

1 **Q. Newfoundland Power is seeking approval to replace its Customer Service System**  
2 **commencing in 2021 with project deployment scheduled for the third quarter of**  
3 **2023. In Ernst & Young’s opinion what are the risks and costs, if any, associated**  
4 **with a one-year delay, a two-year delay and a five-year delay in project**  
5 **commencement and how do the risks change over that time period?**  
6

7 A. EY has provided an assessment of risks in its 2018 Technical Risk Assessment report  
8 which were re-iterated in the 2020 Planning and Assessment report. These risks include:  
9 Vendor Market Share, Vendor Health, Newfoundland Power’s Support, Reliability and  
10 Security, and Business Enabling.  
11

12 It is difficult to accurately predict the realization of risks and related costs over any  
13 deferral period, whether it be one-, two-, or five-years due to the considerable number of  
14 scenarios that could occur. Each would bring with it a different set of factors that would  
15 influence the replacement project cost.  
16

17 In addition, each commencement delay scenario suggested in this RFI requires the  
18 addition of the 3-year procurement and implementation timeframe to capture the full  
19 period of CSS risk exposure. This would make it 4, 5 and 8 years respectively for each  
20 respective deferral scenario before the CSS could be decommissioned with a new CIS  
21 solution in place.  
22

23 As we noted in our response to PUB-NP-022, observed data indicates increasing risk for  
24 the majority of risk categories since we published our report in June 2018, and all five  
25 will likely increase over the next five to ten years.  
26

27 In EY’s opinion, the noted risks and costs of deferring the project increase each year. If  
28 the project were delayed for one year, we believe that both risks associated with vendor  
29 and Newfoundland Power’s ability to adequately support the project would likely  
30 continue to increase. These would likely increase further if the project were delayed two  
31 years. With respect to vendor risks, the trend of declining number of utilities operating  
32 CSS foundational technologies is continuing, along with the corresponding decline in  
33 vendor market share, support and investment. Concurrently, Newfoundland Power’s CSS  
34 support capacity is forecasted to decline from 12 to 10 individuals in 2021, to nine by  
35 2024 and eight by 2025. With a deferral of one- or -two years, these forecasted support  
36 capacity reductions in 2024 and 2025 would be encountered during the CIS replacement  
37 project, increasing the risk to ongoing CSS support and to the CIS replacement project.  
38 Reference PUB-NP-022 for additional information and discussion related to risk  
39 trending.  
40

41 If the project were delayed five years, EY believes all five risks would increase, with  
42 those associated with the vendors of the underlying CSS technologies and Newfoundland  
43 Power’s support capability becoming more difficult to mitigate due to an increased  
44 likelihood of materializing. Reference PUB-NP-022 for additional information and  
45 discussion related to risk trending. The responses provided for each of the five risks over  
46 a 5 to 10-year outlook in PUB-NP-022 are valid for the discussion of risk related to a

1 five-year delay. As noted above, it is very difficult to predict costs over any deferral  
2 period. Based on our experience and the data observed (as referenced below), the  
3 following are potential costs of deferral:

- 4  
5 1. Costs related to additional enhancements of CSS during interim period, whether  
6 planned and unplanned – Newfoundland Power indicated that a significant  
7 enhancement is made to CSS each 2.5 years and that enhancing the system has  
8 become generally too costly and complex to implement.<sup>1</sup> Required enhancements  
9 could be costly depending upon their nature.
- 10  
11 2. Infrastructure upgrades – Newfoundland Power estimates a cost of \$1.6 million to  
12 upgrade CSS to the last line of integrity servers.<sup>2</sup>
- 13  
14 3. System interruption costs, should they occur – System issues and related  
15 fix/recovery efforts, e.g., labor (internal and external), equipment and parts for  
16 replacement, additional customer service costs, etc.
- 17  
18 4. Additional planning and assessment activities – While certain components of the  
19 existing Planning and Assessment exercise could be leveraged, other portions  
20 would have to be re-evaluated and re-planned. The amount of required re-work  
21 would increase as the length of the deferral period increases. For example, it  
22 would be reasonable to estimate that 50% of the Planning and Assessment costs  
23 would need to be incurred again if the project was deferred 5 years. 50% of \$1.2  
24 million = \$600 thousand.<sup>3</sup> For instance, while the template and methodology  
25 could be re-used, much of the assessment would require significant updates  
26 including: review and document as-is and to-be processes, update requirements,  
27 and re-evaluate the interfaces to edge-systems.
- 28  
29 5. Inefficiencies of replacement project execution – Inefficiencies could be incurred  
30 due to the forecasted decrease in Newfoundland Power’s CSS support capacity.  
31 Staffing for CIS projects tends to be roughly equal between the system integrator  
32 (SI) and the utility for CIS projects. When the utility cannot provide the  
33 requested roles or skills, that gap is typically filled by outside contractors or the  
34 SI. However, those contractors or personnel the SI provides are rarely as  
35 knowledgeable about the internal systems, data, and processes as the utilities’  
36 own personnel, so it’s not an efficient like-for-like exchange. Not only does the  
37 contractor or SI typically cost more, but they also know less, which adds  
38 additional risk and cost to the project.
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<sup>1</sup> Source: PUB-NP-014.

<sup>2</sup> Source: PUB-NP-014.

<sup>3</sup> Source: PUB-NP-014.

- 1           6.       Unknown costs – Should an initiation of a replacement program be event-driven
- 2                           (i.e., critical issues/ failure), the cost of a hastily mobilized replacement program
- 3                           would likely be substantially more than a properly planned replacement program.
- 4                           Support staff would be tasked with dealing with legacy system issues, managing
- 5                           ongoing service quality, and concurrently expediting the commencement of a
- 6                           replacement without all planning measures having been conducted. If a scenario
- 7                           such as this were to occur, there would be a substantial increase in risk and cost.