimates and actual future events happens, | 3 | depreciation rates as only resulting in a |
| 4 | and corrective action is taken, the ELG | 4 | narrow short term benefit, and he stated, "The |
| 5 | magnifies the degree of error that has to be | 5 | temptation to reduce depreciation expense in |
| 6 | corrected". Mr. Pous stated that this is | 6 | the short term must be weighed against the |
| 7 | significant, given that the utility industry | 7 | full impact of the proposal". He stated, |
| 8 | has historically lengthened the expected | 8 | "From the perspective of inter-generational |
| 9 | average service life of investments in the | 9 | equity, it's not a proper practice to provide |
| 10 | accounts. We submit that this position has | 10 | a short term benefit to current customers at |
| 11 | not truly been refuted on the record at this | 11 | the expense of all others". You will recall |
| 12 | proceeding. As regards time sensitivity, Mr. | 12 | the discussion with Mr. Wiedmayer about the |
| 13 | Pous testified quite clearly as to the real | 13 | short term nature of what he termed the |
| 14 | life reasons why the ELG calculation procedure | 14 | "benefit". We're not talking about a short |
| 15 | is more time sensitive than the ALG procedure, | 15 | term situation here. I think that's important |
| 16 | and in that regard, we would refer you in your | 16 | to consider. We are talking about taking more |
| 17 | deliberations to page 55 of our brief. We | 17 | than 11 to 15 years to reach the point where |
| 18 | submit respectfully that this position | 18 | customers would be paying the amount that Mr. |
| 19 | likewise has not been truly refuted by | 19 | Pous has stated that they should have been |
| 20 | Newfoundland Power or Mr. Wiedmayer. Mr. | 20 | paying all along. Mr. Wiedmayer says that |
| 21 | Wiedmayer attempts to address the time | 21 | this 11 to 15 year period was longer than what |
| 22 | sensitivity problem by saying that utility | 22 | he had originally thought. He said in his |
| 23 | property is constantly being added and | 23 | evidence, "Sometimes when I've done that |
| 24 | retired, but the plant additions and | 24 | calculation, the crossover occurs somewhere in |
| 125 | retirements, as Mr. Pous says, do not occur in | 25 | the seven year time frame", and that 11 to 15 |
| 25 | Tethements, as IVII. Fous says, do not occur in | 23 | the seven year time frame, and that 11 to 15 |

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| | | Page 101 | | Page 103 |
| 1 | year time frame only gets longer | if 1 | | enjoyed it once again before this Board, and I |
| 2 | Newfoundland Power is awarded less t | than 40. | | thank you very much for your attention to the |
| 3 | percent on its ROE, but already at 11 to | 15 3 | | submissions that I've made. |
| 4 | years we're talking out to 2024 to 2028 | | CHAIF | |
| 5 | advocate ALG not because we have succ | | Q. | Do you have any - |
| 6 | a temptation. We advocate ALG as the | method 6 | | Y, Q.C.: |
| 7 | by which the vast majority of custome | | | No, Mr. Chairman, that would be repetitive. |
| 8 | North America have their depreciation | | | I'd simply echo Mr. Johnson's comments at |
| 9 | determined, and a method that does not | - | | closing. We thank - |
| 10 | in a situation where depreciation accrua | | COMN | MISSIONER NEWMAN: |
| 11 | higher in earlier periods and lower in la | | | Excuse me, I do actually have a question. |
| 12 | periods, and a method, in our respec | | CHAIF | |
| 13 | submission, that is more aligned with | | | Oh, I'm sorry, I beg your pardon. |
| 14 | reality of how depreciation actually g | | | MISSIONER NEWMAN: |
| 15 | implemented in the utility industry, an | | | Mr. Johnson, I wanted to ask you to provide |
| 16 | rate cases. | 16 | | your position on Dr. Booth's suggestion that |
| | 30 P.M.) | 17 | | the Board could establish an ROE for |
| 18 | Now I fully appreciate the technical nat | | | Newfoundland Power of 8.25 percent for an |
| 19 | the depreciation debate, and as anyboo | | | indefinite period, more in relation to the |
| 20 | was here, and perhaps it can be said ha | • | | indefinite period and a certain ROE than it is |
| 21 | endure some of the discussion about | | | to the particular number of 8.25? |
| 22 | accounts, it's slow going stuff, and I'm | | MP I | OHNSON: |
| 23 | going to proceed to go through each of | | | Right. I think that position is borne more |
| 24 | accounts with you. I think you've suf | | | out of a finance point of view than it would |
| 25 | enough. I just want to leave with you | | | be borne out of a jurisdictional consideration |
| 23 | enough. I just want to leave with you | | | |
| 1. | | Page 102 | | Page 104 |
| 1 | couple of key observations as regards | | | that the Board may wish to weigh, and - |
| 2 | Board's determinations on these account | | | because there would be nothing to preclude, I |
| 3 | submit, first of all, that the Board shoul | | | think, a Board - or a utility from making an |
| 4 | give Newfoundland Power's depreciation | - | | application to come before the Board to have a |
| 5 | an automatic pass on the accounts beca | | | cost of equity determined, and for the Board |
| 6 | his relationship with Newfoundland Po | | | to act on the evidence that was brought before |
| 7 | the fact that he's met with the comp | • | | it. So I see where Dr. Booth was driving at, |
| 8 | personnel. We would urge you to look | | | but I don't think that is a proposal that |
| 9 | evidence on each of the accounts and to | | | in the context of the Public Utilities Act |
| 10 | it stands up to scrutiny. Where you find | | | that you could solidify a return for five |
| 11 | Pous is all wet, I'm sure you'll say w | | 967.5 | years and then lock it up without review. |
| 12 | he's all wet, but where Mr. Pous is say | - | | MISSIONER NEWMAN: |
| 13 | look, this is an account that was large | • | | Okay. |
| 14 | based upon an analysis of the actuarial | | | 3 P.M.) |
| 15 | we would suggest that you weigh the ar | - | CHAIF | |
| 16 | back and forth on the analysis in an e | | | I guess if there's nothing further then, we |
| 17 | manner. That's all I can really ask of y | | | are finito. Thank you all very much and we |
| 18 | and I'm not going to further go into | | | will have a decision. |
| 19 | particulars, and I have set out those gen | | (HEAI | RING CONCLUDED) |
| 20 | observations in my Brief. I guess to cor | | | |
| 21 | my comments, I'd like to acknowledge | | | |
| 22 | and the Board staff throughout the proc | - | | |
| 23 | acknowledge my friends at Newfoundla | | | |
| 24 | These cases are tough. I can say I'm ha see the back of it, but I've neverthele | | | |
| 25 | | | | |

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| | | Page 105 | | |
| 1 | CERTIFICATE | 0 | | |
| 2 | I, Judy Moss, do hereby that the foregoing is | | | |
| | true and correct transcript of a hearing in the | | | |
| | | D - 4 - | | |
| | natter of Newfoundland Power Inc.'s General | | | |
| | application heard on the 8th day of February, 20 | | | |
| | t the offices of the Board of Commissioners o | | | |
| | rublic Utilities, St. John's, Newfoundland and | | | |
| 8 L | abrador and was transcribed by me to the best | of | | |
| 9 m | ny ability by means of a sound apparatus. | | | |
| | Dated at St. John's, NL this | | | |
| | 2th day of February, 2013 | | | |
| | udy Moss | | | |
| | Discoveries Unlimited Inc. | | | |
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