

1 **Q. Vander Weide Evidence (page 39) – For his CAPM analysis, Dr. Vander Weide**
2 **refers to an Ibbotson SBBI 6.6 percent risk premium on the market portfolio, which**
3 **is stated to be measured from the difference between the return on the S&P 500 and**
4 **the income on 20 year treasury bonds. Why would the risk premium derived from**
5 **the general group of firms in the S&P 500 (6.6%) be less than the required equity**
6 **risk premium on an equity investment in much safer utility stocks as derived by Dr.**
7 **Vander Weide’s Ex Post Premium Method – 6.7% (p. 35) and his Ex Ante Risk**
8 **Premium Estimate – 7.7% for his electric utility group (p. 38) and 8.1% for his**
9 **natural gas group?**

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11 **A.** With regard to the comparison of the 6.6 percent ex post risk premium result for the S&P
12 500 and the 6.7 percent average ex post risk premium result for the two Canadian utility
13 groups, there is no way to tell why the results differ. The results simply reflect the
14 average actual ex post risk premiums experienced by investors in these groups over the
15 three different time periods. The data presented in Dr. Vander Weide’s written evidence
16 comparing the ex post risk premiums on the Canadian utilities to the ex post risk
17 premium on the S&P/TSX Composite over the 1956 – 2011 and 1983 – 2011 time
18 periods is not affected by a mismatch of data periods, and hence, may be more
19 predicative of expected future returns. Dr. Vander Weide’s evidence that Canadian
20 utilities investors have earned more than investors in S&P/TSX Composite over these
21 two periods is consistent with at least three hypotheses: (1) Canadian utilities are more
22 risky than the Consumer Advocate suggests in this interrogatory; (2) the CAPM does not
23 explain the returns that have been generated in the Canadian market place; and (3) the
24 S&P/TSX Composite is a poor surrogate for the market index of all risky Canadian
25 securities. Each of these explanations support the conclusion that Newfoundland Power’s
26 current allowed ROE is considerably less than its required ROE.

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28 With regard to the comparison of the 6.6 percent ex post result for the S&P 500 and the
29 two ex ante risk premiums for U.S. utilities, it is also not possible to tell why the forward
30 looking risk premiums for utilities are greater than the ex post returns on the U.S. market
31 index. Because there is no way to tell whether the ex post results understate the “true”
32 required risk premium or the ex ante results overstate the “true” required risk premium,
33 Dr. Vander Weide believes that the Board should consider both the ex post and the ex
34 ante evidence presented in his written evidence.