

1 Q. In Concentric’s article of May 1, 2015, “Authorized Return on Equity for Canadian  
2 and U.S. Gas and Electric Utilities” (reproduced at CA-NP-157, Attachment C, p. 1  
3 of 4), it is stated:  
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5 “While authorized ROEs have converged between the two countries,  
6 the authorized common equity ratios have not. In 2014, the median  
7 common equity rates for Canadian gas distributors was 39.3% while  
8 the U.S. median was 51.9%, comparable to the differences for electric  
9 distributors which was 40% and 50.1% respectively. Allowed equity  
10 ratios for Canadian electric transmission companies are 4.0% lower  
11 than their electric distribution counterparts, and 14.0% below U.S.  
12 electric distributors.”  
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14 To what does Mr. Coyne attribute the significantly higher allowed equity ratios in  
15 the U.S.?  
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17 A. In Mr. Coyne’s opinion, an important difference with respect to U.S. and Canadian  
18 regulation that is often overlooked is how capital structure is set for purposes of  
19 establishing rates. Utilities in the U.S. are generally given more discretion to set their  
20 own capital structures within reasonable boundaries, i.e. they often are allowed to use  
21 their actual capital structure for ratemaking purposes as long as reasonably within bounds  
22 of their peer group. By contrast, in Canada, equity ratios are generally deemed by the  
23 regulator. No prudent manager, acting autonomously, would set a company’s capital  
24 structure such that the company is on the cusp of a credit downgrade, at least not without  
25 assurance of regulatory protection. In that vein, it seems reasonable for the ratings  
26 agencies to expect the regulator, in deference to the regulatory compact, to provide credit  
27 support for utilities if the regulators’ capital structure decisions put the utilities in  
28 imminent danger of a ratings downgrade. Mr. Coyne believes the weaker financial  
29 structure of the Canadian utilities does increase their financial risk, but the expectation on  
30 the part of the ratings agencies that regulators will step in should the deemed equity ratio  
31 prove too weak to maintain favorable credit ratings, affords some leeway to the Canadian  
32 utilities.