| 1 | Q. | Refe | rring to page 50, lines 15-28: Please explain the merit of using analysts' |
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| 2 | | forec | casts in view Wall Street's loss of credibility (page 34, line 1). Would it |
| 3 | | be a | ppropriate to discount analysts' forecasts in this analysis if investors now |
| 4 | | disco | ount these forecasts in forming their expectations? Please explain. |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | Α. | Ms. McShane believes that there is merit in using analysts' forecasts for | |
| 8 | | utiliti | es for the reasons given at page 51, lines 1-15. Ms. McShane does not |
| 9 | | belie | ve that the forecasts should be discounted, and notes the following: |
| 10 | | | |
| 11 | | (1) | Ms. McShane relies on growth forecasts for relatively pure-play |
| 12 | | | utilities, which operate in mature industries. The reasonableness of |
| 13 | | | the long-term growth forecasts can be assessed against the long-term |
| 14 | | | growth potential of the economy, to which, it is widely accepted, |
| 15 | | | earnings growth rates across industries should converge. The growth |
| 16 | | | forecasts for utilities are generally within the range of the longer-term |
| 17 | | | nominal growth forecasts for the economy. |
| 18 | | | |
| 19 | | (2) | The "optimistic bias" of analysts generally has been attributed to an |
| 20 | | | incentive to attract the investment banking business of the affected |
| 21 | | | companies. The same cannot be said of Value Line analysts, who |
| 22 | | | provide widely accessible independent research. The analysts' |
| 23 | | | consensus forecast earnings growth rates for the utilities utilized by |
| 24 | | | Ms. McShane have not been shown to be systematically higher than |
| 25 | | | the corresponding Value Line growth rates. |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | (3) | Further, given the recent Wall Street experience, it may be expected |
| 28 | | | that analysts are likely not only to be more vigilant in their supporting |

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| 1 | research, but also to be conservative in their forecasts on a go- |
| 2 | forward basis. Conservatism is also more likely to characterize the |
| 3 | forecasts of the companies themselves (which are inputs to the |
| 4 | analysts' forecasts and recommendations). |
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