October 17, 2001

G. Cheryl Blundon Board Secretary Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities Suite E210, Prince Charles Building 120 Torbay Road P.O. Box 21040 St. John's, NF A1A 5B2

Dear Ms. Blundon:

Re: Newfoundland & Labrador Hydro's 2001 General Rate Application

Attached please find an original plus seventeen (17) copies of documentation to be filed in response to an undertaking to provide information on the Incentive Plan found in the transcript of October 5th, p. 35, lines 78-94.

Yours truly,

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro

Maureen P. Greene, Q.C. Vice-President & General Counsel

MPG/jc

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INCENTIVE PLAN 1 2 3 INTRODUCTION 4 During 2000, the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of 5 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro considered the introduction of a performance 6 based incentive plan for members of the Executive and Senior Management. 7 Hay Management Consultants, a human resources consulting group, was 8 retained to assist with the development of an incentive plan similar in concept to 9 those in place at other Atlantic Canadian electric utilities. In December 2000, 10 the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, 11 approved the implementation in 2001 of a pilot project for the five members of the 12 Executive and twelve Directors (heads of departments). The plan is composed 13 of both corporate performance objectives and individual or departmental 14 performance objectives. 15 16 COST AND REGULATORY TREATMENT 17 The total 2001 compensation for the seventeen Hydro employees participating in 18 the incentive plan is approximately \$1.9 million. Based on the target payout of 19 the plan, which is 6% of salary, the total payment under the plan would be \$114,000. There is also an opportunity to earn more than the target, if higher 20 21 than the targeted performance is achieved. The cap for this "opportunity" is 9%, 22 so that the maximum possible payout is \$171,000, if all the employees 23 participating in the plan achieve higher than targeted outcomes in all areas. 24 25 As noted above, the Board of Directors approved the implementation of the 26 incentive plan as a pilot project in 2001. Depending on the experience with this 27 type of plan, it may be modified or extended to other members of management in 28 future years. As it is a pilot only, the cost of the incentive plan is not included as 29 a regulated expense in the 2002 cost of service.

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2001 CORPORATE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

- 3 Four areas of responsibility were selected for the corporate performance
- 4 objectives or targets for the 2001 pilot: financial performance; improved system
- 5 reliability; safety; and strategic planning. Expected outcomes and standards of
- 6 performance were established for each of the selected objectives. If
- 7 performance is achieved as targeted in each of these areas on a corporate basis,
- 8 then the employees participating in the incentive plan will receive a payment
- 9 based on the level of achievement of each objective.

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The following standards were established for each of the four corporate areas of responsibility chosen for overall corporate performance in 2001:

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 Financial Performance – The target established was achievement of a certain level of net income on regulated activities i.e. the interest cover forecast of 1.16 on a corporate regulated basis.

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2. System Reliability – The measure chosen to determine the improvement in system reliability was based on an improvement in the overall corporate reliability statistics as determined by CEA benchmarks: SAIDI (the average duration of interruptions per delivery point), and SAIFI (the average number of interruptions per delivery point). As well, the number of underfrequency trips was selected a measure of performance.

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On SAIDI, the target selected of 91.16 for 2001 is the actual performance for 1999, one of the better years in comparison to the average of the last five years. The threshold of 112.13 is based upon 90% of Hydro's average over the last five years, while the opportunity of 68.85 is a targeted improvement of 25% over 1999 performance. The number of underfrequency trips target of 10 relates to the total target for 2000 of ten

1 (including the number of 8 affecting Newfoundland Power as agreed with 2 Newfoundland Power) and the threshold of 12 relates to the average over 3 the past five years for Hydro. On SAIFI the target of 2.32 is tied to Hydro's 4 performance in 1999, the threshold of 3.20 is 90% of the 5 year average 5 and the opportunity is 1.79, a 25% improvement over 1999. 6 7 3. Safety - The performance standard for this corporate objective for 2001 8 is the implementation of the revised safety plan. A number of elements (8) 9 have been assigned for complete implementation in this year on an overall 10 corporate basis. 11 12 4. Strategic Planning - The standard for this objective is the successful 13 rollout of this process to all employees. 14 15 Where possible, objective targets were established and objective 16 measures of performance for the targets were determined. In certain 17 cases (e.g. strategic planning process) this was not possible and some 18 element of judgment will be required in evaluating performance. 19 20 The percentage of an individual's performance payment associated with 21 corporate performance is 60% for Vice-Presidents and 40% for Directors. 22 Thus, for example, 40% of the total incentive payment that a Director 23 would receive would be based on corporate performance. Also, a 24 weighting was assigned to each of the four corporate objectives for 2001. 25 Financial performance and system reliability were each assigned a

weighting of 30% of the overall corporate area, while the safety and

strategic planning objectives were assigned a weighting of 20% each.

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2001 DIVISIONAL OR DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Divisional or departmental performance areas were also selected for 2001 for each of the participants in the incentive plan and standards of performance were identified for these areas. The weighting for the departmental or divisional areas of responsibility is 60% for the Directors and 40% for the Vice-Presidents. The areas of responsibility selected for evaluation relate to the principal areas of responsibility of each division or department and their support of the overall corporate strategic objectives for the year. Thus, each employee will have some unique targets, while certain common ones were also assigned. For example, each employee participating in the plan was assigned the target to control his/her controllable operating expenses. If the operating expenses for the department are within the budget, the objective is met. If controllable operating expenses come in less than the approved budget for the year, by at least 5%, then the employee is eligible to receive a higher payment. No payment will be made if operating expenses for the department exceed the approved budget.

EVALUATION AND PAYMENT

At the end of 2001, the individual employee's performance in relation to the set objectives as well as the Corporation's performance, will be reviewed by the President and Chief Executive Officer and the Board of Directors. The actual incentive payment for each of the individuals will depend on how the Corporation has performed with respect to the corporate targets, as well as how the individual has performed in achieving the objectives set for his/her department or division for the year.

Each participant in the incentive plan for 2001 has a performance contract which sets the objectives, the measures of performance and the payouts for achieving different levels of performance. Attached is a sample performance

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contract which indicates for a Director how the performance payment is determined. For example, the chart attached for an operating Director would indicate that with a base salary of \$95,000 the target bonus maximum payment would be 6% or \$5,700 provided that the agreed upon standards had been met for the corporate objectives (40% of the incentive payment) and the departmental or personal objectives (60%) had been met. Thus, for example, if the overall target for corporate financial performance were achieved, this Director would receive 6%, being the target amount for this achievement, times the weighting assigned for this financial performance measure of 30%, times the weighting assigned for the corporate area of 40% for a payment for corporate financial performance of \$684. Similarly, with respect to the departmental objectives, if the system reliability improvement targets were met by the department, the payment would be 6% times the salary times the weighting of 25% assigned to this in the departmental area. times 60% being the departmental objectives weighting, for a payment for this particular measure of \$855. If all the targets are met for both the corporate and departmental objectives, the payment would be \$5,700. If all targets are exceeded and the higher standards are met then the maximum payout would be \$8,555 based on this particular performance contract.

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NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR HYDRO

SAMPLE PERFORMANCE CONTRACT

INCUMBENT INFORMATION:

Incumbent Approval:		
	Name	Date
Supervisor:		
•	Name	Date

Period:	January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2001
Position:	Operations Director
Incumbent:	
Salary:	\$95,000

	l				J	Performance Levels and Payments								
		Major Areas of	Indication of			Threshold % 3.00			Target % 6.00			Opportunity % 9.00		
Performance Area	Weight %	Responsibility	Successful Performance	Weight %	Measure	Performance Level	Payment \$	Salary %	Performance Level	Payment \$	Salary %	Performance Level	Payment \$	Salary %
		Financial Performance	Net Income - Regulated	30%	Interest Cover – Excluding Recall	1.10	342.00	0.36	1.16	684.00	0.72	1.21	1026.00	1.08
		System Reliability	Improvement	10%	No. of Underfrequency Trips	12	114.00 114.00 114.00	0.12 0.12 0.12	10	228.00 228.00 228.00	0.24 0.24 0.24	8	342.00 342.00 342.00	0.36 0.36 0.36
CORPORATE	40.00			10%	SAIDI ¹	112.13			91.16			68.85		
				10%	SAIFI ²	3.20			2.32			1.79		
		Safety	Implement new safety plan	20%	No. of segments completed by Dec 31.	6	228.00	0.24	8	456.00	0.48	10	684.00	0.72
		Planning	Strategic Planning process	20%	CEO Judgment	Satisfactory	228.00	0.24	Good	456.00	0.48	Very Good	684.00	0.72
		Safety	Implementation	25%	Segments Completed	6	427.50	0.45	8	855.00	0.9	10	1282.50	1.35
	60.00	Management	Controllable expenses	15%	% of Operating Budget		0	0	Budget	513.00 342.00	0.54 0.36	-5%	769.50 513.00	0.81 0.54
DEPARTMENT				10%	% of Capital Budget				Budget			-5%		
		System Reliability	Improvement	25%	Develop significant economic performance improvements	3	427.50	0.45	4	855.00	0.9	5	1282.50	1.35
		Environment	Implement ISO 14001	25%	Develop key objectives and program	January 31	427.50	0.45	December 31	855.00	0.9	November 30	1282.50	1.35
TOTALS	100.00						2422.50	2.55		5700.00	6		8550.00	9

NOTE: ¹ Duration of Interruptions/Delivery Point ² Average number of Interruptions/Delivery Point